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Abstract
Different kinds of collectives help to coordinate between individuals and social
groups to solve distribution problems, supply goods and services, and enable individuals
to live fulfilling lives. Collectives, as part of the process of socialization, contribute to the
normalization of behaviors, and consequently, structure our ability to be self-reflective
autonomous agents. Contemporary philosophy of action models characterize collective
action as the product of individuals who have the proper motivations to perform
cooperative activities (bottom-up); or they begin with the social-level phenomena and
explain this in terms of individual actions and the mental states that motivate them (topdown). One general goal of this project is to show how and why both of these approaches
through focusing solely on the individuals involved fail to capture and account for
important types of group actions: those of economic group agents.
Group agents, one kind of organized collective, are unique in that they have the
potential to develop group-level decision-making processes that result in the capacity of
the group to engage in practical reasoning. Because of this capacity, group agents can be
stable and respond to reason—capacities we would not expect from other kinds of
collectives. Inasmuch as we value the possibility of influencing the reflexive dynamics
that perpetuate social institutions, understanding the range of organization structures and
their agential capacities will open up the possibility of altering the course of those
dynamics toward more just systems of organization. Understanding what kinds of group
agents currently operate within the systems of organizations that make up social
iv

institutions is the first step in determining how to move toward developing group agents
that are also moral agents. By analyzing how different systems of constraint—inside and
outside the firm—inform one another to influence the possibility of design and the
group’s possibilities for action, I use Christian List and Philip Pettit’s account of group
agency as a springboard to develop a more adequate account of how structure influences
and constrains the possibilities of economic group agents in non-idealized circumstances
(i.e. this world, with our history).
My chapters include 1) a taxonomy of organization structures and an analysis of
how a narrow conception of organization structure in jurisprudence can lead to systems
of constraint that limit the rights and freedoms of individuals even as it seeks to extend
them, 2) an evaluation of the popular accounts of collective action (cf. Raimo Tuomela,
1997; Michael Bratman, 1993, 1997, 2009; and Christian List and Philip Pettit, 2011) that
could be made to accommodate the actions of certain kinds of economic associations, 3)
an exploration of the standards of evaluation that influence these powerful group agents,
and how these standards limit the economic group agent’s capacity to engage in moral
reasoning, and 4) an analysis of the group agent’s reasoning capacity and the internal
mode of interaction between group agent and group members that perpetuate group
agency.
I argue that we can understand group agents that have the capacity to be moral
agents as the products of a particular kind of decision-making process within an
organization’s structure. The decision-making process, together with the organization
structure and group member support, produces and sustains judgments and actions at the
level of the group that cannot be reduced to the beliefs and actions of particular members.
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In this way, the group displays a systematic unity of actions based on its own judgments.
That is, the group exhibits agency. Moral group agents exhibit more than practical
reasoning; they also demonstrate the capacity for critical reflection upon the ends they
pursue. Member buy-in promotes a tight connection between group members and their
role in bringing about and sustaining group agency, and is the foundation of the group
agent. Without a holistic organization structure, a member’s personal identities could
undermine group aims, thereby undermining group agency. Group moral agency, I argue,
begins with promoting an organizational way of life conducive to collective flourishing
and respect for members.
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Introduction
Even those who aim to change the world had better first learn how to describe it.
–Brian Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract
Collectives and groups rely upon the actions of human persons to sustain their
existence, but to what extent does the agency of the group depend upon the persons
themselves? That is to say, to what extent can groups of persons be said to cause change
in the world through actions that cannot be descriptively reduced to the actions of the set
of members? How we understand collectives to act, and likewise how we understand
their possibilities for action, is intimately connected to two related yet divergent sets of
principles. On the one hand, our concept of collective action itself is dependent upon the
metaphysical ideas underlying how we conceptualize groups, their capacity for reasoning,
and their possibility to form intentions as reasons for actions. On the other hand, our
understanding of collective action undergirds how the law treats collective behavior, how
we think about individual and collective responsibility, and how models in disciplines
such as economics, political science, and management theory explain present collective
behavior and predict future collective behavior.
Historically, these two sides of the discussion have been distinguished by their
focus and aim. Philosophical or theoretical accounts of group agency seeking to explain
the function of groups at their most foundational level address both ontic and ontological
concerns prior to moving onto practical or applied considerations. Social science
accounts of group agency focus primarily on explaining how groups cause change in the
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world, frequently decoupling the empirical ‘facts’ used as the basis for modeling
predictions from the ontologically rich concepts that underlie the facts, and how these
groups show up to us in the first place. Given the interrelations between these two sets of
principles, it is my aim in this project to bring them into conversation.
A satisfactory model of group behavior should describe and predict group actions
at the more abstract level of systems, not just from the perspective of some particular
components (i.e. the individual persons in it). Likewise, a satisfactory metaphysical
account of group agency should have the potential for practical import and should be
considered the proper grounding for models that seek to measure, predict, and explain
group actions. Eliminativist models, of the kind the social sciences historically use to
predict collective action as if it were the result of only the actions of the members,1
smuggle in a particular concept of agent and of group reasoning and behavior, one that
assumes an individualism about the basis for group actions.
Individualism as an explanation of social behavior, while predating sociology as
an independent discipline, is attributed to Max Weber for its development and
popularization within the social sciences. In Economy and Society, Weber states that
“action in the sense of subjectively understandable orientation of behavior exists only as
the behavior of one or more individual human beings” (p. 13).2 As he explains it, “for the
subjective interpretation of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated
as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual

1

Different models consider different persons to be the active agents. In firm theory, for example, some
models consider stockholders to be the active agents that influence the board of directors and managers,
while other models consider the managers, and to lesser extent the employees, to be autonomous active
agents that function only for their own self-interest. For a more recent discussion of this assumption see
Jensen, 2000, pp. 4-6.
2
Use of Italics within quotations are original emphasis, not my own.
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persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively
understandable action” (13). This individualism about actions also entails an internalism
about the processes underlying the decisions that ground actions we track in the world.
In the social sciences, models of group behavior of particular kinds, such as
economic or market group behavior, combine individualism about actions with an
internalist account of motivation (rational choice theory and behaviorist economics, to
name a few) as the basis for explaining and predicting future group behavior. This school
of thought goes beyond merely analytic individualism, where statements about a group
can be analyzed in terms of statements about individuals in the group, to ontological
individualism (reductionism), which denies the possibility that groups possess a reality
over and above the members. Talking about groups as the proper locus of agency and
responsibility, Economic theorists argue, is simply a façon de parler (Coase R., 1937;
Friedman, 1970; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Velasquez, 1983; Jensen, 2000). What we
really mean is that individuals in groups are the loci of agency and responsibility. Such a
view is captured by Velasquez:
It may thus appear that when a corporate member acts the corporation may be said
to have performed the act of the member, much as when a person’s bodily limb
moves the person is said to have moved his limb. But this similarity is deceptive,
because a group, unlike a body, is made up of autonomous individuals. The
individuals who make up the organization are autonomous in the sense that each
individual can choose not to carry out the direct bodily movements necessary to
bring about the corporate act. And this autonomy is due to the fact that the body
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of each member is under the direct control not of the corporation but of the
individual member. (1983, p. 7)
Similarly, Jensen and Meckling argue that “the ‘behavior’ of the firm is like the behavior
of the market…we seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as
an individual, but we often err by thinking about organizations as if they were persons
with motivations and intentions” (1976, p. 311). What this ontological individualism
entails, when used as the starting point for social science models, are explanations and
predictions about group actions of a behaviorist or methodological individualist form.3
While these explanations may appear to be adequate, the limit of their explanatory force
makes them quite problematic.
Part of the appeal of such explanations is that they avoid the perceived messiness
of non-empirical metaphysics; thus, divorcing philosophy from these models is seen as a
necessary step toward a more scientific (naturalistic) methodology. These explanations
deliver an empty concept of group agency and in doing so they do not avoid the
messiness of metaphysics. By ignoring the metaphysics, these traditions also ignore the
richness of the phenomena under observation, and reduce their explanatory scope. I take
it that the social science models, particularly those in the neoclassical economic tradition,
do not divorce, but rather cover over the philosophical concepts grounding their theories.
By bringing these concepts back into the forefront of the conversation, we can open a
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To distinguish between these two, one could say that behaviorism believes that the best way to account
for group behaviors is through appeal to an account of the behaviors of persons. By way of analogy, David
Copp (1984) explains that such theories refer to the behaviors of persons in much the same way chemistry
is to be explained by the laws of physics (p. 251). Predictive models that take this up are rational choice
theory and behavioral economics. Methodological individualism weakens this position and holds that the
best way to construct explanations of collective phenomena is through appealing to the psychological states
of individuals. Two traditional schools of economics, which developed their models off methodological
individualist foundations, are governance economics and the Chicago School theorists, such as Frank
Knight, Ronald Coase, and Milton Friedman.
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new conceptual space within which to examine the interplay between different variables
inside and external to organizations. From this analysis, we will be better situated to
develop models for explaining and predicting different kinds of group actions,
determining how to hold such group agents responsible, and understanding what it means
that we are the parts making up these kinds of groups (i.e. the role of personal identity in
a group agent).
In a move similar to the social sciences, a popular vein in philosophy of action
subscribes to individualism about group actions, where explanations of group agency are
made by way of referencing the mental states of the members. These kinds of
mereological descriptions conduct explanations of group action beginning with either the
parts or the whole. That is, by explaining how the individuals have the proper motivations
to join together to form groups that act cooperatively toward common ends (bottom-up)
or by explaining the social level phenomena in terms of individual actions and the mental
states that motivate them (top-down). One general goal of this project is to show how and
why these approaches through focusing solely on the individuals involved fail to capture
and account for important types of group actions. The project’s title, “Structure and
Agency: An Analysis of the Impact of Structure on Group Agents” alludes to Michael
Bratman's most recent work Structures of Agency (2007) and the sub-title highlights what
I see to be missing from the popular accounts of group agency (the impact of structure).
In the first chapter, I develop a taxonomy of organization structures and use this
classificatory system to examine the relation between our representations about group
agency and the juridical conception of corporate personhood. I begin by explaining
agency more generally and detailing how different agential capacities (e.g., to be self-
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representing; to have the ability to make judgments, engage in practical reasoning, and
make promises) relate to attributions of accountability and responsibility. One aim of
Chapter 1 is to show how Constitutional law and corporate law present two conflicting
views of corporate agency, as is evident in the recent Supreme Court case of Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission (2010). I argue that the Court’s basis for
attributing political speech to economic associations is undermined by the misperception
that economic associations function democratically. By scrutinizing the justifications
offered in the ruling decision of the Citizens case, I argue that such misperceptions are
not only ontologically problematic, but also result in worrisome practical consequences.
From the case of Citizens United, an example of how the representations that act as the
basis of our explanations of economic group agency fail to accurately track the
phenomena under observation, I move on to explore other accounts of collective action
that might provide a more suitable starting point.
In the second chapter, my goal is to evaluate the extent to which popular accounts
of collective action (cf. Ramio Tuomela, 1997; Michael Bratman, 1993, 1997, 2009; and
Christian List & Philip Pettit, 2011) could be made to accommodate the actions of certain
kinds of economic associations. I argue that while List and Pettit provide us with a novel
way to view group agency, their account is difficult to apply in non-ideal circumstances
(i.e. this world, with our history) and overextends what we could expect from corporate
agents. Throughout this project, I use List and Pettit as a springboard to develop a more
adequate account of how structure influences and constrains the possibilities of one kind
of corporate agent, the business firm.

6

In Chapter 3, I examine how environmental variables shape group agency—more
importantly, how this perpetuates particular types of organization structures—and explore
the relationship between the representations of organizations and the possibilities for
particular kinds of group agents. I claim that understanding how the structure of
corporations is affected by both internal (strategy/organizations) changes (see Chandler,
1962, 1977, 1988; List & Pettit, 2011) and external pressures from other social
institutions (see Denzau & North, 1994; North, 1991, 2005) will be a better starting point
from which to recognize the limitations and possibilities of economic group agents who
are also moral agents. I argue that a business firm’s organization structure encourages the
firm to develop information processing and decision-making systems that mimic strategic
rationality. However, we should not assume that the group’s ability to engage in strategic
practical reasoning entails that the agent will engage in moral reasoning.
I argue that the ideals this kind of agent measures itself against are the ideals of
strategic rationality, and strategic rationality should not be confused with the kind of
reasoning employed by moral agents. Arguing against List and Pettit, I claim that even if
certain types of organizations were capable of moral reasoning and acting from moral
principles, those outside of the firm would have no way of recognizing this capacity. If
the aim is to understand the conditions under which a group may be able to engage in
moral deliberations and be the appropriate target of moral praise or blame, we need to
have a different set of ideals framing our expectations of these kinds of groups. I end this
chapter by discussing what kinds of environmental parameters (external constraints)
would be more hospitable to the development of group agents capable of engaging in
moral reasoning.
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In the fourth chapter, I suggest that attributions of group responsibility should be
mitigated by the group agent’s possibilities for developing different kinds of reasoning
capacities. When organizations are situated in an environment that does not promote
organization structures that engage in moral reasoning, not only should we not be
surprised when moral reasoning is not present at the level of the group, but we should
also expect attributions of moral responsibility to ring hollow. Thus, within systems that
constrain group agential capacities against a standard of strategic rationality, group agents
should still bear the consequences of their actions, but the grounding for responsibility
will be the agents’ causal role and the degree to which the group could foresee the
consequences of their actions. This is to say, group agents who can engage in practical
reasoning are still accountable to others for their actions, but unless the group has the
ability to recognize itself (the group) as the author of its actions, moral responsibility is
off the table. When group agents are in a system of constraint that models, promotes, and
aids in the development of group agents that engage in moral reasoning, attributions of
moral responsibility for actions are appropriate. At the end of this chapter, I explore what
an organization structure would need to promote as part of its member buy-in process to
give rise to a virtuous group agent.
Finally, I end my project by exploring how my account of group agency resonates
with some of the work done in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility. Specifically, I
look at how the second wave of corporate social responsibility seeks to find room for
moral reasoning in business decisions. Arguments in support of corporate social
responsibility, though, are constrained to justifying the role of moral judgments in
business decisions through engaging to the interests of business rather than connecting
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business actions to society. I argue that a more fruitful starting point, and an extension of
my arguments in chapters 3 and 4, would be to see business strategies as political
strategies. I argue that doing so will initiate a shift to a conception of the business firm as
a modality of power. This modality of power emphasizes intersecting and overlapping
power relations between political economy, government, and populations that give rise to
the defining forces shaping our possibilities. In identifying the points of power
asymmetries in corporate structures, and undoing their histories, we will also be opening
the possibilities for the kinds of social arrangements that enable ethical relations between
persons. This shift in orientations does not entail that we cannot appreciate how these
kinds of social communities give rise to solutions for solving the problem of pricing
mechanisms and increasing efficiencies. Rather, it gives us a way to renegotiate the
interactions between the individuals who determine the possibilities for group agential
capacities, the people who enact the decisions that give rise to the group agent itself, and
the interplay between acting in organizations and having organizations determine the
possibilities of individuals’ practical identity.

9

Chapter One
Corporate Persons, Corporate Actions, and Agency
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could
silence their proposed speech. — First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978, 435
U.S. 765, 777)
1.1 Introduction: Representations of Corporate Agency
When the law recognizes a business firm as a kind of person, what does this
mean? With some exceptions,4 the colloquial intuition is that the legal body of the
corporation is manifestly different than the kind of agential entity I am. The historical
recognition , under the 14th Amendment, that corporations are citizens with the right of
due process is the means by which governments keep a grip on these kinds of legal
bodies. As discussed at length by Joshua Barkan, in the late 19th and early 20th century,
the Supreme Court heard a series of cases that shaped the contemporary concept of
corporate personhood. The concept of corporate personhood and “legal personality was a
response by the state...regulating individuals, groups and populations as individuals was a
mechanism by which the federal government attempted to centralize its power and
connect ‘persons’—human or otherwise—back to the state” (Barkan 2006, p. 130).
By treating corporations as persons, the state could determine jurisdiction by
virtue of its ability to locate the corporate body to a particular state, and as such, the
articles of incorporation became bound by the laws of the state, and governments secured
4

For example, as reported by the Huffington Post (August 11, 2011), Mitt Romney stated that
“Corporations are people” in response to a question about increasing corporate taxes to alleviate tax
burdens on citizens.
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an avenue for taxation and redress for corporate actions. But how are we to conceptualize
the relation between agency, which by the most minimal definition is the ability to cause
change in the world, collective action, and personhood? To begin, I will discuss the basis
by which we can distinguish non-agents from agents. From a minimal conception of
agency, we can more concretely discuss what kinds of agential capacities firms might
have and whether or not the language of personhood or rights is appropriate.
This chapter will lay the foundation for my broader project, which aims to outline
a non-idealized account of group agency. Aiming for a non-idealized explanation of this
phenomenon, I will be constructing an account of group agency that can help us make
sense of the ways we represent groups and how these representations inform the ways in
which we engage with particular kinds of group agents in our ordinary existence. I will
use the recent Supreme Court case of Citizens United as an example of how the
representations that act as the basis of our explanations of economic group agency fail to
accurately track the phenomena under observation.
I will begin by examining a minimal concept of agency and how different agential
capacities (e.g., ability to reason, self-reflect, make promises/take on obligations) relate to
attributions of accountability and responsibility. It is imperative to identify the minimal
capacities that must be present before we can accurately call an entity to an agent. I will
then proceed to elucidate how one might practically come to attribute agency to a
structured group or organization. Agential capacities arising within groups, as with
individual persons and other organisms, are not isolated, one-time flickers of rational
action. Rather, the attribution of agency to an entity or system entails that it displays a
particular pattern of behavior over time. Following from this, I will be working with a
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conception of agential capacities that focuses on the dynamic process between inputs
from the world (environmental stimuli) and outputs from the entity (actions/behaviors).
Throughout this project, then, I will seek to demonstrate the necessity of accounting for
the role of structure and external environmental factors in adequately explaining
economic group agents.
1.1.1 Agency, Agential Capacities, and Personhood
Looking to the outside world, we might observe many different kinds of events
that appear to be actions under the control of an entity or a system. However, discerning
which actions are under the control of an agent, or even which entities or systems are
agents is not always prima facie obvious. In the beginning of The Principles of
Psychology, William James explains the connections between observable phenomena and
attributions of intentional action (1890/1918). First, James asks us to compare a pair of
lovers, Romeo and Juliet, to metal filings and a magnet (pp. 6-8). The actions of both
might be attributed to goal directedness on the part of the entities involved; the metal
filings moving toward the magnet could be understood as aiming to be together in a
manner resembling two lovers acting on the intention to let nothing keep them apart.
However, as James points out, a simple piece of paper can block the metal filings’ path,
and as metal filings do not modify their path in light of changes in their environment,
they fail to reach the magnet.
From this rather simple observation, we can discern that one of the primary
differences between these two systems is the ability to form representations of the
external environment and the ability to modify the pursuit of the goal in light of those
representations; that is, in the case of the lovers, there is means-end coherence in a strong
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sense. As James put the point, “[w]ith the filings the path is fixed; whether it reaches
depends on accidents. With the lover it is the end which is fixed, the path may be
modified indefinitely” (p. 7). With means-end coherence as the minimal mark of
mentality or intelligence, we can see that in the case of the metal filings and the magnet,
the attribution of intentions and aim directedness seems less justified than the pair of starcrossed lovers. Thus, on a very minimal definition, an entity or system under observation
has to display a minimal level of intelligence, such as exhibiting means-end coherence in
actions, to be a candidate for agency.
Yet, even as the presence of intelligent behavior gives us a way to distinguish the
agent from the accident, it does not mean that higher-order cognitive processes capable of
practical reasoning govern the systems underlying the entity’s actions. That is to say that
just because a creature or system’s behavior appears rational does not mean the creature
or system is deliberately aware of its actions. Take the slightly different example of a
standard cockroach I observe on my kitchen floor when I turn on the light. It quickly
scurries over the rug, along the wall, until it disappears into the darkness under my
refrigerator. The bug escapes my frantic foot-stomping, usurping my attempts to smash it,
and demonstrates, possibly better than Romeo, that it has a clearly fixed end (i.e., escape
the light, avoid sources of vibration and movement), as well as a variety of means to
achieve it. Both Romeo and the cockroach are using their representations about the world
to adjust their actions to achieve their ends.
Adding to the index of agential capacities, means-end coherence involves more
than the pursuit of goals. For an entity to display means-end coherence it can be said to
have desired ends or goals, which entails forming representations about its environment,
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to act on the basis of those representations toward its aims, to track changes in its
environment, and to modify actions accordingly to continue the pursuit of the goal.
However, there seems to be a fundamental difference between the kind of agency
underlying Romeo’s actions and those underlying the actions of the cockroach. The
distinction lies not with the ability to pursue an end, but with the processes by which the
ends present themselves as such, the ability to self-represent, and the ability to reason
over one’s ends.
To draw on a distinction that Harry Frankfurt elucidated, the cockroach does not
act on desires that the agent identifies (see, for example, Frankfurt 1988, 1999). This is to
say that the insect may be a purposive agent (to employ a weak sense of the term), but it
does not choose the avoidance of light as its end. To put the point another way, even as
the cockroach may control his actions, it is not the author of its actions; it does not have
the ability to understand itself as an agent (form self-representations). At most, the
cockroach’s actions are subject to a kind of teleological explanation. As James puts the
point, “the animal is, on the whole, safer under the circumstances for bringing it [the end]
forth. So far the action has a teleological character; but such mere outward teleology as
this might still be the blind result of vis a tergo…produced by automatic mechanism” ( p.
9).
In contrast we could explain Romeo’s pursuit of his beloved in terms of
physiological instincts or evolutionary biological drives, but his additional capacities to
self-represent, reflectively engage in a decision-making processes, and act on the basis of
reasons makes him self-governing in a way that manifestly distinguishes his agential
capacities from the cockroach. With the agential capacity of reasoning and decision-
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making, we expect that Romeo could choose not to pursue Juliet. As such, my ascription
of agency to Romeo, and entities or systems like him, is more complex than the
ascription of minimal agency I attribute to the cockroach. Moreover, this difference
displays itself in the range of reasoning capacities creatures like Romeo are capable of
engaging in; he can reason strategically and morally. When it comes to evaluating the
actions of this kind of agent, I take this difference of agential capacities, and the fact that
Romeo is a moral agent, into account.
One consequence of the cockroach’s agential limitations is the subsequent
limitation of attributing responsibility for its actions to this kind of minimal agent. For
example, if the cockroach startles me in my kitchen and I stumble over a firearm as the
bug scurries away, and the firearm goes off and a stray bullet happens to graze my leg,
even as the cockroach is a cause of the shooting, it is not responsible for the shooting.
However, if my ex-wife goes to a store, purchases a firearm, comes to my home, and fires
a gun at me, I would say that her agential capacities, combined with her actions to carry
out her plan, justifies my attribution to her of more than mere causality for the shooting. I
would look for evidence as to whether or not she intended, planned, and executed the
plan to shoot me. My ex, who has the capacity to reason over the ends she pursues,
supposedly made a judgment about the rightness or wrongness of her actions, and then
endorsed certain plans as those she ought to take up. In short, she engaged in a different
kind of reasoning than the roach’s flight from the light.
This additional capacity to engage in moral reasoning is the minimal threshold of
a moral agent, and with this extra capacity comes a greater degree of accountability and a
different kind of responsibility. Moral agents, those that have the additional capacity to
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engage in moral reasoning, are expected to engage in such a capacity when, at the bare
minimum, actions would violate certain general moral principles (e.g., taking a life,
causing unnecessarily pain to other agents, lying).5 For example, suppose that we live in a
society that frowns upon child labor. If a moral agent employed child labor in the use of
textile mills, that society might expect that the agent would have been aware of this
standard and would have to had to consider the rightness or wrongness of the action prior
to exploiting the innocent. If the decision to employ child labor was the result of a
decision-making process that aims at maximizing profit, rather than considering the
moral weight of the means toward that end, the primary variable in the decision-making
process would be the maximization of profit.
In such cases, the end is set, the reasoning employed to determine the most
efficient means to the end is one of strategic rationality. When I consider the statement
through the process of strategic rationality, I judge whether this statement fits with my
general aims and past judgments, and then I either accept or reject this course of action in
accordance with my practical reasoning standards by determining whether or not child
labor would increase the likelihood that I reach my goals by the most efficient means
necessary. To the extent that child labor is profit maximizing, instrumental reasoning
would dictate the affirmative. When I consider the statement through a process of moral
reasoning, I not only judge whether the statement fits with my general aims, but I also
engage in the additional reasoning process of evaluating whether this action, employing
5

To be clear, I am not claiming that moral principles, which enter into an agent’s reasoning process, are
universalizable. Additionally, I am not making the claim that moral principles all ultimately derive from
some universal principle (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative). In other words, I am not making any claim
about what good moral reasoning looks like. Rather, my claim is that, at a minimum, moral reasoning
involves the capacity to reflect upon at least some general moral principles during the process of practical
reasoning. These moral principles could be understood as something akin to community standards, or they
could be something we consider a special class of principles derived from a universal principle.
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child labor, is an end to consider in the first place. To make a judgment on either
statement in a manner that is consistent with past judgments necessitates practical
reasoning, but strategic rationality does not require me to be capable of bringing into
question whether the ends I am pursuing are worth pursuing in the first place. Moral
reasoning and the ability to make moral judgments about courses of action require
practical reasoning. Practical reasoning, however, does not necessarily entail that the
decision-making process will bring into question the very ends it is considering, or that
the agent is self-reflective about his or her actions more generally.
I have alluded to the idea that we might attribute agency not only to individuals or
particular entities, such as a cockroach, but also to systems that produce observable,
measurable actions in the world. Describing a corporation as an agent is a useful way of
understanding how complex interactions between people and structures independent of
specific human involvement give rise to autonomous group decisions and actions. Yet,
not all organizations work like this. While viewing the group as the agent, and extending
the example above, would allow us to talk about Bank of America, Citigroup, Chase, and
Merrill Lynch as entities distinct from their employees, shareholders, and boards of
directors, these kinds of large-scale bureaucratic systems do not adequately represent
many other kinds of organizational arrangements. Inasmuch as the group is responsible
for the organization structure and the consequences of group actions, understanding how
different structural dimensions of the organization influence or augment information flow
and decision-making processes affect group actions would be the first step toward a
practical conversation about holding the group responsible, over and above the individual
actors who might have unintentionally “pressed the button” of the subprime crisis. To
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begin the development of a taxonomy of organization structures, I will first describe the
basis of the taxonomy (i.e. the defining variables) and the resulting general organizational
classifications. Then, I will move on to discuss group agential capacities within the
context of this classification.
1.2 Taxonomy of Organization Structures
While sociological theorists such as Max Weber have examined different types of
organizations and their mode of operation, their focus was not the development of a
taxonomy of organizations or organization structures. Attempting to divide organizations
into discrete categories based on the kinds of organizations they are may intuitively seem
to be a good starting point. Likewise, dividing up organizations based on their stated
goals (e.g., maximizing profit, political or social change) may also seem like a good
starting point for distinguishing between kinds of organizations. However, both of these
ways of separating kinds of organizations run into limitations when attempting to
understand how the organizations act as causes of change in the world, and how to
account for the agential capacities of different kinds of organizations.
Looking to the kind of organization as the basis of a system of organizational
classifications might give us more explanatory power when we attempt to predict how a
given organization will set up decision-making processes, weigh information when
setting organizational priorities, or share power amongst group members, etc. For
example, knowing that an organization is an LLC (limited liability corporation) might
give us reason to think that it will have a hierarchical decision-making process, whereas a
voluntary political association might be more likely to have more democratic decisionmaking processes and a more balanced sharing of organizational power. Similarly,
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looking to the goals of the organization, which would be directly related to the kind of
organization that it is, might indicate how an organization would prioritize different
variables in its decision-making process. For example, an organization with economic
(profit) goals would put a heavy emphasis on profit maximization, whereas an
organization with political goals would put a heavy emphasis on demonstrated social
progress reflective of those political goals. The problem with this kind of discrete
classification is that it does not map onto organizational life we see in the world.
Organizations are multidimensional, and their decision-making processes are
often less reflective of the kinds of organizations that they are per se than a reflection of
the interplay between an organization’s structure and a complex network of pressures
(e.g., implicit forms of regulations, such as understood community standards, and explicit
forms of regulation, such as legal codes and sanctions, or member expectations).
Similarly, organizational goals are often multifaceted and not easily categorized
according to how organizations see themselves or how particular societies conceive of
their purpose. For example, corporations are primarily seen as economic organizations,
but the ways in which they pursue the economic interests of some sets of persons
(corporations rarely serve the best interest of all involved in their operations) is a social
and political enterprise, one that, upon closer examination, directly and indirectly shapes
the very networks of pressures that act as the foundation of the taxonomy.6 With this in
mind, it seems more fitting to look first to the world to see what structural variables
might present themselves as the basis of a taxonomy of organizational structures.

6

For a more in-depth analysis and overview of the history of organizational classifications and early
attempts at taxonomy see Carper, W. B. and Snizek, W. E. (1980). The Nature and Types of Organizational
Taxonomies: An Overview. The Academy of Management Review 5 (1), pp. 65-75.
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Developing a taxonomy of organizational structures, one that focuses on
observable (empirical) and measurable characteristics of organizations existing in the
contemporary social landscape, will give us the means to look at decision-making
structures or information processes and to better predict organizational decisions or
possibilities for change. Moreover, creating a taxonomy of organization structures would
provide a starting point from which to determine the ways in which different dimensions
of an organization’s structure might be blocking deliberation processes we think are
important in different kinds of organizations.
A series of empirical analyses completed by an Ohio State study (Hall, Haas, &
Johnson, 1967; Haas, Hall, & Johnson, 1966) and the Aston research group (Pugh,
Hickson, & Hinings, 1969; Pugh et al., 1969; Pugh et al., 1968; Pugh et al., 1963)
identify and define five primary variables of structure, which produce relatively
homogenous groups of organizations in general, as opposed to their particular aspects,
such as the group’s goals, function in society, etc. The five variables can be summarized
as follows:
1) Specialization of function: the degree of division of labor in the organization
2) Standardization of procedure: the extent to which an organization explicitly
defines the member roles, organizational rules, and procedures to generally
apply
3) Formalization of documentation: the extent to which standard procedures,
rules, and member roles are clearly documented, distributed, and
communicated with members throughout the organization
4) Centralization of authority: the degree to which authority in decision-making
and execution of group plans is localized to particular roles within the
organizational structure (e.g., higher in the hierarchy)
5) Configuration of positions: the shape of role structures and information
processing structures within the organization
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While there are variations in how fine-grained particular theorists make the taxonomies
resulting from the correlation of clusters with certain variable scores, there are some
common organizational forms:7
1) Factory firm: an organization with a high level of internal structure, low
concentration of authority, a high integration of standardized procedures and
formalization of documentation. Examples might include large, independent
assembly-line factories such as car manufacturers
2) Hierarchical firm: an organization with a high degree of centralized authority;
member activity is highly standardized and organizational roles are clearly
defined, but daily work is not highly structured (i.e., members have a fair
amount of freedom from micro-managing). An example of this kind of
organization might be a college or university or a service organization that has
an external board of directors or governance committees.
3) Organic firm: an organization that has both low levels of structure and a
dispersed authority structure. Such an organization has an organic rather than
hierarchical configuration, and has low levels of explicit formalization,
although organizational culture and external regulatory mechanisms still
structure member roles and activities. Many small-scale start-up companies
would fit this description.
4) Bureaucratic firms: an organization with a high score on all dimensions. The
organization has a high degree of standardization, centralization of authority is
present and the configuration of positions parallels the centralization of
organizational power. There is a high structuring of member activities, and a
high degree of formalization in organizational procedures. An example of
such a firm might be a government-run factory or a military organization.
This kind of multidimensional framework provides more explanatory force than more
discrete typologies of organizations because it captures how external variables, such as
strict regulatory and legal frameworks, influence internal variables, such as the
formalization of documentation (and vice versa).

7

For example, Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings develop a taxonomy that includes preworkflow bureaucracy,
nascent workflow bureaucracy, workflow bureaucracy, personnel bureaucracy, implicitly structured
organizations, nascent full bureaucracy, and full bureaucracy. Note that they do not attempt to classify
voluntary associations. (1969, pp. 117- 123). In contrast, I am aiming to develop a more general taxonomy
that can map organizations and as such, I am making up general terms to refer to these organizational types
rather than borrowing from a particular organizational theorist.
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With the more dynamic framework as our foundation, we are now in a better
position to ask a slightly different question. How do different agential capacities map
onto different kinds of organizations? In particular, what kinds of organizations, if any,
should we expect to be candidates for group agents? Does this make a difference to the
way we interact with these kinds of groups, or the way these groups interact with citizens
or other social institutions? By more closely examining how we represent the entity we
call the corporation, the ideals against which we determine its proper function, and the
degree to which firms exist that do not fit the framework grounding this ideal, we can
identify how the variables making up this taxonomy would encourage the development of
economic group agents who are also moral agents.
1.2.1 Group Agents and Organization Structures
Christian List and Philip Pettit’s recent book, Group Agency, discusses the
possibility of group agents arising from corporate entities (e.g., churches, nation-states,
commercial corporations). List and Pettit begin their conversation about the conditions
for the existence of group agents by pointing out that our representations of corporate
entities directly shape how we understand these entities to function. For example, they
ask us to imagine ourselves observing a robotic device moving around a small confined
area performing simple tasks (for instance, picking up cylinders lying on their sides on a
table top) (Group Agents, 2011, p. 22). One way to view the robot would be as a series of
silicon and metal pieces fit together in such a way as to passively carry out tasks. In
contrast, another way we could view this robot, which is performing programmed
functions, is as a kind of agent. However, in doing so, we would be reinterpreting its
actions. Agential representations are made salient by the way we describe an agent’s
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functioning. The robot is scanning its environment, it represents the environment, and
how that environment should be arranged (all upright cylinders), and appears motivated
to respond to the gap between how the environment is and how it wants it to be (when a
cylinder has fallen over, the robot stands it up again).
In the case of different kinds of organizational structures, we can observe how the
entity acts, and when the organization displays patterns of actions that are not easily
explainable in terms of its individual parts, this may give us reason to reevaluate how we
are representing its function. In other words, when a particular kind of organizational
arrangement yields judgments and actions that appear more like a unified system, that is,
some kind of minimal agent rather than simply extending the wishes of a centralized
authority or simple majority, we should look for an explanation as to why and how such a
phenomenon is arising. Moreover, what we gain by taking the robot or an organization as
a kind of agent is a different way of making sense of what it is doing and why it does the
things that it does, and of judging its actions accordingly (i.e., does it succeed in its
task?). In other words, it changes the representations we use as the basis of our
evaluations of the entity under observation. One may ask, though, what are the variables I
have noted that make different kinds of organizations candidates for agency?
When the organization has a decision-making process that results in rational
patterns of decisions that mirror the practical reasoning capacities present in other agents
(e.g., individual human agents, some kinds of animals, the robot), then the organization is
a candidate for agency. Group agency would, in its most basic form, be identified in
entities or systems that display minimal standards of rationality through means-end
coherence. Group agency, if it is not to be superfluous, will have the additional
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requirement that the group’s decisions and actions are distinct from, and not reducible to,
any specific set of organization members. The justification for considering the group,
rather than individuals within the group, as the source of this display of minimal agency
is grounded in the organizational decision-making processes themselves.
What I am claiming, and what I will examine in greater detail in the next chapter,
is that with increasing complexity, there is (sometimes) a phenomenon displayed at the
level of the group (whole) that cannot be adequately explained through reference to what
is going on in its parts (persons).8 It is not merely a case of people acting in coordination.
Rather, by examining the framework of the organizations in which they are acting, we
gain a way to make transparent the representations of a class of organized group agents.
By making these representations transparent, we can more adequately model how
different variables influence the decision-making processes and the way information
flows through the organization, and how these processes result in organized collective
actions that do not reduce to the actions of individual members. Moreover, with
transparency in processes comes the ability to develop ways to change what we expect of
the group, what we expect of individual group members, and what individual group
members expect of themselves.
When we examine, as List and Pettit do, more sophisticated groups whose
decision-making processes include complex feedback mechanisms that result in grouplevel practical reasoning, our expectations and attributions of group responsibility should
be indexed to this capacity. Getting clear on the extent to which group agents function as
8

I hesitate to say that the phenomenon would be “emergent,” given the problematic history of emergentism
in collective action theory. Emergentism, generally speaking, is less stable a phenomenon than the sort in
which I am interested here. Rather, it should suffice to say that the phenomenon is autonomous from the
actions described at the level of individual actors, but the two sets of descriptions share some of the same
mechanisms (i.e., individual persons).
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agents, and the degrees of control we have in shaping these agents, enables us to develop
group decision-making processes that reflect more ideal representations of these kinds of
collectives. In other words, we can begin to determine the relationship between our
representation of group arrangements and the kinds of organization structures that give
rise to groups that function as agents.
One consequence of starting from a taxonomy of organization structures, and with
it a taxonomy of understanding the possibilities of group agency within organizations, is
that it brings into question our assumptions about the degree to which organizations are
reflective of their members in the ways that we think they are. When we bring into
question these basic assumptions, the justifications for granting certain groups rights and
privileges is also brought under fire. Thus, changing our representations of organizations
may cause subsequent changes in what shows up as the relevant functions (goal-directed
actions) of the system and how we might change internal processes within the entity to
make it better suited to pursue its function. This point will be made salient by examining
how American jurisprudence conceives of economic associations and the justification for
corporate political speech.
1.3 Understanding Economic Associations as Associations of Persons
Economic associations can come in any of the organizational structures discussed
above. Understanding economic associations as merely associations (or conjunctions) of
persons may be the ideal representation from which we envision individuals to come
together toward their common end of making profit. This, in any event, is the idealized
view from the Constitutional law. We can see evidence for this in the recent Supreme
Court case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (Citizens) (2010, 558 U.S.
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50). The careful language of the decision focuses on enabling and protecting the rights of
citizens when they enter into different kinds of associations. To paraphrase the question
asked by Justice Kennedy in holding, why should persons qua individual citizens9 be
denied their right to free speech when engaging in corporate associations? If we
understand corporations as forms of association where individual citizens join together
freely, why should the fact that they do so for business purposes limit their freedom of
political speech (Citizens, 558 U.S. 50)? This is the point echoed in Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion, in which he states, “the individual person’s right to speak includes
the right to speak in association with other individual persons. The association of
individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the
right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not ‘an individual American’” (Citizens,
558 U.S. 50).10
By focusing on the rights of citizens, The Court implicitly endorses a vision of
economic associations as a kind of organization structure that ensures a direct connection
between the actions at the level of the group and the members making up the association.
This kind of deliberative group decision-making structure stands in stark relief to the
model of corporate governance that dictates the degree to which economic associations
have to model their group political speech from the speech of their members. Economic
associations are not designed to represent the members, but to represent and promote the
ends of the group. Turning my analysis to this recent Supreme Court case will elucidate

9

Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise specified, I will use ‘citizens’ to mean natural, traditional
individuals as opposed to corporate individuals. Whenever reference is made to corporate persons, these
should be taken to mean corporate individuals or group agents.
10
Scalia, J. concurring opinion, original emphasis. As noted by Bryce Huebner, Scalia is also vacillating
between an inflationary and rabidly deflationary account of group mentality (Distributing cognition: A
defense of collective mentality, book manuscript in preparation).
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how our representations of organizational design function as the basis of manifestly
different canons of group freedoms.
Citizens focused on balancing two concerns. First, the Court wanted to ensure that
the right of individual citizens to exercise political speech in association with others was
protected in a variety of associations, including economic associations (i.e.,
corporations). Second, the Court wanted to ensure that the protection of group rights
would not come at the expense of ensuring that the First Amendment remained a public
good accessible to citizens more generally. This is to say that the Court had to decide
whether granting group rights to economic associations would guarantee the freedom of
expression of its members without compromising the freedom of expression within the
context of liberal democracies broadly understood. I will focus on the issue of the degree
to which the political speech of economic associations is reflective of its members in the
way described by the decision.
The right to political speech for corporations has historically been constrained, not
because individuals lose their rights upon entering into this form of association, but
because corporations can do things individuals cannot. Case precedent, including Buckley
v. Valeo (Buckley 1976, 424 U.S. 1) and later Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce
(Austin 1990, 494 U. S. 652), state that such privileges include the ability for corporations
to accumulate massive amounts of wealth and property, and to influence policy to an
extent far surpassing the individual citizen. These unfair advantages, it was argued in
precedent, carry over into the marketplace of ideas directly because of the economic
advantages some corporations have over individuals (Citizens, 558 U.S. 50, 34).
Precedent argued that once these economic influences found their way into the
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marketplace of ideas, they would be able to unduly influence the political opinions of
citizens by buying more air time, using more media space, and giving voice to political
opinions even as the provenance of said opinions remains opaque, thus clouding the
marketplace of ideas and threatening the freedom of expression as a public good.
Additionally, previous decisions held that corporate political support with which
shareholders disagreed would effectively force those who had differing political opinions
to support the political opinions of the group financially. Another way to state this
concern is to say that corporate speech would not be reflective of or responsive to the
political attitudes and preferences of the corporation’s members.
In the case of Citizens, the Court claimed that shareholders could regulate
corporate spending in campaign donations through the regulatory mechanisms of
“corporate democracy.” It was argued that the shareholders had the means, through their
ownership of the corporation, to regulate the spending habits of the corporation. If
shareholders have the ability to directly reflect their political opinions through their
ability to control the actions of the corporate association, there is no need for a separate
fund (i.e., Political Action Committees [PACs]) or strict ceilings on corporate donations
to express their opinions. The Court’s argument works because it treats corporations as if
they are directly reducible to the individuals who make them up. In other words, the
Court assumes that the beliefs, intentions, and actions (in this case political speech) are,
or can be, directly attributed to the members making up this kind of association, and
furthermore, that the members can change the group-level speech. Following this line of
reasoning, the Court’s decision models the rights of the association from the rights of the
individuals within it.
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I will discuss two reasons why this type of aggregated-form reductionism is
problematic.11 First, the Court assumes that economic associations are relevantly similar
to other kinds of associations, in which the political speech of the group can be directly
linked to the political opinions of some particular sets of members. This view of
corporate organization fundamentally ignores the limits on shareholder freedom set by
corporate law threshold standards. Shareholders in publicly traded companies may have a
say on some actions of the firm (i.e., those measures they vote on). However, by looking
at how political expenditures and contributions are treated by corporate law, and by virtue
of the precedent set by shareholder derivate cases, I will argue that we have good reason
to think that shareholder freedom will not translate to the ability to demand money spent
on political speech be in accordance with shareholder preferences. Shareholders are not
free in the same way general citizens are to express their opinions at the level of the
group; just as managers and directors are bound and constrained by fiduciary duty, so too
are shareholders bound by limitations on voting rights and the ability to challenge
management decisions.
Second, the decision has substantially stripped employee members of a voice in
the political speech of the group. The Court’s elimination of the connected PAC
requirement for economic associations renders employees unable to participate
meaningfully in the group’s political speech. Moreover, this change also silences

11

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) argued that to grant corporations the right of freedom of
expression was to confuse corporations with persons and to ignore how powerful corporations are, and that
treating them as such can be detrimental to society by virtue of the fact that large asset-holding corporations
have a major impact on shaping the lives of citizens. The Court, as mentioned in the beginning of this
chapter, refocused the topic from one of corporate personhood and corporate structure to one that assumes
that corporations and the individuals within them are relevantly similar. This is the problem that I address
here. Thoroughly addressing the FECs concern is an important, but separate, project. I will address the
FEC’s broader question about why treating corporations as performative persons might be problematic in
the Chapter 4.

29

minority and dissenting voices that previously had a role in deciding the political speech
of the group. Even if, in some cases, the political speech of the corporation does reflect
the shareholders’ views, the correspondence is merely serendipitous. If shareholders have
a right to political speech within the economic association, it should hang on something
stronger than coincidence or the goodwill of the association.12 I argue that ensuring
members the right of political speech, in a manner consistent with the representative
model of corporate democracy grounding the Court’s decision, entails external
mechanisms that allow individual members to contest the actions of the group through
the channels of exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970) of the political opinions of its members.
As it stands now, the corporation does not have a legal duty to reflect the political
opinion of the shareholders. As such, the Court has wrongly applied the standard of
association, that is, as a group of individuals acting together, in the case of Citizens.
1.4 A Practical Problem
The law is one way that we attempt to shape and structure the social sphere to
enable and support liberal democratic ideals. In doing so, our regulatory mechanisms aim
to protect the rights and privileges of persons at the level of groups. While this is not
Constitutional law’s only function, the acknowledgement and protection of the rights of
citizens, including citizens in association with others, is informed by how those who
interpret and define jurisprudence understand individuals to function within certain kinds
of associations. When it comes to protecting the freedom of expression guaranteed under

12

List and Pettit make a similar point in the chapter on “The Control Desideratum” between contentindependence and context-independence. When an individual is under the domination of another, even if
she can act in the manner she chooses, she is not free in the more robust sense of freedom from
interference. This is content-independent decisiveness. When the same individual is making decisions
without the possibility of interference from another, the situation is changed to one of context-independent
decisiveness (2011, pp. 133-35 and 145).
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the First Amendment, this takes the form of political speech rights. The Court has to
balance individual rights to expression as a public good--something accessible to citizens
outside of the group association--with the rights of individuals to join the association
while maintaining their freedom of speech.
Citizens paved the way to record-breaking expenditures on political campaigns
and issues during the 2010 midterm elections (Zeese, 2010). What is particularly
troubling is not the amount spent per se, which was in excess of four billion dollars, but
the fact that citizens could not ascertain precisely where the campaign contributions came
from.13 As direct campaign donations are still restricted for economic associations, many
of the large donations were not given directly to the political parties, but took advantage
of the lifted limitations on political expenditures. One result of this new freedom on
political expenditures was the ability for economic organizations to donate funds through
non-connected political action committees (PACs). Although funds donated to 527
organizations14are subject to external reporting, donations to 501(c)(4) organizations15
allow associations, corporations, or private individuals to contribute anonymously; the
13

Starting from the presupposition, as the Court does, that financial contributions toward political
campaigns are a form of political speech, finding fault with the amount spent would be comparable to
finding “too much” free speech exchanged in the marketplace of ideas problematic. While the question of
whether monetary donations should be taken to be a form of speech is an interesting question, it is largely
outside the scope of this project.
14
527 organizations are created primarily to influence the selection, nomination, election, appointment, or
defeat of candidates for federal, state, or local public office. In common practice the term is usually applied
only to such organizations that are not regulated under state or federal campaign finance laws because they
do not "expressly advocate" for the election or defeat of a candidate or party. There are no upper limits on
contributions and no restrictions on who may contribute. There are no spending limits imposed on these
organizations; however, they must register with the IRS, publicly disclose their donors, and file periodic
reports of contributions and expenditures. Many 527s are run by interest groups and are used to raise
money for issue advocacy and voter mobilization outside of the restrictions on PACs.
15
501(c)(4) organizations operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations
with membership limited to a designated municipality or neighborhood, and with net earnings devoted
exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes. They may lobby for legislation, and unlike
similar organizations, they may also participate in political campaigns and elections, as long as their
primary activity is the promotion of social welfare. These kinds of organizations are not required to
disclose their donors publicly.
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non-profit organizations can then channel capital to a political party without reporting the
source of the funds. Because political expenditures are considered to be under the
purview of corporate leaders and management rather than the shareholders, no
mechanism exists for shareholders or independent citizens to obtain detailed information
regarding corporate political expenditures, absent voluntary disclosures (111th Congress
66, 2010). In short, even if corporate associates have knowledge about corporate
sponsorship of a particular candidate, the individual citizens outside of the corporate
association would not have guaranteed access to the economic association’s political
expenditures. This lack of transparency is problematic because voters take the identities
of political donors as evidence of the candidate’s political beliefs, future actions, and
potential (future) conflicts of interest. In short, by denying citizens the ability to trace
where a candidate’s campaign funds are coming from, voters are denied access to
relevant data concerning a candidate’s intentions once he or she is elected to office.
Although it may be beneficial for corporations and other forms of associations to
contribute significantly to the political debate in the marketplace of ideas, this does not
mean that they have the right to do so in a manner that leaves the individual citizen
effectively blind to potential conflicts of interest on the part of political candidates.
Without the ability for individual citizens to access pertinent information about political
advertisements, such as who is paying for the ad and what interest they may have in the
claims made therein, citizens’ ability to make informed decisions and fully participate in
free democratic elections is seriously compromised. However, I would like to grant that
we could, theoretically, address concerns of transparency. Granting this point, I still think
it is worth raising the question: to whom are we granting speech rights when we give
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certain kinds of associations political speech rights? That is to say, who do we think is
speaking when corporations speak?
1.5 The Politics of Corporate Speech Rights16
In the 19th Century, the Supreme Court had to deal with the question of whether or
not to treat corporations as “persons” in the eyes of the law. The impetus behind the series
of decisions to treat corporations as artificial persons arose5 from practical questions
about how to tax. In other words, the Court was concerned with holding corporations
accountable. How the federal law categorized the corporation directly determined
individual state’s rights (e.g., to sue, inspect, tax) and duties (to supply police protections,
allow participation in civic events, etc.) concerning the corporations within their
jurisdiction. If, for example, the law wanted to consider the corporation some kind of
citizen, even if only for tax purposes, it would have to grant corporate entities legal
standing as persons (since only persons could be citizens).
The earliest cited case concerning the treatment of corporations as separate legal
persons, that is, as distinct from the members making up its incorporated body, is Bank of
the United States v. Deveaux (1809, 9 U.S. 5). In Deveaux, the Court deemed that the
corporation “is certainly not a citizen.” This decision was overturned in Louisville, C. &
C.R. Co. v. Letson (1844, 43 U.S. 2), in which the court ruled that corporations are
“capable of being treated as a citizen . . . as much as a natural person.” The motivation
behind the wording of such judgments was to rule in favor of holding corporations liable
for taxes owed to states, not to grant corporations the same rights and privileges granted
natural citizens. Although the Louisville decision was upheld ten years later in the case of
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For the purposes of this project, I will focus the historical overview of corporate personhood on that of
recent United States Supreme Court Cases.
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Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. (1853, 57 U.S. 314), a contrary ruling in the
case of Paul v. Virginia (1869, 75 U.S. 168) deemed that “the corporation was not a
citizen” was made a decade afterward. The case of Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Company (1886, 118 U.S. 394), approximately twenty years after Paul
v. Virginia, is incorrectly cited by theorists and scholars as granting corporations the right
to citizenship under the 14th Amendment (Yeoman, 2006).
Precedents established by more recent Supreme Court cases, particularly Carden
v. Arkoma Associates (1990, 494 U.S. 185), set the bar for legal precedence of corporate
citizenship. In Arkoma, the majority decision as reported by Justice Scalia found that the
citizenship of the corporation stems directly from the citizenship of the entity’s members.
The wording in Arkoma is mirrored in the majority rulings of more recent cases that
extend political speech rights granted to citizens, as natural persons, to the corporation as
a citizen. Interestingly, the dissenting opinion written by Justice O’Connor raises
concerns over the application of citizenship extending from the members of the entity.
The primary misgiving expressed in the dissenting opinion was the difference between
the form of the corporation under consideration in prior cases--joint-stock companies-and the organizational differences in corporations that are more commonplace now.
In the 150-year history of conflicting decisions, there is no clear consensus in case
precedent that firmly establishes how to interpret the legal personality of the firm. The
debate over how the American law would characterize the corporation traces back to
1809, but precedence was set circa 1844. The primary concern was to determine how best
to balance the power of corporations (e.g., to purchase property, disconnected from the
debts of shareholders, etc.) with the necessity to hold the “corporate body” responsible
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for its actions (see Barkan, 2006). The general sentiment, as reflected by U.S. jurists, was
that ensuring corporate responsibility through legal recognition and sanction of the
corporate body was the only sure means of protecting the public against the actions of the
firm (Barkan, pp. 168-69). There was and still is no consensus in case precedent over
core questions pertaining to the legal personhood of corporations. The sentiment from the
Court, however, has consistently recognized the duty of economic associations to
function within the constraints of the law and respect the rights of its members. Looking
into the most recent Constitutional law cases granting economic associations group rights
reveals how the juridical representation of the group has shifted, and the subsequent shift
in rights afforded the group.
1.5.1 From the Rights of Corporate Persons to Political Speech
The most recent principal cases that shaped and delimited this particular form of
group political speech rights were Buckley (1976, 424 U.S. 1) and McConnell v. FEC
(McConnell 2003, 540 U.S. 93). Buckley and McConnell set the limits on the extent to
which corporations could contribute to political speech through monetary donations.
Buckley found that spending money to influence political campaigns constituted a form of
political speech. McConnell, the most recent case (prior to Citizens), modified the
constraints of corporate political speech to close regulatory loopholes that allowed socalled soft money donations to candidates and campaigns on the part of corporations.
McConnell rested largely on the precedent set in Bellotti (1978, 435 U.S. 765) (to a lesser
extent) and Austin (1990, 494 U. S. 652).
Importantly, Bellotti and Austin held that allowing corporate associations to
engage in political speech was not reflective of the individual members’ speech. The
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model of group decisions and actions reflects the economic organization, not the
members making up the group. Bellotti, held that the protection of the freedom of
expression for those that engage in the exchange of political opinion in the marketplace
of ideas is not only about what is best for the individual; it is also an essential principle of
liberal democratic societies (435 U.S. 821). The decision in Bellotti held that the freedom
of expression is the cornerstone for open, free deliberation. This open and free
deliberation is, in turn, indispensable to ensuring that elected officials are representative
of and responsive to the needs of their constituents. This means that the proper function
of electoral processes is one conducted in a manner closely approximating the oneperson, one-vote principle, resulting in elected representatives who are reflective of and
responsive to those who voted them into office. When these points were combined with
the recognition that corporations could do things beyond the capacity of most citizens, the
decision upheld the need to regulate corporate speech, but did not ban it altogether.
Rather, it treated corporate political speech as a special case of expert speech. The Court
stated that corporate political speech may be valuable when the matters under
consideration directly pertain to the corporation’s business interests. The Court, however,
did not take up the abstract question of whether corporations have the full measure of
rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment (435 U.S. 777).
In Austin, the Court upheld censorship of corporate political speech, while
allowing some organizations comparatively more freedom of expression in the
marketplace of ideas, particularly media corporations. Media organizations, the Court
argued, do not use funds for political speech as a means of furthering economic gain;
rather, the fundamental role of the media is to provide information to general citizens and
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be a tool of democratic deliberation. As all organization-based speakers use money
amassed for political speech, the aims and goals of the association are brought to bear on
when and how different kinds of groups could have access to political speech.
Additionally, the Court cited the existence of PACs as a way for corporate members,
including employees, to donate to and engage in political speech on behalf of the
association. As a result, the Court found that the individual right of expression was
retained for citizens within such associations and at the same time addressed the
shareholder-interest concern. Consequently, the existence of separate PACs was used to
justify curtailing the political speech of corporations.
In the case of Citizens, concerns regarding the economic advantages of
corporations failed to gain the same traction. The Court pointed out that individual
citizens with independent means can spend unlimited amounts in support of political
candidates and issues. The Court took this point as evidence for the claim that no level
playing field in the marketplace of ideas exists; even between individual citizens, some
voices speak louder than others. In other words, the freedom of expression does not hinge
on citizens having the same ability of expression. If the argument that corporate
contributions for political campaigns will corrupt the marketplace of ideas is based on the
premise that such contributions will disenfranchise citizens, this argument loses its teeth.
If the playing field is already inherently unfair, insofar as it reflects the economic
conditions and the difference in abilities amongst citizens, does this then imply that we
should censor the economic influence of particular individual citizens? If not, then why is
the political speech of for-profit corporations and other forms of associations tightly
regulated and/or prohibited?
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This kind of reasoning, however, strongly relies on the tight connection between
the speech and the speaker. In the case of business firms, this tight connection falls apart
in two places: 1) the lack of external mechanisms that ensure members have a secured
right to have their voices reflected, and 2) lack of the means by which to ensure all
members within a group can be said to have a secured means of contesting the political
opinions of the group. In the case of the individual citizen, one person speaks, and we can
clearly infer it is her voice we hear. Whose voice do we hear when corporations speak?
To whom--that is, to which group of persons within the corporation--are we giving a
voice when we grant corporations speech rights?
When corporations had to contribute through a separately formed and governed
PAC, employees had a role in that voice. Moreover, through government mandated
PACs, differing political opinions, even those that conflicted, were ensured equal
representation in a manner that did not conflict with the cogency of the group’s agency.
For example, if half the members held opinion x and the other half held not-x, the PAC
contributions, when used to promote the ends of its members in the marketplace of ideas,
would financially support both x and not-x in direct proportion to member demands.
When we consider how this allows members to express minority and dissenting voices
through the mechanisms of political speech, it seems fairly democratic. Without this kind
of mechanism, the ability to express dissenting or minority opinions at the level of
corporate political speech effectively disappears. In other words, the Citizens decision
removed voices that were previously audible in the marketplace of ideas. In this way, the
connected PAC requirement was an external mechanism, which may have been unduly
burdensome for smaller businesses to establish and maintain, which ensured that a
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pluralism of opinions from a diverse member set were guaranteed autonomy and freedom
of political speech.
With the obliteration of the connected PAC requirement, employees’ voices—an
entire population of speakers—have been silenced within the group. For example, take
Joe, the mid-level manager at Bubba’s Big Bank. Joe has, at times, thought it important
to involve himself in the Political Action Committee of the Bank, and has donated
handsomely to the PAC fund. His voice, as a member of the bank, has elevated
candidates to office who raised minimum wage, secured more equitable treatment of
employees, and mandated paid vacations for workers. As a member of the bank, Joe’s
political speech was joined with the speech of others who felt the same and wanted to
effect political change. After Citizens, Bubba’s Big Bank dissolves the PAC. As a
consequence of the connected PAC’s dissolution, Joe can no longer voice his political
opinions in association with others in the group. This is to say that Joe has lost his ability
to be a member of the group and maintain his right to political speech in association with
others.
The Court might defend its decision by claiming that employee members still
have the power to form non-connected PACs; or the Court might make the stronger claim
that employees are not full members of the corporation—only shareholders are. The
claim that shareholders are the only members that ought to be given a secured means of
political speech within the corporate agent is problematic. However, even granting this
point, that is, even if only shareholders have a voice, it seems their only avenue for
dissent is an exit option; this does not seem to meet a robust contestability condition. This
decision, then, ignores the fact that shareholders are not free to express their political
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opinions in the way general citizens are free to express their opinions in the marketplace
of ideas.
1.6 First Concern: Economic Associations and Other Associations
Business enterprises, as Justice Kennedy recognized, are economic associations.
In the eyes of the law, corporations, one form of business enterprise, are artificial persons
created to serve the economic ends of the persons within the association. What this
means, although the ruling does not make it explicit, is that economic associations are not
voluntary associations with individuals as members, but primarily associations of assets
(Hacker, 1964, pp. 7-8). As mentioned in Austin, voluntary political associations “more
accurately reflect members' support for the organization's political views than does a
corporation's general treasury” (494 U.S. 652, 666, 1990). If the Court is going to base its
decision on an idealized model of corporate governance that does not mirror the reality of
corporate law, then it should provide some rationale for why the group is only required to
represent a narrow set of member preferences. In lifting the connected PAC requirement,
doing away with the limitations on political expenditures had the additional consequence
of removing an avenue for direct employee contribution (financially, at the very least) to
the group’s political speech. Even if this result was unintended, the Court cannot ignore
the double effect of the decision.
In order for a group of this kind to accurately reflect the opinions of its members,
the individuals making up the group must have a reasonable chance of shaping the
group’s opinion (or in this case, its speech). Employee members of corporate associations
often cannot willingly reject the political speech of the group without fear of reprisal. If
people do not have a protected and enforced right of expression within the group
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association, how can that association claim to reflect its members’ opinions? In the case
of corporate associations, if people fear reprisal there is little chance that their views will
shape those of the association, particularly if they espouse views at odds with the
corporate leaders (i.e., their bosses). This is to say that employee members of firms do
not have a legally protected voice option.
However, one could still respond that employees could participate in the political
speech of the group by forming and engaging in the marketplace of ideas through nonconnected PACs. If employee members can engage in the political speech of the group
through another avenue, this may allay the concern that they do not have a legally
protected voice option. This is to say that employees have not lost anything because they
can still contribute to non-connected PACs. This line of argumentation seems to miss the
point of speaking in association with others as members of the group, not just as
individual citizens. Moreover, many companies would not let employees represent
themselves as such (members of the economic association) in a non-connected PAC. If
employees joined a non-connected PAC, they would be doing so as individual citizens,
not as members of a group who wish to have their voice heard both within the group and
by others in the marketplace of ideas as recognized members of that group.
1.6.1 Sphere of Control and Employee Voice
List and Pettit, in the chapter on “The Control Desideratum,”17 distinguish
between content-independence and context-independence. When individuals are under
the domination of another, even if they can act in the manner they choose, they are not
free in the more robust sense of freedom from interference. This is content-independent
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The control desideratum explains the conditions under which group agents should be organized such that
they respect the sphere of control of individuals within the group.
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decisiveness. When the same individual is making decisions without the possibility of
interference from another, the situation is changed to one of context-independent
decisiveness (2011, pp. 133-35 and 145). This kind of fear of reprisal is an example of
how a person’s supervisor, manager, or a corporate leader could interfere with an
individual’s or group’s freedom of speech. In economic organizations, particularly those
that operate within at-will employment states, employees depend upon the goodwill of
others for their livelihood.18 Under perfectly competitive market conditions, employees
would always have an unhindered exit option. Given the absence of ideal economic
conditions, the right of political speech for employee members of the organization must
take the form of a protected and enforced voice option.
Following Hirschman’s theory of exit and voice, a voice option is a mechanism
whereby members attempt to change states of affairs within an organization to which
they belong through actions, protests, or petitions to the organization’s leadership (1970,
p. 30). Voice, however, could also be worked into the feedback mechanisms of an
organization’s structure to ensure that employee members have protected avenues of
contestability when it comes to issues concerning their personal freedoms.
One might defend the point of view that employees are not full members of the
economic association by arguing that employees contract their labor in exchange for
wages/benefits. Although the corporation may have duties to treat them fairly (i.e., pay a
living wage, provide sanitary working conditions, and not use forced labor), the
employees do not have a right to have their opinions reflected in the group (corporate)
political speech. To think otherwise would be to confuse labor capital with financial
capital, when only the latter has a stake in the corporate association. One might further
18

Except, of course, when an individual or group of individuals leads the organization.
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claim that only the shareholders are full members of the corporation, and it is this
aggregate of individuals that makes up the body of the corporate association; as such,
shareholders have the right to pursue corporate political actions that reflect their political
opinions. Their financial stake in the corporation is the true basis of this form of
association and, thus, the individual shareholders come together to control the interests of
the corporation, or at least they have the right to do so. Therefore, the Court ought to be
concerned with protecting the interests of the shareholder; this is the impetus behind the
shareholder-interest argument.
1.7 Second Concern: The Metaphysics behind the Decision19
The shareholder-interest argument is problematic for two reasons. First, this
argument presents a model of corporate speech rights that conflicts with case precedent,
which did give employees the opportunity to engage in group-level political action.
Consequently, in the case of Citizens, this argument assumes that the only citizens who
count as members of the corporate association are the shareholders. Such a position is
questionable in that it fails to provide a clear rationale for denying employee members
equal consideration and protection of political speech rights within economic
associations. In addition, it may be unethical if the basis for relegating employees to
second-class citizens within economic associations is that they are less economically
valuable. The second reason why the shareholder-interest argument is problematic is that
it is based on an idealized model of democratic debate and deliberation that does not
mirror the constrained reality of shareholder activism. This is to say that the Court
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This argument touches upon a broader question, namely, to whom does the corporation have a
responsibility? Although this question is interesting in its own right, it is largely outside this project.
However, the Epilogue will address how I see my claims coming to bear on the related question of
corporate social responsibility.
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believes that the shareholders have a protected right to have their voices heard. Not only
is this not the case, but no external mechanisms exist by which to enforce and protect the
options of voice and exit for shareholders (i.e., the law recognizes the duty of corporate
associations to reflect and respond to the demands of the shareholders). I will discuss
each of these issues in turn.
The Court, citing case precedent,20 claims that the rights of the individual, as a
member of an association, depend upon the ability of that member, or a majority of the
members, to have a voice reflective of the one-person, one-vote principle. In the case of
Citizens, then, the Court has in mind a democratized version of the shareholder primacy
model of corporate governance; shareholding members of corporations have direct
influence or control over the choices made and the actions of the corporation. The model
of group agency that arises is a majoritarian decision-making process set within the
context of a shared cooperative activity (Bratman, 1992b). The shareholding members
have overlapping and meshing sub-plans that share a similar aim. The shareholders
engage in democratic deliberations to come to an agreed upon group decision and then
present the decision to management for enactment. Justice Kennedy, citing precedent
from Bellotti, seems to have this type of model in mind as he states, “There is . . . little
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders through the procedures of
corporate democracy” (558 U.S. 50, 46, 2010). Although it may be the case that some
smaller business enterprises might exhibit democratic processes similar to those described
by Justice Kennedy’s statement, there is nothing inherent in the structure of the
organization that enforces or guarantees this.
20

It should be noted that one complication with corporate case law is that corporations are entities of the
state and, barring few instances, do not fall under the purview of federal regulation. As such, precedent
determining who has “a voice” in the corporation changes from state to state.
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The presentation of corporate democracy is analogous to the idealized debate in
the marketplace of ideas. In American jurisprudence, this sentiment is nicely captured by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.:
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas
— that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution
(Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616, 1919).
As Jill Gordon explains, this liberal interpretation of how the marketplace of ideas
operates is based in the Millian interpretation of free expression. By joining Mill’s
arguments from On Liberty with a free-market example, we get a picture of a conceptual
space in which all opinions are to be expressed; everyone comes to the market with his or
her ideas, and through discussion, everyone exchanges ideas with one another. The ideas
or opinions compete with one another, and we have the opportunity to test all of them,
weighing one against the other. As rational consumers of ideas, we choose the best
among them. In the same way that bad products are naturally eliminated from the market
due to a lack of demand and good products thrive because they satisfy a demand, so also
do good ideas prevail in the marketplace and bad ones are weeded out in due course
(Gordon, 1997, p. 245).
To carry this analogy forward into corporate associations, what we get is a picture
of a place (maybe a shareholders’ annual meeting) where all ideas are welcome.
Shareholders can join together to express views that they believe should be represented at
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the level of the group, and through rational deliberation (proceeding to a vote), what the
shareholders want—that is, the ideas that express the interests of the shareholders
(assuming we can make them one homogenous group) becomes reflected at the level of
the association. These ideas, or in this case acts of political speech, then enter the general
marketplace of ideas where general citizens (the other consumers of ideas) can take the
views expressed to be an adequate reflection of the shareholders’ sentiments. Thus, from
an outsider’s perspective, the ideas at the level of the group are indicative of the
individual members—that is to say, we can understand corporate political speech to
reduce to the political speech of its members. What shareholders have, and what
jurisprudence calls “corporate democracy,” is the right to exit through the sale of stock.
However, exit is not a sufficient replacement for voice; and a sufficiently robust
contestability condition should require both exit and voice.
1.7.1 Contestability as Exit and Voice
There is good reason to think that some corporations, particularly those that have
the economic means to “speak” loudly in the marketplace of ideas, are designed to pursue
the group goals, not the goals of the individual members making up the association. As
cited in Austin, the Court could claim ambivalence to this possibility; seeking to deal only
with cases that apply to the vast majority of economic associations that are not group
agents. If we justify the extension of political speech rights to corporations on the
grounds that these rights map onto the political speech of some distinct set of members,
group decisions that are consistently heterogeneous from the group member’s opinions
and decisions undermines this justification, and gives us reason additional reason to
proceed with caution.
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As I will discuss in the chapters that follow, the degree to which a firm is
responsive to its constituents, which include but are not limited to the shareholders,
depends more on the external environmental variables (such as size of the community,
cultural response to deviance, and degree to which the firm/group can internalize
knowledge, skills, and abilities), and is not something akin to the democratic nature of
corporations more generally. In the eyes of the law and the SEC, managers are not
required to reflect the consensus of either the board of directors or the shareholders if
they can show that the proposals at hand contradict the interests of the corporation (Lan
& Heracleaous, 2010, pp. 294-314). Moreover, as Anne Tucker explains, “political
expenditures and contributions fall under management decisions decided by a vote of the
board of directors or delegated to management, but are not subject to shareholder votes”
(2011, p. 528).21 Even shareholder derivative suits, one of the bastions of shareholder
activism, are limited in scope.
The Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Dodge 1919, 170 N.W. 668) decision is often
cited as an example of the strength of shareholder activism and influence in corporate
decisions. In the case of Dodge, Ford Motor Company was sued by the Dodge brothers,
who were minority shareholders in the corporation, for investing in the local community
instead of maximizing the wealth of the shareholders. The Court found that firms had a
duty to promote the shareholders’ interests first and those of the local community second.
Although Dodge has not been overturned, it does not adequately represent the precedent
used in corporate responsibility suits over the last three decades. Recent precedent set
with cases such as A.P. Smith Manufacturing Company v. Barlow (A.P. Smith 1953, 346
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U.S. 861) or Shlensky v. Wrigley (Wrigley 1968, 237 N.E.) have addressed the degree to
which corporate interests go beyond wealth maximization for shareholders.22
In the case of A.P. Smith, shareholders sued the corporation for philanthropic
giving to Princeton University. The Court ruled that corporate giving is an allowable
method of increasing good will in a community, something in the long-term best interest
of the corporation, if not in the best interest of the shareholders. The case of Wrigley,
where the majority shareholder disagreed with the business decisions of the company
director, held that disagreement with the decisions of corporate leaders was insufficient
for establishing wrong action. Even when the foreseeable consequences of management
decisions might affect profitability, shareholders were not in a position to overrule the
director’s decisions. Consequently, Wrigley set the standard higher for shareholder
derivative suits. For shareholders to bring a derivative suit against a company, they have
to show that the actions of management display a dereliction of duty (e.g., fraud,
nepotism, negligence).
If the shareholders have little right to intervene in the actions of corporate
directors and leaders in decisions that determine a company’s profitability,
competitiveness, or decisions resulting in donations to philanthropic organizations, it is
unclear why they would expect the directors or leaders to have any obligation to reflect
their political opinions in decisions to donate funds in support of political candidates or
issues. At the very least, a more compelling argument is necessary, one that explains why
acts of political speech differ significantly from the ways in which the corporation
secures its best interest in other arenas, such as philanthropic giving and major business
decisions. What basis do we have to think that fiduciary duty would bind the
22
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corporation’s expression of speech in the marketplace any less than it binds all of its
other actions?
These cases demonstrate that shareholders, like employees, lack a guaranteed or
enforced right of voice within the organization. In the case of Citizens, the Court must be
taking exit as sufficient for contestability of an organization’s actions. However,
contestability is not only about the right to exit. It also concerns the degree to which
members can change the organization from within. In the case of political speech, this
entails having a secured means of dissent and an effective means of shaping the decisions
that directly pertain to the shareholders.
1.7.2 Shareholder Primacy and Silencing of Other Stakeholders
The idealized notion of shareholder control and shareholder activism confuses
owning shares with the running the corporation. The directors of a corporation should not
be confused with its shareholders. Corporate directors and managers do not answer
completely to the shareholders; rather, they have a fiduciary duty to do what is best for
the long-term success of the corporation. Through the personification principle, by which
a corporation is recognized as a legal entity distinct from its shareholding members, the
law recognizes a conceptual space between its shareholders and the corporation itself.
This principle also forms the basis for the limited liability of shareholders (Lan &
Heracleous, p. 301). Additionally, if the case precedent is taken into consideration, there
is a clear duty on the part of the corporation, or more specifically its corporate directors,
to act in the best interest of all of its members.23
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One may wonder if Lan and Heracleous are intending to make a claim about the nature of the law or
about an ideal corporation. The answer is both; business and management theory often cite legal precedent
in support of their corporate models. When the business/management theorists look to the law for a
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It may, of course, be a good idea for the managers to keep the interests of the
directors in mind (since the directors employ them), just as it may be a good idea for
directors to keep the interests of the shareholders in mind (since the shareholders could
vote them out); this is not the same as saying that either group (managers or directors) is
required to hear the proposals of shareholders or that shareholders have a robust say in
the actions of the company. What the Court has in mind, then, is an idealized model of
shareholder activism and firm responsiveness. The Court presents “corporate democracy”
as a procedure by which shareholders can openly debate about proposals and enact
“legislation” with which the directors and managers would follow through.
This idealization of corporate democracy would more likely obtain if shareholders
have the freedom to openly challenge management decisions and corporate decisions
pertaining to political expenditures. Carried further this line of argumentation may give
us reason to think that shareholders with enough power, such as institutional
shareholders, might have the right kind of force (or at least enough voice) to compel firms
to enact their expressed beliefs and plans of action. Drawing a parallel between
shareholders and citizens in liberal democracies, we see that even if individual citizens
lack the ability to compel government action, a powerful enough group of citizens has a
better chance of doing so. Institutional shareholders, who constitute large unaffiliated
blockholders of stock, are more centrally organized and have a greater chance of
pressuring firms in their portfolios to enact changes (Smith 1996, pp. 231-32). However,
institutional shareholders effect change through settlements and side-deals, not through

metaphysical justification for the ideals they use as a basis for their business plans. Thus, an evaluation of
the nature of the law is necessary to make sense of corporate models.
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the democratic process of bringing proposals to proxy statements and soliciting a
majority of shareholders’ votes.
Here we see where the analogy breaks down: institutional shareholders do in fact
have a higher likelihood of having their proposals considered, but we also find that the
mechanisms in place for proxy votes on shareholder proposals have, at best, questionable
influence over the board of directors and manager initiatives (Hazen, 2006). Furthermore,
fiduciary duty binds institutional shareholders to their members (see Gordon & Pound,
1993). In other words, institutional shareholders are not free to challenge corporate
leaders in the way that general citizens are free to challenge the policy actions of
governments; they are explicitly constrained by securities regulations and fiduciary duty.
According to the SEC rules, section 14A-8, which outlines the rules and
regulations by which shareholders can place proposals on the company’s proxy statement
or add to the agenda at the annual meeting, a company can refuse to include proposals or
refuse to implement passed shareholder initiatives for a number of reasons, two of which
are most pertinent to considerations of political speech (Securities Lawyer’s Deskbook,
1998). A company can expressly exclude proposals or refuse to implement passed
initiatives if the proposal is made on behalf of a special/personal interest and not
reflective of the long-term interest of the company as a whole (reason #4) or if it would
interfere with the management functions or daily operations of the business (reason #7).
This means that even individual shareholders coming together to stand in support of a
given proposal are only allowed to have such proposals considered or implemented if
they are in accordance with the standards of fiduciary duty as the managers and board of
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directors understand it. Thus, shareholders are implicitly constrained by the same
standards as management.
Both of these interpretations of the SEC rule undermine the Court’s claim that
shareholders would be able, or even have a right, to control the political speech of the
corporation. The political strategies that are best for the corporation as a whole are not to
be confused with the political sentiments of its shareholding members, and this difference
limits the freedom and bindingness of shareholder initiatives. One consequence of such
rules is that the difference in political opinion between the shareholders and political
interests of the corporation allows corporate actors to dismiss shareholder initiatives as
special-interest laden. Similarly, motions that arise from differences in political opinions
between shareholding members and corporate management could just as easily be written
off on the grounds that they would interfere with the daily operations of the firm,
especially in cases where shareholder activism would result in higher transaction costs
(e.g., supporting candidates or legislation that are pro-union, would raise corporate taxes,
increase worker safety standards). This means that shareholder activism and control is
quite limited, as is shareholders’ ability to challenge the decisions of management when
actions do not reflect their sentiments.
A deeper point can also be made about the Court’s assumption that the
shareholders are the members of the corporate association and they (and only they) are
the individual citizens whose voice can be represented through corporate speech. This
exposes an inherent difference between the for-profit corporation and other forms of
associations, such as civic organizations, voluntary political associations, and PACs. It is
specifically through the ownership of capital that this form of association is able to
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operate; but for the shares of stock (i.e., the aggregation of assets of individuals toward
the end of business transactions), the corporation would not exist.
Although this is true in a superficial sense, this second tenet of the shareholder
primacy argument fundamentally ignores the contributions of a multitude of other
stakeholders24 who directly and indirectly make the large-scale enterprise possible.
Against the shareholder primacy argument, one could claim with equal force that these
stakeholders contribute to the existence of the corporate association just as much as the
shareholders. With even more strength, one could say that it is specifically through the
labor of the employees, the privileges of governments, and the resources of local
communities that this form of association is able to operate; but for the investments of
these stakeholders (i.e., the aggregation of assets of individuals toward the end of
business transactions), the corporation would not exist.25
Two prior conditions would have to be met for the Court’s claim that shareholders
can regulate corporate speech to remain valid. First, it would have to be the case that the
shareholders have, at the very least, a robust and clear Constitutional and corporate legal
claim on the actions of the corporation. In short, the shareholding members of economic
associations would have to possess a robust voice option. Furthermore, as political speech
is, by its very nature, personal and special interest-based, shareholders would require a
means by which to have their political opinions marked as special exceptions, thus
distinguishing political speech from other forms of interest-based initiatives. Second, if
we extend the Court’s ideal model of representation to include a more democratic
representation of group members, mechanisms would have exist for ensuring that
24

A few internal stakeholders include employees and managers, while external stakeholders include
vendors, customers, creditors, governments, and local communities.
25
This is another formulation of the stakeholder-interest argument.
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corporate political speech was responsive to a wider constituency of stakeholders--at the
very least, to employee members of the organization.
We are left, therefore, with disconnections at two levels of corporate governance.
On the one hand, a conceptual gap opens between the interests and political opinions of
the shareholders and those of the corporate directors. That is to say, there are clear breaks
in the degree to which the authority to speak is centralized in the way the Court implies.
On the other hand, a second conceptual gap opens up between the interests and political
opinions of the employee members of the corporation and the corporate directors and
shareholders. Although in some cases the individuals’ views connect or overlap with the
political speech acts of the corporation, such as might be the case in many Organic firms,
this should be considered a happy coincidence; there are no mechanisms that connect the
two. As such, economic associations do not act in a way that mirrors the vision of
associations put forward by the Court.
Without a direct, clear, and protected relationship between the managers,
shareholders, and employee members of economic associations, we are left with an
undemocratic representation of individual citizens; managers and leaders of corporations
do not in general directly “represent” the shareholders or employees in the same way that
elected public officials represent their constituents. Furthermore, shareholders, the
members recognized by the Court as having the right to political speech in economic
associations, lose the ability to meaningfully initiate political speech that mirrors their
own sentiments within the association. Additionally, this ruling fails to address the
concern that dissenting or minority shareholder voices may be silenced, as laid out in
Bellotti and Austin. In the final analysis, it seems that corporate political speech in the
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manner set forth by the Citizens decision curtails the freedom of expression, rather than
protecting it, as the Court intended.
In this chapter, I have not expressly advocated for a particular representation of
economic group agents in jurisprudence. Rather, my objective was to demonstrate how
the misrepresentation of the connections between group members and group opinions
(e.g., political speech) results in limitations in personal freedoms for group members and
individual citizens more generally. By illuminating the contrasting representations of
corporate design, member beliefs, and corporate action (i.e., political speech), I have
exposed some of the constraints actual systems (corporate law) place on idealized
theories (constitutional law) of group agency.
In the next chapter, I will look more closely at how particular kinds of firms make
decisions and which decision-making processes give rise to distinct group intentions and
actions. The analysis of group decision-making processes as it relates to group agency
will act as the foundation for the third chapter, where I will argue that economic group
agents are encouraged by capital market systems to develop strategic rationality, but
discouraged from engaging in moral reasoning when such reasoning produces judgments
that contradict strategic rationality. I will also offer a positive account of the necessary
environmental parameters (incentive structures and external structural constraints) that
would be encourage the development of virtuous group agents. As I will argue in the final
chapter, changing the external conditions of development will not be enough to consider
such group agents as full persons; it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. To be full
persons, group agents will need to demonstrate their capacity to enter into and engage in
a wider range of interactions; and this is where the limitations of group moral agency lie.
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Chapter Two
The Metaphysics of Group Agents: Groups, Minds, Groups with Minds
Groups display patterns of collective behavior that will be lost on us if we keep our gaze
fixed at the individual level. And to lose sight of those patterns is to lose an important
source of guidance as participants in a social world—List and Pettit, Group Agency
2.1 Introduction: Kinds of Groups
Microsoft decides to scrap new Zune models (TREFIS TEAM, 2011); but one can
rightly ask who is the agent here that is Microsoft? The board of directors? The
employees? The shareholders? Wal-Mart is charged with sex discrimination (Savage,
2011); does this mean that the legal persona we call “Wal-Mart” committed acts of sex
discrimination, or does this mean that individuals within Wal-Mart displayed systemic
discriminatory behavior against women? Mobs protest in Wisconsin (Rubin, 2011).
When the mob causes damage to public property, is it the group we blame or the
individuals who engaged in the protest? What consequence arises from viewing the mob
as anything over and above the individuals who engage in protest? In these examples,
references to the collective are not necessarily references to group agents, but constitute a
particular way of grouping the actions of individual agents.
We often speak colloquially of group action as shared action, that is, as action that
depends on the coordination between persons: we take a walk together (Gilbert, 1997),
they dance the tango (Bratman, 1993), and Finns go to the sauna every Saturday night
(Tuomela & Bonnevier-Tuomela, 1997). There are clear cases of groups being able to do
things that individuals cannot do on their own (e.g., one cannot riot, sing a duet, or dance
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the tango on one’s own). When individuals act in concert to perform group actions, are
they simply conjuncts of individuals or something more? Is the group, over and above the
individuals making it up, an agent in its own right?
On the one hand, a pair of dancers could not tango apart, but describing the pair
as an agent over and above the individuals seems superfluous. On the other hand,
describing a large corporation as a collection of individuals does not seem adequate when
such a description fails to fully explain how that corporation’s actions play out in the
world, or how to attribute responsibility to group members when their actions do not map
onto the actions of the group. For example, when a bank has instituted a series of policies
and procedures that result in over-investments in subprime mortgage markets, we might
be able to describe the action as resulting from decisions of individuals within the
company. This description only tells us one side of the story. As discussed in the previous
chapter, when the collective action is the result of a system that compounds human
actions, describing the action at the level of the collective gives us a conceptual
framework to understand group behavior in a way that reference to the actions of
individuals alone does not.
The general aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the types of
organized group actions explained by different contemporary philosophical frameworks,
the kinds of group action these theories do not account for, and how the picture of group
agency they present is unsatisfying. More specifically, this chapter aims to fill out the
account of what capacities these kinds of groups are capable of exhibiting, and the extent
to which these capacities enable the group to function as a moral agent in the world (i.e.,
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understand and engage in moral reasoning, make promises, and be held morally
responsible for its actions).
To begin this chapter, I raise two questions: First, if some groups might be the
kinds of things that could be agents, what is the difference between these kinds of groups
and other kinds of groups? Second, when might it be useful to describe a group as an
agent distinct from its members; this is to say, to understand it as if it were an entity
capable of reasoning and acting in accordance with practical rationality? I will take up the
second question by analyzing List and Pettit’s recent work on group agents, and the kinds
of decision-making processes that produce group agency. Getting a grasp on these two
questions will also serve to narrow the scope of the investigation and bring into focus
how we might understand the role particular structural variables in augmenting group
agency.26
I begin by examining collectives more generally. From there, I will turn to
demarcating the space between groups of discrete individuals who (sometimes) act in
concert and structured groups (i.e., collectives). I will work with the definition of a
“collective” as “an entity that has persons or other collectives as members” (Copp, 1984,
p. 249).27 Furthermore, I begin from the assumption that if group agency exists, it does so
within the confines of a collective.28 We could press this assumption and ask, what is the
relationship between collective action and group agency? In replying to this question, we
should distinguish between the theoretical goals of the joint intentions and collective
26

Chapter 3 will focus on why external constraints present in capitalistic business environments limit the
ability of these kinds of agents to enter fully into the space of obligations. The end of Chapter 3 will be
devoted to exploring what kinds of social structures would be necessary for List and Pettit-type group
agents to emerge and function. This will, consequently, call for a modified account of corporate
responsibility and interpersonal/intrapersonal group identity.
27
This definition is broad enough to encompass non-human members.
28
This is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
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action literature, and explain how this relates to understanding collectives as group
agents. In doing so, we can begin to get a clearer sense of how group agency can function
within the broader social and institutional framework, and how it is directly related to
questions of joint intentions and collective actions, but also importantly different.
2.1.1 Collectives and Group Agents
Collectives can be understood as the building blocks of our social units. They
participate in the processes that teach us our social norms, customs, laws, etc. When
collectives establish patterns that are relatively stable, they create systems of
organizations that form social institutions. Jonathan Turner explains that social
institutions are “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular
types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with
respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing
individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment”
(1997, p. 6). Different kinds of collectives, then, help to coordinate between individuals
and social groups to solve distribution problems, supply goods and services, and enable
individuals to live fulfilling lives. Additionally, collectives, as part of the process of
socialization, contribute to the normalization of behaviors, and consequently, are a
structuring process in our ability to be self-reflexive autonomous agents. How we
represent these groups and use these representations to model organizational
arrangements, is one of the ways in which we perpetuate systems of interaction.
Representing and understanding the group as an agent, distinct from the group’s
members, gives us a starting point to form different expectations of groups’ capabilities.
This kind of representation recasts the decision-making processes in the group as a means
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by which the group comes to know things about the world, forms intentions, and acts on
the basis of those intentions. When we recognize the product of this decision-making
process as stable and responsive to reason, we are representing the group as a kind of
agent. The ability to represent group behavior as agential opens up a conceptual space of
engagement where two different kinds of agents are engaging with one another;
individual persons and the group agent itself.
With this shift in representation, and the possibility of engaging with certain kinds
of groups differently, comes the ability to understand the role these kinds of groups play
in social institutions. As a kind of agent, these kinds of groups are not merely reflecting
the will of the members; something different is going on. Inasmuch as we value the
possibility of influencing the reflexive dynamics that perpetuate social institutions,
understanding how the scale of organization structures and possibilities of organization
capacities will open up the possibility of purposively altering the course of those
dynamics toward particular systems of organizations. Thus, getting a grasp on what kinds
of group agents are currently within the systems of organizations that make up social
institutions is the first step in determining the possibilities for group agency in general.
2.1.2 Collective Action and Group Agents
The primary characteristics that distinguish a collective from a mere group are its
level of complexity and its organization. That is to say, a collective is not simply the
aggregate of individuals that may be serendipitously performing the same action (e.g.,
everyone opening their umbrellas at the same time; everyone dashing toward the metro
car, Finns going to the Sauna, or teenage girls wearing miniskirts). Organized collectives
and associations form around a given purpose or goal (of which members are aware to
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some degree), have structures shaped by internal and/or external standards of inclusion
(i.e., membership conditions), and involve different levels of planned coordination with
the expectation of satisfying their goals. Getting a grasp on how groups act and how these
actions might be similar to or principally distinct from the individuals who make them up
begins by exploring the mereological map of the land.
The joint action literature focuses on explaining how people act together to give
rise to collective outcomes (see Gilbert, 1997; Bratman, 1992b, 1993, 2009; Pettit &
Schweikard, 2003; List & Pettit, 2011). When collective outcomes are planned and
coordinated, we can say that they involve joint intentions. Joint intentions are a subset of
the broader category of joint actions. People acting independently, without any
forethought or intentional planning, routinely give rise to collective outcomes. Even
when people are acting independently of others, they are still acting intentionally. Thus,
as Pettit and Schweikard argue, we have three main families of problems addressed by
the joint action literature:
The I-to-we issue: can I as a separate agent be rationally moved to think in weterms and act as the member of a plurality? Or is the shift to we-thinking
essentially subrational?
The we-as-acting issue: is the primary intention in joint action an intention that
we do something together, acting as one? Or is it an intention on the part of
each to do his or her bit?
The we-as-intending issue: is the primary intention a single state of ours,
intending as one? Or is each of us moved only by a separate, individual
intention? (2006, p. 20)
Michael Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, and Christian List and Philip Pettit put forth
three different accounts of how to respond to each of these three main families of
problems. When taken together (but not jointly) these three accounts seek to explain a
considerable assortment of group actions by appealing to the intentional states of
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individuals making up the group. Bratman takes up the task of describing social action
from basic cases of small groups acting in coordinated ways.29 From these smaller-scale
models, the eventual aim is to be able to scale up to explanations of larger, more complex
group structures. Bratman explains joint intentions, the fundamental building blocks of
joint action, through reference to the mental states (planning states) of the individual
members. Planning states have to be endorsed mental states that aim at the joint
intentional action, which are also referred to as shared cooperative activities. Tuomela
seeks to explain social level collective action through reference to the mental states of
individual members of a group that do not require intentional endorsement of the practice
as a jointly intending practice. Tuomela suggests that shared collective action necessitates
the acceptance of similar mental attitudes.30
Tuomela’s “we-attitudes” seek to explain the perpetuation of social practices.31
Such mental attitudes are much weaker in their content than a fully endorsed belief; one
must merely accept the role-based attitude, but need not actively or fully believe the
content of the proposition. Unlike Bratman, who claims that all members of a group hold
a belief to do their part in completion of the group action, Tuomela holds that shared
cultural backgrounds and institutional arrangements are sufficient for group-level actions
that display something like agency. Such group intentions require acceptance, but not
reflective endorsement.32 Thus, it is entirely possible for a wide range of groups to hold

29

A few examples of such basic cases discussed throughout Bratman’s writings are painting a house,
dancing the tango, singing a duet, and going to New York together.
30
Tuomela distinguishes between belief and acceptance in “Belief versus Acceptance” (2000). He rejects
the claim that acceptance of propositions entails belief (p. 10).
31
A few examples discussed throughout Tuomela’s writings are economic/financial practices based on
notions of money, acts of social imitation, or cultural norm following (putting up a tree and decorating it
during a certain time of the year, Finns going to the sauna).
32
In a weaker sense, reflective endorsement is akin to the attitude being warranted, where the attitude
supports actions aimed at some good. Reflective endorsement can be used in a strong sense if we require
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collective intentions as the basis for actions without believing the reasons for actions to
be true; the members can act as if x.
Group agency, for both Bratman and Tuomela, results from the coordination and
shared information amongst group members. This is to say, both theorists talk about
group actions independent of the structural constraints (e.g., regulatory frameworks,
social expectations of group functions) on social groups and group actions. Rather, they
want to focus only on what I call agent-side factors as a means to strip out the noisy
factors that structural variables, such as authority or power relations, might bring into
group actions. In doing so, their accounts build explanations of joint action and agency
into the mental states of individual actors.33
List and Pettit, building on Pettit’s earlier work on group agency, narrowly tailor
the kinds of collectives that have established mechanisms that allow the group to selfregulate. Groups of this kind may be organized as jointly intending collectives, but they
need not have such a demanding model of member interactions. List and Pettit define
group agency as members acting together “for the achievement of one result in particular:
the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of
consistency and rationality in adequate measure” (Pettit & Schweikard 2006, p. 18).
These groups, such as a team of flight deck personnel (see Weick & Roberts, 1993), must
be stable and function with a high degree of accuracy to achieve the organizational goal.
These efficiency demands result in organizational structures that produce group reasoning

the threshold for rationality to entail the employment of certain other capacities, such as employment of the
Categorical Imperative (Korsgaard, 1996) or, from an Aristotelian view, “the point of view of life as a
whole and how that life accommodates all goods found by the agent to be intrinsically important (finality
and self-sufficiency” (Harris, 1999, p. 97). An exploration of when and how an attitude is sufficiently
rationally endorsed is largely outside the scope of this project.
33
This is what Bratman means when he says that planning states are internal to the actors and are not
dependent upon or embedded in social institutions (1993, pp. 98-99).
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and decision-making. By identifying the necessary organizational structures that enable
group agency, List and Pettit help explain why the more general accounts of joint actions
as forming a network of individual action fail to represent and predict the behavior of
these kinds of collectives. In doing so, List and Pettit add another dimension to the joint
action literature, one that better explains the kinds of group actions that Bratman or
Tuomela’s accounts cannot easily explain.
2.2 Bratman’s Complexity Ceiling
Bratman develops his account by differentiating intentional states from other
dispositional states, such as beliefs or desires (see Bratman 1984, 1992a).34 Intentions, for
Bratman, are mental states used explicitly to simplify one’s reasoning for planning
purposes (1992a, pp. 4-6). Shared intentions underlying joint actions are part of the
framework agents use to plan present and future action. Intentions “help to organize and
to unify our intentional agency in ways to some extent [that are] analogous to the ways in
which the intentions of an individual organize and unify her individual agency over time”
(1993, p. 99). The content of the individual’s intentions is the common knowledge claim
of the other “to intend that we J.” In Bratman’s words, “our shared intention to J will
appeal to your and my intention that we J” (1993, p. 102).35 In addition to mutually
referential intentions, joint action for Bratman must satisfy the following conditions:
1) There exists a mutual intention of P and Q to J;
34

Bratman moves from talking about intentional states in his earlier work (1983, 1984) to talking about
intentions simpliciter (1992a, 1992b, 1993). Bratman’s earlier projects focused on distinguishing
intentional states from beliefs and desires as a means to put forth a new account of action that did not
reduce intentional states to complex desire-belief states (contra the desire-belief model). He shifted from
arguing against the desire-belief model to explaining different kinds of actions and the limits of planning as
a form of practical reason. Although he does not address this shift directly, the shift in word usage
coincides with this shift in focus. For ease of tracking I will only refer to intentional states, rather than
intentions, when I am discussing Bratman’s earlier work.
35
Bratman defends his account against claims of vicious circularity in “I Intend that we J” (1997, pp. 5561).
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2) The meshing sub-plans of the intentions of P and Q are in accord;
3) There exists common knowledge on the part of P and Q regarding 1 and 2
(1993, 1997, and 2009).
This account is designed to focus solely on particular sets of individuals involved
in group action. By tracking only the variables that rely on some particular set of
individual persons rather than others, Bratman front-loads his account to assume that all
groups will be of the same kind. Specifically, Bratman treats all groups as if they are
conjunctions of the intentions of the individuals engaged in the joint action(s). In addition
to sharing a common end, each member of the jointly intending group must make their
plans for engaging in the shared co-operative activity explicit; this is the common
knowledge requirement. But what happens if we run into a group that functions without
such common knowledge conditions being met? If we are restricting the possibility of
group action to those groups that can share intentions in the way described by Bratman,
this restriction also seems to limit the explanatory power of his analysis to only small
groups; that is, those groups that operate through intimate coordination, where the action
only involves the specific agent(s) referred to in the intentions of the other(s).36 This
severely limits the kind of joint intentions and joint actions the agents can engage in to
static, environmentally isolated actions. For example, we might be able to dance the
tango together, but can we open a business together? It may seem that the two are not that
different, but if we look more closely at the structures and, more importantly, at what it
takes to establish and maintain those structures as complexity increases, something more

36

As I will discuss later, this account, when it is used to inform models that predict and explain group
behavior on a larger scale, has normative and practical consequences. This undermines Bratman’s ability to
claim complete neutrality on the matter.
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than intentionality is needed to maintain coherent (organized), goal-directed, group-level
action.
The kinds of examples discussed by Bratman are those in which the primary
binding vehicle of the activity we are able to observe is the shared intentions of the
participants. Furthermore, the examples do not explain the importance of shared systems
of support that directly and indirectly result in the processes of planning and the
phenomenon we observe. Can we describe the shared activities of running a bank or a
restaurant using only the conceptual tools Bratman gives us? Do we really want to say
that the vendor supplying the restaurant with food and equipment is participating in a
jointly intended project of the food organization? Although this may sometimes be the
case, it seems that many employees, customers, and supporting social structures do not
engage in what we can properly call shared cooperative activities.
Even in cases where conditions of joint-intentionality are not met, when the right
kind of organizational structure obtains, organized, rational, goal-directed37 group action
can be achieved without the joint intentions of the individual members (List & Pettit,
2011, pp. 32-35). Looking at a few examples may help to draw out the significant
differences between the kinds of groups that depend to a greater or lesser degree on the
intentionality of the actors within the group to maintain the shared cooperative activities
(e.g., dancing the tango, painting a house) and other kinds of groups--in particular, the
kinds of groups that require the shared intentions of their members to maintain agential
capacities, the kinds of groups that require more than the shared intentions of its
members, and the kinds of group agents that do not depend on the shared intentions of the
group’s members to any significant degree.
37

In List and Pettit’s project, goal directed corresponds to propositional truth-tracking.
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For us to dance the tango together, that is to say, for our action to count as a
jointly intending venture, the dancers must make explicit the conditions under which the
tango will be danced. We might imagine that the pair discusses who will lead, where the
dancing will take place (the living room or the dance floor), which musical
accompaniment they want to dance to, etc. The structural components, which determine
the conditions under which two people count as dancing the tango, play a weak framing
role in the shared cooperative activity of tangoing. In other words, the only necessary
criteria for the joint action to count as such are the shared intentions of the dancers; the
external factors shape the action (e.g., the music playing, other obligations the dancers
may have, and the social norms governing the context in which they are dancing the
tango), but do not constrain the shared cooperative activity.
In contrast, the functions of a large corporation, such as United Healthcare
(UHC), provide a different type of joint action scenario. UHC employs 75,000 people,
and the member-set of employees, shareholders, directors, and vendors is constantly in
flux. Even if it were possible that they could all satisfy Bratman’s requirements for
sharing a group intention, the way that this sort of group comes into being and acts is not
only about the internal intentions of the group members. Rather, the function of
corporations, and similar organizations, is better explained by reference to the
organization structure, not to the intentions of the members. The importance of the
internal structure of the organization is its role in the development and maintenance of a
collective that can function as the basis for members’ common knowledge, which enables
the organization to withstand members whose sub-plans do not mesh, and deal with
turnover in member association and open-ended and ongoing interactions with
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unspecified agents (e.g., other social institutions, other organizations, and individual
persons).
There is, however, a fair amount of overlap between the conditions for sharing
intentions as the basis for actions and what happens in other kinds of collectives. When
we consider opening a business together, the initial member-set may be similar (i.e,. it
only takes two to open an LLC), and the individuals that want to incorporate must share
an intention to file the articles of incorporation; but as soon as corporate operations are
off the ground and the collective begins to change in structure, the similarities
correspondingly diminish. In some cases of genuine group agency, the similarities
between these two kinds of group action cease altogether.
This flexibility and propensity to change in organization membership and
structure can be understood to be a by-product of the kind of relationship the group has
with its parts, as well as the reason why Bratman’s analysis cannot provide explanations
for these kinds of group actions. The group may be dependent on its members in a
superficial sense; the members do keep the body of the corporation alive. On the other
hand, this kind of group has an existence distinct from its members; it has needs of its
own. Businesses need customers to buy their products, vendors to supply goods,
distributors to deliver products, and local governments to guarantee that contracts are
fulfilled. As the number of agents involved makes the common knowledge requirement
difficult to satisfy, we begin to create structural mechanisms, such as policies,
procedures, and formalized agreements enforced by regulatory bodies, to ensure
coordinated group behavior; we stop relying on our shared intentions forming the basis of
group action. This is not to say that group agents could not involve jointly-intending
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individuals, but the intentions are not what are doing the work. The content of the
intentions of agents involved in these larger scale groups can still be called joint
intentions. What makes the implementation of group structure (i.e., the formalization and
externalization of the content of the individual intentions into a non-human medium) that
individual agents work with (and could not complete the activity without the aid of) any
less of a joint intention? In an attempt to answer this question, I will explore what
variables can change this kind of shared cooperative activity into a form that outstrips
Bratman’s analysis. I will start by describing the kind of business operation that
Bratman’s account captures, and continue by adding structural complexities that mirror
the non-ideal reality of business operations. My aim in doing so is to make explicit how
structural variables, particularly the standardization and formalization of processes, alter
the interactions within shared cooperative activities such that the group actions become
different in kind from the shared cooperative activities Bratman is concerned with.
My example will begin with Peter, Mary, and Susie, who run a small independent
record store, PMS Records, a company that functions as an Organic firm. Peter handles
the billing, Mary interfaces with the customers, and Susie travels around the country
finding new and interesting indie records to stock the shelves. Each agrees on what the
others’ roles will be, each must act in coordination with the others if they want the
enterprise to continue, and each publicly agrees, intends, and acts as decided. As their
business grows, Jake and John join the ranks. Jake and John then decide to get married,
move to Canada, and eventually branch out to open their store. Both stores are considered
part of the same company: Is the business venture still a shared cooperative activity? Has
the addition of more people changed the joint intentions? Let’s push the boundaries a bit
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more: the company is now ten years old and has expanded to five locations in four states.
PMS Records employs vendors across three continents, interfaces with customers online,
and outsources their billing to India. How are these complex group activities sustained?
Explanation only at the level of the individuals coordinating within the group seems
insufficient.
Likewise, it seems simplistic to say that the only difference between these cases
of group activity is the scale of activities or the passage of time, or that the only thing
making up the interactions is the coordination of individual intentions in the “right way.”
Rather, the role of the internal organizational structure of the group increases in
importance because the standardization and formalization variables of the firm indicate
corporate intentionality more accurately than the combined intentions of the individuals
in the group. As groups become more complex, that is to say, as individual member’s
roles within the group are set up in such a way that the members do not take their
intending to J in the strong sense of satisfying the explicit individual intentions and
shared knowledge conditions, Bratman’s theory loses explanatory force.
Bratman’s complexity ceiling occurs at the level of group action that depends on
the structural mechanisms of organizational design more than on the joint intentions
between members. The organizational structures are a necessary part of group actions to
occur. Even when members do not jointly intend to J, they are what enables corporations
to engage in economies of scale. I take it that Bratman’s account runs into a complexity
ceiling quite quickly; specifically, as soon as a shared intention or action becomes
ongoing and the organization configuration becomes highly structured. Tuomela’s
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account might offer us a modified version of joint intentions that is able to explain largescale group actions.
2.3 Tuomela’s Structural Passivity
Tuomela aims to “somehow carve the social world at its joints to achieve a
workable classification of collective action,” by building an account of social action that
works with a broader definition of a collective (Tuomela & Bonnevier-Tuomela, 1997, p.
1). Tuomela’s definition of collective social action is that which “entails, roughly, that
several persons are somehow involved and ‘social’ entails that the actors’ reasons for
acting must refer to other actors or to some other social—i.e., institutional—factors” (p.
2). Tuomela expands the picture of social actions to collectives embedded in a social
context and uses this shared context as a basis for coordinated social activities. He
reevaluates the concept of belief motivating actions, in part, because he seeks to explain
“actions involving several agents exercising their agency” and not specifically joint
intentional action (Tuomela, 1997, p. 2).38 These sorts of actions are what he calls “thin
cases [of] joint or collective commitments generated by joint intentions” (Tuomela, 2005,
p. 346). Since Tuomela is starting off with more complex activities at the level of
collective behavior, and his level of individual member involvement is much less
dependent upon members’ jointly intending to J, his account could more fruitfully
explain larger scale coordinated group actions.
Tuomela’s analysis focuses on group actions that do not require joint intentions of
group members. One example he discusses requires the acceptance of the claim that
squirrel furs are money in a social collective. In the case of we-mode acceptance and
resulting acceptance belief, the collective will share the content (i.e., for them it is correct
38

Emphasis added.
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to assert that P and to act on P in group-related activities); they are entitled to assert, “We
believe that P.” Furthermore, when agents employ the we-attitudes, they must be
collectively prepared to sanction each other and to be sanctioned by the others (2000, pp.
12-13). Other examples he discusses are teenage girls all wearing miniskirts, Finns going
to the sauna on Saturday nights, etc. These kinds of acts, Tuomela claims, are supported
by socially held collective attitudes that are carried out without reflective belief in the
content of the attitudes.
From the outset, the kinds of actions that might display something like group
agency are not people displaying similarly minded actions on a large scale, but distinctly
organized action as part of a more exclusive collective. Turning to the example of the
business organization, it seems the kinds of group actions Peter, Mary, and Susie perform
are more than a thin collective commitment. Their intentions were made public, they
voluntarily accepted their roles in relation to one another in pursuit of their jointly
intended goal, and they exercised group actions.39
Returning to the example of the firm that has a higher degree of standardization
and formalized processes, Tuomela’s account fills in more of the story about how we can
describe the connections between the greatly extended and loosely bound collective
making up the company. When we situate the company in the context of organizational
structure, Tuomela gives us the conceptual tools to explain how the individuals are
connected in the right ways to thinly commit40 to the goals of the collective (i.e.,
39

What Bratman would call shared cooperative activities.
Thin commitment, for Tuomela can be understood as committing to the actions (voluntarily accepting the
role, pressing buttons, etc.) without endorsing the ends of the organization as their own. For example, I
could be hired by Bank of Shamerica as a bank clerk, thinly commit to the organizational goals associated
with my job (depositing checks, giving folks money from their accounts, helping people fill out paperwork)
without endorsing the organizational aim to be the largest bank in the United States (or any other general
organizational goal).
40
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continued success of the company).41 This, in turn, might tell us something about why
they join collectives more generally, but not how these thin commitments translate into
group actions in an interesting way. The problem with Tuomela’s account is similar in
kind to the problem with Bratman’s account: both treat the structure as if it plays a
passively framing role, not a direct causal role in the production of group action.
Part of what seems to be missing in the accounts of Bratman and Tuomela is a
more thorough analysis of the dynamic interactions between the individuals within the
group and the group’s structure. Even in smaller scale organic firms, the organization’s
configuration dictates how members will be able to engage in shared intentions, how they
will interact with one another, and the degree to which individuals need to commit to the
actions of the group to achieve organizational goals. Within highly structured groups, the
organization structure and decision-making processes do not merely frame the situation;
they are essential to the group becoming and functioning as an agent. If the agency of the
group arises not simply from the members of the collective, but also from the way the
group is structured, how are we to understand when and how the structure itself changes
the agency of the individual members to produce group agency? Did the members of the
group function together to make group-level decisions that were distinct from the
attitudes or beliefs of any one member? If so, does this undermine the group action as
collective action? How much does the stability of the large-scale group depend directly
on the individuals making it up in the same way that Peter, Mary, and Susie depended on
each other to be in business? If there is a conceptual space where the group actions are
distinct from the members, whom do we hold accountable for actions committed on
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Success is framed in a myriad of ways; for our purposes here, success means maximizing output (where
output can also be measured in a variety of ways).
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behalf of the group? Is it redundant to hold the group accountable when we also hold
accountable the individual group members who contribute to the group actions in a
significant way?
Taking a step back from the abstract characterizations of how people coordinate
will allow us to look at the way group decision-making processes, which constitute one
aspect of organizational structure, result in the manifestation of decisions that cannot be
explained as a mere repetition of the group members’ personal opinions. Independent of
the beliefs or attitudes of the members, it is the group’s structure and the way information
flows through the structure that is essential to explaining group agency. By mapping this
structure, we can pinpoint what kinds of decision-making processes are capable of more
than merely producing heterogeneous group beliefs and judgments. List and Pettit claim
that some groups are capable of internal processes that replicate some of the cognitive
capacities of human agents. These processes enable the group to make judgments about
states of affairs and to act based on those judgments. Thus, List and Pettit claim, we can
understand the group to function as a kind of agent. Although the group agent is not
locationally similar to individual persons,42 the group agent is recognized by the
institutional framework and is able to engage with other individual persons and social
institutions.
List and Pettit’s account aims to explain the presence of these kinds of group
agents in a variety of corporate forms, including nation-states, political organizations,
religious organizations, and business firms. Although I grant that explaining the logical

42

In that there is no “there” there; the personhood of group agents is quite different from the personhood of
other individuated agents. I cannot point and declare, “There’s Bank of America” in the same way I can
point and declare, “There’s Emre.” The latter has a specific reference that has to do with a given body in
space and time; the former does not.

74

possibility of group agency in a plethora of corporate agents may be plausible on their
analysis, I hold that we need a more nuanced discussion about how we can constrain the
development of each kind of corporate agent. The organizational structures and realworld systems of constraint for each kind of corporate agent have a particularized history.
For example, the juridical representations of democratic decision making inform how we
develop legal constraints in order to bring about democratic governing bodies. Likewise,
the neoclassical economic representations of firm function inform how we organize
business organizations. The histories of different kinds of corporate agents will come
with varying degrees of transparency, making some kinds of corporate agents easier to
analyze at the level of the interrelations between social representations of the group and
systems that control group functioning. As each kind of corporate agent will necessitate
its own personalized analysis of how we, in this world, can use a theory of group agency
to develop more ideal group agents, I will focus on economic group agents (i.e., business
firms).
2.4 Expanding the Scope of Group Capacities: List and Pettit’s Theory
List and Pettit develop an account of the kinds of groups that may be candidates
for group agents. On their functionalist account, they explain group agency by first
looking at what groups do (i.e., their actions in the world), and then describing how the
inputs from individual members of the group produce this phenomenon. Starting with the
aggregating decision function, which is the process whereby individuals input their
beliefs and opinions (or data) to make collective judgments that act as the basis for group
decisions and actions, they argue that a group might have a “mind of its own” when the
inputs of the system produce group decisions and actions sufficiently distinct from those
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of the members. For example, if the board of directors of firm x is determining which
candidate to hire as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the process that they use to make
the collective decision is a kind of aggregate function. Taking into consideration the
rationality requirement groups must meet to be candidates for group agency, the type of
aggregate function that might produce consistent and coherent group decisions and
actions will be highly standardized and formalized within the organization structure.
Through the aggregate decision-making process, the group is able to consider
statements upon which they make judgments, and these judgments function as an
expression of the group’s intentions. These statements are reflective of states of affairs in
the world, and the members input data about the group’s external environment in such a
way that the group, through its decision-making process, forms representations about the
world. After group judgments are made, the group members act in such a way as to
purposively effect change in the world in accordance with the group’s intentions. The
group must also have an error detection processes to determine if it is satisfying its
intentions, adjust its plans in light of changes in the world, and determine the degree to
which it is truth-tracking.43
When these conditions are met, List and Pettit argue that a phenomenon results
wherein the group displays rational judgments (coherent judgments that do not logically
contradict), reasons about the world, and changes its mind. In this case, the group’s mind,
or the group’s mental states, are multiply realizable; there is a higher-level description of
group processes in terms of their causal role that abstracts from the group’s lower-level
structure. In other words, the group functionally exhibits the capacity of practical
43

We should expect such possibilities when the aggregate function works with a high level of
effectiveness; that is to say, when the member input and aggregate function is able to process judgments
that display rationality and logical consistency in judgments, it is working effectively.
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reasoning. This ability, the ability to engage in practical reasoning, is what enables
particular kinds of groups to be considered agents. Moreover, with the ability to engage
in practical reasoning we would expect the group to display means-end coherence and
persist through time (be a stable agent).44 The kinds of organization structure that could
support these kinds of requirements would be those that have a high degree of
standardization of procedure and a high degree of formalization, but not a highly
centralized decision structure; such would be the case in a factory firm, a bureaucratic
firm, or a hierarchical firm.
2.4.1 Taking Group Agency Seriously
List and Pettit recommend that the way to “see” groups as agents, and not merely
as a collection of individuals, is to alter our representation of the group action. Instead of
only looking at the “parts” (individual group members) and explaining the group action
in terms of how the individuals are joined together, they suggest representing the
corporation45 as a collective agent.46 However, List and Pettit argue that we are justified
in endorsing these kinds of representations about groups because they accurately depict
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Human agents (i.e., persons) can experience a range of mental states that even the most complex group
agents cannot track with the group’s aggregate decision processes. Even if we could explain the cognitive
processes of group agents by taking them to be exactly equivalent to their human counterparts, I take it to
be noncontroversial that group agents do not experience the full range of mental states human agents do.
For example, group agents, such as Microsoft or Wal-Mart, do not actually feel pain, get hungry or angry,
or become sexually aroused.
45
List and Pettit use the term corporation to refer to a range of organized collectives, including churches,
states, business firms of various kinds, and voluntary political associations (e.g., teacher’s union,
Democratic Party). Since my analysis is limited to economic group agents, my use of the term corporation
should be read more narrowly to mean only economic organizations.
46
List and Pettit use the language of the ‘intentional stance’ to argue that part of adequately accounting for
group behavior (before we can suggest novel ways to interact with it, hold it responsible, or structure it
differently) means seeing it as the sort of entity that might exhibit intentionality (p. 23). I, however, will
keep it simpler and make reference to the representation of the group organization and design. The
language of representation (i.e., the description or portrayal of something being a particular way) gets the
theoretical work done just as well.
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facts about the world. Thus, they argue that their account defends an epistemic realism47
about group agents. This means that they take beliefs about group agents as sometimes
true, and that these are made true by stance-independent facts and properties about the
group itself. In accordance with the realism about the group agents they are endorsing,
List and Pettit present an explanation of collective action in terms of the aggregation of
individual decisions. They call their approach “individual holism.”
The sense of individualism they ascribe to simply means that, “as the agency of
individual human beings depends wholly on the configuration and functioning of
biological subsystems, so the agency of group agents depends wholly on the organization
and behavior of individual members” (2011, p. 4). List and Pettit distinguish their
account from classical accounts of collective aggregation decision making,48 which hold
corporate agents to be a means by which group members can off-load responsibility to an
empowered individual or democratic process, by arguing that group agency requires the
group to have a mind of its own. When individuals are members of organizations, and
these organizations contain certain internal structures, the actions resulting from the
group are not “a systematic function of the attitudes of the members” (List & Pettit, 2011,
p. 10); this is the sense of holism they want to build on.
List and Pettit’s endorsement of individual holism stems primarily from a concern
to avoid a metaphysically “spooky” notion of group agents in which the group somehow

47

While List and Pettit do not distinguish epistemic realism from realism broadly construed, it would
follow from their commitment to avoid a “spooky” metaphysics that they limit their discussion of realism
to the idea that what one knows about an object exists independently from one’s mind.
48
Among the theories they count as authoritarian theories of individual holism are those put forth by
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. I will not be making any claims about how well or poorly their depiction of
these classical accounts of group action fit the mold of individual holism.
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emerges from the individuals.49 They believe individual holism allows them to avoid the
position that an account of group agency “requires something above and beyond the
emergence of coordinated, psychologically intelligible dispositions in individual
members” (p. 10).50 The decision-making process, which is the structural process that
governs how information moves from individuals through the organization, is the
mechanism that produces those group beliefs and judgments that are not explainable in
terms of the individual member’s beliefs and judgments. Thus, the group’s beliefs and
actions, while not simply a reflection of the beliefs of individuals in it, literally would not
exist without the group members fulfilling their roles. In other words, what is appealing
about individual holism is that it does not seem to require any other metaphysical
properties apart from the group members, a particular kind of group structure, and an
aggregate decision-making process to produce a group agent. The real explanatory work,
then, begins by looking more closely at the necessary aspects of the internal and external
variables that together produce group agents.
Even when systems of aggregate decision making seem to produce judgments that
are consistent with practical reasoning, we still have to explain how this representation of
the group (i.e., as a rational agent) can act as a model for decision-making processes
within groups. That is to say, we still have to explain, if we want to promote group
agency in organizations, how we can organize the decision-making processes toward this
end. List and Pettit explain the more demanding organizational design epistemic,
incentive, and control desiderata that will need to be met to ensure group agency. As we
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Although this sentiment seems to rely on a problematic relationship between emergence and
reductionism, I will largely sidestep this point, as an in-depth explanation as to why this is the case is
outside the scope of this project.
50
Emphasis added.
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explore these desiderata, I will focus my analysis on the degree to which the kind of
agency that arises in groups is the similar to the kind of agency we expect from human
beings.
As I will argue in the next few sections and throughout the project, economic
group agents are limited in the extent to which they can engage in moral reasoning. These
limitations will come into focus when we look at the context in which group decisions are
made about morally weighty considerations (i.e., questions pertaining to fairness, justice,
equality). List and Pettit outline more stringent requirements for bringing group decisionmaking processes closer to a model that produce group moral reasoning, but I will argue
that even when we satisfy their desiderata, economic group agents will still be limited to
a kind of practical reasoning (not moral reasoning). Although the kinds of systems List
and Pettit discuss may be possible, they are highly idealized. Given the external
environment in which corporate agents exist, such an idealized account may not be
probable.
2.4.2 The Epistemic Desideratum, Rationality and Truth-tracking
A group agent’s consistency is one of the qualities that distinguish it from a mere
collection of individual judgments. We can determine a group’s consistency by tracking
its reasoning, which is measured and determined by whether group actions can be
functions of an entity that persists through time with a coherent history of beliefs and
desires even when significant changes to its members occur (List & Pettit, p. 32). If a
group makes inconsistent judgments and acts in a way that contradicts its prior
commitments on a regular basis, it would be difficult to understand the group level as
engaging in practical reasoning reflective of rational engagement with the world. Without
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consistency in judgments, those outside of the group would have a difficult time
attributing rationality in decision making to the group agent. For a group to demonstrate
rationality, it must have a decision-making process that aggregates the beliefs and actions
of the individuals, considers them against the interests of the group, and enacts group
decisions and actions that create changes in the world in a consistent manner (List &
Pettit, p. 24).
By casting the reasons underlying the group attitudes and actions occur as
products of the aggregate function, List and Pettit avoid the demand to have all the
members of the group form and enact a single system of beliefs and desires or hold the
group’s attitudes as their own. It may happen that, more often than not, group agents have
members that do, in fact, share the same beliefs as the group, and jointly intend to carry
out the goals of the collective, but this need not be the case. What is necessary for groups
to be agents is consistency in judgments and actions through information pooling and
accuracy tracking (List & Pettit, p. 94), which is done in three ways. First, the group’s
organization must aim for attitude-to-fact standards, which ensures that group-level
beliefs about the world are true and that actions aim to realize its ends. Second, the
group’s organization must aim for attitude-to-action standards, where the group
designates some person or set of persons to function as “enactors” to program or carry
out actions on behalf of the group. Third, the group’s organization must aim to ensure
attitude-to-attitude standards, where the group’s organization seeks to uphold a coherent
whole (List & Pettit, pp. 36-37). By getting clear on how these three standards of
organizational rationality are built into the group’s aggregating function, and the kinds of
organizational decision-making processes that support this aggregating function, I will
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have a starting point from which to analyze the ways these organizational structures
encourage or block the development of moral group agents.
The primary aim of the aggregate function is to overcome the possibility of a
discursive dilemma so that group decisions do not result in inconsistent judgments; this is
the basis of the epistemic desideratum. A discursive dilemma is a paradox in social
choice theory resulting from majoritarian voting procedures. The paradox is that
aggregating judgments with majority voting procedures can result in self-contradictory
judgments.51 The aptly named paradox arises when majoritarian decision procedures
result in group-level aggregated decisions that are inconsistent with individual decisions
on the statements. The discursive dilemma is problematic because it gives rise to
irrational preferences, which can result in incoherent beliefs between the members’
expressed preferences and the group-level expression of those preferences. An example
of a discursive dilemma is illustrated as follows:
Table 2.1 Discursive Dilemma in Majoritarian Decision-Making Processes52
Discursive Dilemma
In Majoritarian
Decision Processes

Statement ‘p’
Increase Prices?

Statement ‘q’
Reduce Spending?

‘p’ or ‘q’
Increase prices or reduce
spending (to ensure
solvency)

Individual 1
Individual 2
Individual 3
Majority

Preferred
Dispreferred
Dispreferred
Dispreferred

Dispreferred
Preferred
Dispreferred
Dispreferred

Preferred
Preferred
Dispreferred
Preferred

To overcome the discursive dilemma, the decision-making processes should aim to form
beliefs that produce true, rather than false, judgments about the world (List & Pettit, pp.
98-100), compare these judgments to prior judgments, and revise decisions based on
changes in the world. This will mean that the aggregating function, the group’s structural
51
52

For more on the discursive dilemma see List and Pettit (2004).
I adapted an example based on the table in List and Pettit, p. 46.
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mechanism that pools information from group members, must operate with a sufficiently
high level of reliability, have access to states of the world, and be able to incorporate
reasoning constraints. List and Pettit advocate implementing a straw vote decision
procedure as one method for avoiding such inconsistencies.
As List and Pettit explain, a straw-vote procedure is a non-binding decisionmaking process that allows for sequential priority of previous decisions to constrain the
possible avenues of new attitudes or group decisions. As the decision-making process is a
premise-based decision procedure, wherein judgments that are made about the premises
necessary for the conclusion are made separate from decisions about the conclusion,
consistency is ensured when conclusions are constrained by past decisions on related
issues. For example, if law makers are considering whether to build a school, they may
agree that schools are important and that current schools are overcrowded, and they may
also agree that they have the money and resources necessary to build a new school, but
the judgments they make when they consider the question of building a school may or
may not be connected with these previous judgments. By constraining group judgments
by past decisions and related judgments, a straw-vote procedure is the most likely to
ensure that group members engage in feedback and produce coherent, consistent
decisions.
Through the process of feedback mechanisms to guarantee consistency in
judgments, the group is also enacting a causal relationship between the individual-level
decisions and the decisions that occur at the level of the group (List & Pettit, pp. 62-63).
The internal structure, when composed to a truth-tracking and truth-indicating decisionmaking process, produces group behavior that reflects systematic perturbability (ability to
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register and remedy inconsistencies), contextual resilience (ability to recognize abstract
goals as targets and the different ways for realizing them), and variable realization (group
attitudes are a causally relevant factor that programs group action, and group behavior
displays itself in a way that is not easily an extension of nor easily reduced to the
attitudes of individual group members). This method produces reliable judgments (List &
Pettit, p. 94) that, in turn, stabilize the intentions of the group by ensuring that the inputs-the attitudes and beliefs of the members--result in the “output” of collective
rationality.53,54
The straw vote decision-making process described by List and Pettit give us a
starting point for how group information pooling can result in decisions that are stable
and reflective of collective, as opposed to individual, intentions and beliefs. The next step
in explaining the plausibility of redescribing organizations as group agents is to explain
how people fit into this decision-making process. Specifically, we will need to fill in the
story about how people are necessary for information processing, but explain why their
beliefs do not affect the beliefs and decisions of the group agent.
2.4.3 Spheres of Control, Rights, and Freedom
List and Pettit explain the relationship between the group’s intentions and the
intentional states of the individual group members as a supervenience relation. They state
that the supervenience relation “leaves open the possibility that while the ‘lower level’
53

As discussed in depth by List and Pettit, the satisfaction of all criteria of the epistemic desideratum runs
into an impossibility paradox similar to Arrow’s theorem (p. 50). List and Pettit recommend relaxing the
systematicity requirement to work as “a premise-based or sequential priority procedure to enable a group
not only to form rational intentional attitudes but also to do so in a way that collectivizes reason” (p. 58).
54
List and Pettit discuss the possibilities of decision design, including dictatorships, majoritarian voting
(which gives rise to the discursive dilemma, discussed above), unanimous decision voting, and strawvoting procedures. For the purposes of this project, I will only discuss the discursive dilemma and why
majoritarian voting procedures cannot adequately perform as an aggregate function to produce distinct
group-level judgments and actions, and the conditions under which a straw-voting decision procedure is
able to do so.
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pattern determines the ‘higher level’ pattern, the higher level pattern may be realized in a
number of lower level ways” (p. 65).55 List and Pettit’s concept of supervenience roughly
expresses that individual beliefs necessarily fix group beliefs, however, group beliefs are
not strictly reducible to individual beliefs. In other words, the supervenience relation in
their account is not symmetric. This epistemic gap between the group-level agent and the
member-level agents is another one of the necessary conditions for considering groups to
be a kind of agent.
It is this gap between what individual qua citizen might prefer and what the
individual qua member of the group might prefer that List and Pettit address with their
incentive-compatibility desideratum. The incentive compatibility desideratum places
special constraints upon the organization so that the group agent becomes incentivecompatible in the face of strategic individual action. One of the strengths of their account
is that List and Pettit build it with real-world conditions in mind, such as disparities
between individual and group beliefs. The incentive-compatibility desideratum discusses
strategies for maintaining coherency of group decisions, despite these conditions. One
such challenge is that a group agent must have mechanisms to ensure that its aggregate
function can withstand the propensity for individuals to have strong inclinations or
preferences to act in their own interest, or display what List and Pettit call “individual
strategic behavior” (p. 104). The incentive-compatibility desideratum describes properties
that are rational for individuals to act upon, given internally (group-based) and externally
(society-based) existing social mechanisms (p. 105).

55

This type of many-one relationship is also able to deliver the multiple realizability criteria necessary to
pass the test of group agency.
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Given the fact that individual members may not always act out of group
preferences, and considering that individuals within groups have a slight peer-conformist
preference, List and Pettit discuss strategies to incentivize members to act in the group’s
interest. Such strategies can take the form of modifying the incentive structure of an
organization (organizational route), modifying the individual member’s preferences
(behavioral route), or some combination of both (pp. 119-28). Such strategies are
intended to help enable individual members to endorse and enact group attitudes (p.
128),56 and List and Pettit argue that one way to do this is to organize group policies in a
manner that respects the rights and freedoms of members; that is, in a manner that
respects their sphere of control. By examining the sphere of control, we start to get a
clearer picture of the ideal kind of organizational structure, and the resulting ideal group
agent, List and Pettit have in mind.
On List and Pettit’s account, the sphere of control in organizations pertains to
issues of personal significance (autonomy rights) and issues of special expertise
(expertise rights) (pp. 129-31). The control desideratum dictates that when corporate
agents make judgments that pertain to these spheres, the individual ought to be able to
exercise control over group decisions as a means of protecting that individual’s rights.
Unlike the control of the supervenience relation, where we understand the group-level
attitudes to come from the individual members even when those attitudes are quite
distinct from the attitudes individual members might endorse for themselves, decisions
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In Chapter 4, I will discuss the process of group buy-in in more detail, particularly the ways in which
buy-in is a transformational act that shapes how individuals make sense of themselves and their
possibilities of being outside of the organization. The focus in this part of the project is to discuss the
different aspects of organizational design that enable a group to produce autonomous judgments and
actions at all.
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which affect the realm of autonomy or expertise rights ought to be decisive.57 The ideal
situation presented is a group whose agenda is set in such a way as to limit
interdependencies so that individuals do not logically conflict with the judgments in
anyone else’s sphere of control. There are two points of contention with this kind of
ideal: one that List and Pettit address and one they do not.
The problem they address is that we live in an interconnected world where issues
often cross a multitude of different persons’ spheres of control. In response to our
interconnectivity, List and Pettit entertain three possible solutions: lower the standards of
control to allow for democratic decision making, make individual control less robust, or
shrink the individuals’ spheres of control (pp. 138-44). Although there is no one answer
to such problems, List and Pettit discuss the ways in which different kinds of groups
might address such concerns. The most plausible scenario would be to aim at ensuring
that decision-making processes remain as resistant to errors in rationality as possible
while relaxing the formal rules of decision-making processes,58 thus protecting individual
choice from the interference of others in a manner that will not affect consistency of
group judgments (p. 146).
The problem they do not address is whether it is desirable to endorse the picture
of autonomy this notion of freedom and the idea of spheres of control gives us. This
concept of freedom, which Pettit develops in Republicanism (1997), and List and Pettit
bring into Group Agency, has as its foundation the ideal of freedom as non-domination
57

Decisiveness is defined as a judgment coinciding with the member’s preferences on the proposition
under consideration (p. 131). The notion of freedom at play is rooted in the republican notion of freedom as
non-domination. Non-domination goes beyond the conception of freedom as non-interference to noninterference plus the absence of anyone else’s capacity to interfere (pp. 135-36).
58
List and Pettit refer to this as relaxing substantive robustness, which refers to measuring robustness of
decision-making processes as a function of statistical accuracy, while loosening formal robustness, which
refers to the strict adherence to rule-guided decision processes.
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being necessary for ensuring an individual’s right of self-determination. However, List
and Pettit have not explained why we should accept that this is the account of freedom
and autonomy organizations ought to promote.
Although the ideal of freedom from arbitrary interference carries with it freedom
from oppressive conditions for those populations frequently found in dependent
situations, such as the exploitation of women’s labor or forced child labor, it does not
offer us a positive account of what appropriate dependency might look like. Dependency
amongst persons is not something that happens only in the context of intimate
relationships in the private sphere; it also happens within the context of the public sphere
and throughout our social institutions. Pettit’s earlier work, The Common Mind (1993), is
compatible with the view that it would be a mistake to think of ourselves as isolated
“willers” who do not need social support from either individual or corporate agents for
efficacious intentional action.59 Indeed, his concept of freedom as non-domination is a
move away from the more isolated notion of freedom as non-interference (Pettit, 1997,
esp. Ch. 2). However, List and Pettit still adhere to a perspective of public
interconnectedness as a state of being from which we ought to be relieved. Their claim
that group interactions are inherently social to mean that group interactions are just
people working together, but not interdependent. Even in cases where exit is an option,
meaning that individuals are in situations of non-domination, I may be bound by
affiliative obligations and duties that the perspective of non-domination fails to capture.
As such, understanding ourselves as relationally autonomous agents dictates taking a
different standpoint when devising standards of freedom as members of corporate agents.
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A more thorough examination of this point in the context of social choice, group identity, and group
responsibility will be part of the focus of Chapter 4 and the Epilogue on corporate social responsibility.
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When part of my identity becomes dependent upon the bonds I have with other members
of a group, and these bonds are seen as a common good, exit may be foreclosed as a
viable option.
The point is that affiliative bonds do not take place strictly in the spheres of
control beyond the realm of corporate agents, but this is not necessarily a problem for
recognizing group agents as such. What this means is that we need an account of
organization structure and agency that is flexible enough to escape being tied to any
particular theory of freedom or for autonomy to have explanatory force. Putting to one
side the question of whether we want to endorse the republican notion of freedom, that is
to say whether or not we would want this notion of freedom acting as the guiding value
of a group agent’s structure, we can still ask to what extent different kinds of corporate
agents can be constrained to their sphere of control. The short reply offered by List and
Pettit is that organizations can be separated in a way that power is shared among a variety
of different authorities (p. 146). Such a division across individual and corporate agents
limits any singular organization from denying individuals’ control. However, at least in
the case of economic associations, such group agents are uniquely situated in their ability
to transgress attempts at this kind of separation of spheres of control. Such transgression
is made possible by the use of market functions to solve coordination problems in
different social spheres; the influence (a form of control) of economic agents crosses
from public to private.
Economic group agents often directly influence the public social institutions that
inform and give shape to how we manage our private lives. Charter schools and forprofit, privately operated hospitals and nursing homes are two examples that demonstrate

89

how businesses are blurring the boundaries of this kind of public/private distinction. As
has happened in the sphere of education, healthcare, and access to public goods (e.g.,
transportation, parks/recreation, and libraries), privatization opens up the possibility for
business solutions. These business solutions involve the process of commodification,
which is made explicit when we look at how the standards for successful policy
implementation are evaluated against the efficiency standards of business firms.60 The
process of commodification entails an ideal of perfect competition where success is
determined, in part, by the ability to assign a value to something. This process of valuing
commodities, for these kinds of corporate agents, becomes the primary consideration in
the group-level judgments over potential courses of action. Interestingly, the reason why
we cannot constrain such corporate agents from dominating the spheres of control of
other social institutions is the same reason why we should not expect economic
associations in capitalistic environments to be able to engage in certain kinds of
reasoning.
2.4.4 Making Sense of Group Responsibility and Obligations
List and Pettit outline three conditions by which groups are fit to be held
responsible for their actions and the consequences of their actions. The conditions are: 1)
the group agent faces morally significant choices,61 2) the agent has the ability
(understanding and access to evidence required) to make judgments about those morally
significant choices, and 3) the agent is able to choose between avenues of action (p. 155).
After defending these conditions, they discuss how we might understand such groups to
be more than rational agents; they claim that we should consider corporate agents to be
60

This will be discussed in depth in Chapter 3.
A few examples of morally significant choices could be whether or not to pay a living wage to workers,
employ child labor, or dispose of environmentally hazardous materials in the river outside of the factory.
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moral agents who are able to enter into the same kinds of relationships as other persons.62
There are a couple of reasons why I think we might want to resist this point of their
argument. List and Pettit’s theory focuses on two levels of analysis: making sense of
individuals’ decisions within the aggregate decision-making process as well as group
agent decisions and actions from outside the group (i.e., in the world). As such, the
reasons I offer for resisting certain points of their argument in favor of viewing a
corporate agent as a kind of person focus, likewise, on these two parts of the analysis.
Particularly in the case of economic associations, I take it to be an uncontentious
claim that business firms face decisions of moral significance. For a group agent to
satisfy the second condition it must have as part of its agenda the goal to make decisions
of moral significance, meaning that it must make an explicit choice at some point in the
decision-making process that entails that the group has the structural mechanisms for
making judgments more generally. List and Pettit claim that if a group does not
implement mechanisms that explicitly block moral reasoning, then individual group
members who have the capacity for moral reasoning must introduce moral reasoning into
the group reasoning and decision-making processes. At this point, then, they are
concerned with the relationship between individual members and the aggregate decisionmaking process. It is important to note that even as an individual within the group is able
to maintain the ability to consider morally significant claims, when she is speaking as a
member of the group, she must reason differently. Individual preferences, as List and
Pettit discuss at great lengths, will often fall away when the individual must make
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judgments or maintain group-level attitudes to enact member roles.63 What we see at the
level of the group, then, is the pressure group roles place on individuals and their
decision-making processes. To be a member of the group, or to occupy a given role
within the group, the member cannot make any decisions indiscriminately. Rather,
members must make decisions in a manner that will be justifiable to the group. We can
make a similar observation about the group agent.
Group preferences, like individual preferences, are often subject to external
pressures. That is to say that group preferences, and decisions based on those preferences,
are informed by and must be justifiable to external others (i.e., not just the members
within the group). When a corporate agent’s preferences are ordered on the basis of
economic (market) values, it should be no surprise that such values become part of the
reasoning process in the aggregate function. If the group agent recognizes that it must, as
a means of survival, make decisions and act in a manner that can be justified in
accordance with the external systems of constraint, it would be rational for the group
agent to develop an aggregate function that can engage in this kind of strategic
rationality. If it fails to incorporate decision-making procedures that force members to
consider such decisions through the lens of strategic rationality, this will threaten the
economic agent’s ability to survive in the face of external pressures (i.e., maintain
efficient functioning and justify actions to stakeholders).
When we look at real-world group decisions, we can start to get a sense of how
these external representations of firm function, which are captured in the modes of
evaluation and justification, play a role in decision-making processes. For example, it
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was not until 1990 that the NIH mandated equal inclusion of women and minority
subjects in grant-funded human subjects research initiatives (Dresser, 1992, p. 24). Even
after the mandate, significant under-representation of women and minorities in human
subjects research persisted. Rebecca Dresser’s analysis revealed that one of the
justifications given for white-male only participants had to do with the time and cost of
recruiting women and minorities for inclusion (pp. 25-26).64 In this case, the justification
reveals what such a decision-making process considers when making judgments on
morally weighty claims. The moral mistake evidenced by this kind of justification was
allowing economic strategy to govern the decision-making process.
This example, of the inclusion of women and minorities in human subjects
research, provides a clue as to why the absence of explicit restriction against engaging
certain kinds of reasoning capacities does not entail the likelihood of engaging in moral
reasoning in a situated context. Even as explicit restrictions against considering the
morally significant aspects of choices are absent, systems of norms constrain how
decisions are made within organizational roles. This suggests that the morally significant
aspects are not what cost-based decision-making processes are focusing on. Rather, the
external processes of evaluation and justification set up ideals that heavily influence
which factors are appropriate to consider in all decisions of this kind. In the example of
including diverse populations in human subjects research, the justification of the decision
to recruit only white men demonstrates that the focus was about how to count the cost of
recruiting. In such an instance of calculating subject recruitment, the focus was not on
how to ensure that the population sample (N) adequately represented gender and
64

Although there were many justifications offered, and some of them were verging on or were explicitly
sexist, racist, or patronizing, I will focus my discussion on the justification that appealed to market values
as a way to appeal to more objective grounds of exclusion.
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ethnicities. Rather, choosing less expensive recruits was the primary goal, without
reflection upon whether this was a desirable metric for recruitment. This is to say that the
primary mode of reasoning focused on the (economic) cost of inclusion, not whether the
cost should determine the N. Thus, the cost-benefit style of reasoning overshadowed the
moral reasoning from the decision-making process itself.65 If the process of justification
demanded by the external environment forces certain kinds of corporate agents to use
instrumentalist cost-benefit analysis of choices as a primary means of judgment and
decision making, then the primary value that will shape group decisions is efficiency.
That is to say, even as there are not explicit restrictions banning morally weighty
considerations, the community standards dictating how groups ought to be (i.e. efficient,
profitable), when different general moral principles guiding the community standards
individuals might live by, gives rise to situations in which such groups runs the risk of
treating morally weighty statements as just another cost or benefit to maximizing output.
Hence, in such cases, the cost-benefit analysis covers over the context-dependent
networks of meaning that inform whether the ends ought to be pursued in the first place.
It is, likewise, not a question of how we can translate the value of morally
significant variables (e.g., people, sentient beings, the natural environment) into the
decision-making process.66 The process of putting a price on something, which may
reflect an attempt to synthesize these two kinds of reasoning (strategic and moral), does
not necessarily bring moral reasoning into the strategic process. Rather, it commodifies
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In this particular example, tweaking the external controls, that is, mandating inclusion, yielded more
equitable results. The degree to which changing external control mechanisms will change organizational
behavior depends on the degree to which the particular group agent can transgress various spheres of
control.
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Although, if faced with the decision of either cobbling together a means to do so or disregarding such
factors completely, I think the correct decision would be to use the incomplete cost-benefit analysis.
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the subject, and in doing so, brings it under the process of strategic reasoning. Thus,
when we attempt to synthesize these two kinds of reasoning, the result is a replacement of
one with the other. The process of commodification is one aspect of the decision-making
mechanisms employed by economic group agents.
Nevertheless, say that a business does recognize the need to make morally
weighty decisions, and that the economic agent sincerely wants to do the right thing;67
does this mean the group necessarily cannot do so? To answer this question, we need to
look at the relationship between the group having the ability to do something and those
outside of the group recognizing this ability as such. To be clear, I am not saying that
everywhere and for all times businesses, and possibly other kinds of corporate agents,
will not be able to engage in moral reasoning and act on the basis of those judgments.
What I am saying is that, even when businesses have the ability to consider the moral
weight of claims and to act on the decisions of those judgments, when they do so in an
environment that uses a common language of economic evaluation, we will have no way
of distinguishing those who have such an ability from those who do not. Consequently,
the external values and modes of constraint play a role at least equally as important as the
internal structural constraints in determining the extent to which such groups might do so.
I will grant List and Pettit their claim that individuals making up group agents do
not necessarily rob the group agent of control. The reason for this claim has to do with
understanding the different roles individuals have in group action, and the group has a
distinct set of responsibilities from those of the individual members. List and Pettit argue
for an understanding of individual responsibility within the context of group agents to be
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mitigated by internal (organizational) and external (social) constraints and pressures (pp.
163-67). Similarly, it seems intuitively compelling that a group agent’s fitness to be held
responsible ought to be mitigated by the external environmental factors it survives (or
thrives) on, and indexed to its reasoning capacities.68 One consequence of a more
nuanced account of group agency as it arises in non-ideal circumstances is that a more
nuanced scale of organization structures becomes possible. In a manner similar to how
List and Pettit attribute different degrees of responsibility to different group members and
their roles, a more nuanced account of group responsibility could assess a different
degree of responsibility to minimal group agents than it would to moral group agents.
List and Pettit present the presence of group practical reasoning as the foundation
for treating corporate agents as a kind of person (p. 173). They claim that in thinking
about a group agent as a kind of person we can understand and treat it as a proper subject
of complaints and reprimands in expectation of compliance with social norms, able to
share in a common awareness of norms and expectations, etc. (List & Pettit, p. 173). I
have claimed that we should not expect economic group agents to exhibit the same
capacities as persons, at least not solely on the basis that the individual members have
those capacities. Rather, a better starting point for shifting representations of firm
function and the expectations for group agential capacities is by understanding how we
(mis)represent firm motivation as simply reflective of the ideal firm function in our
contemporary economic structures.
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2.5 Dynamic Group Agents: Moving beyond List and Pettit
From the perspective of the group-level cognitive processes, the group agent
develops intentions and actions in ways that should not be described merely in terms of
the intentions of the members. Much hangs on the operation and structure of the group
within ideal conditions, something that may give us the logical possibility of group
agents, but not a high probability that such agents exist in our world. The aggregate
function that connects the members of the group to the group agent seems to make up
only half of the equation. List and Pettit attempt much more. Their goal is to explain how
group agents can function in the world as a kind of person, able to engage in moral
reasoning the very way individual human agents do, and to enter into deliberative
engagement with other group agents and persons. In other words, List and Pettit want to
count group agents as full members of the moral community of persons, who are fit to be
held morally responsible for their actions and become an integral part of individual and
social identities. In line with their more general aim, I hope to extend our understanding
of what variables within organization structures give rise to genuine group agents, and the
conditions under which such agents can develop the ability to engage in moral reasoning.
Through the inclusion of environmental variables in the process of group structure
dynamics, a subject that will be more thoroughly explored in the next chapter, we will get
a better sense of the larger system-environment picture only partially captured by List
and Pettit. In particular, I will focus on the extent to which systems of constraint set up
the ideals of proper functioning and how the neoclassical ideal of proper firm function
does not track the range of group judgment capacities. In doing so, we will also get a
better sense of what the possibilities for group agents in our world might be. By
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extending the loci of group agency and tracking the different variables that affect the
decision-making processes within organizations, we will lay the groundwork for what
group agents capable of engaging in moral reasoning look like.
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Chapter Three
External Structures, Firm Agency, and Organizational Design
Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or
normative judgments. As [John Neville] Keynes says, it deals with ‘what is,’ not with
‘what ought to be’…—Milton Friedman, Methodology of Positive Economics
3.1 Introduction: Shifting Orientations
I have argued that economic groups with particular decision-making processes
can develop and display the capacity of practical reasoning. In this chapter, I show how
the external systems of constraints encourage practical reasoning within these kinds of
groups to adhere to the standard of strategic rationality. While filling out and defending
this claim, I will be working to capture the dynamic interplay between the environmental
variables that inform how we (i.e., those outside the firm or in society more generally)
represent this kind of group’s capacities and the group’s internal decision-making
processes. Examining the external environment will make explicit what we currently
expect from these kinds of group agents, how these expectations influence the way in
which these group agents and their capacities show up to us, and how our expectations of
their capacities open up the possibility of different paths for group agent development. I
will be paying particular attention to the cultural values that play a direct role in
determining the specific shape of the decision-making processes that this kind of group
agent uses when making judgments about actions. By focusing on how environmental
variables (i.e., incentive structures) influence and constrain the group organization of
economic agents, we can understand how economic groups, in their aim to meet the
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demands of environmental constraints (i.e., competition) end up arranging in such a way
that also gives rise to group agency.
I will first describe the environmental variables and incentive structures that
directly impact the development of economic associations within an American-style
capital market system as a means by which to elucidate the ways in which the
representations grounding the models of firm behavior, particularly neoclassical
economists, constrain the internal design of a firm. Because the neoclassical conception
of firm function has come dominate how we understand firms, by examining how this
model has narrowed the way we conceive firm function (i.e., to be only an expression of
individual preference) we will be in a better starting point to explore other possible kinds
of firm designs. These expectations of firm performance, however, have far reaching
consequences. Since our social expectations for firm behavior and the norms that are the
basis for those expectations of maximization are based on this neoclassical model, when
we move to a higher level of abstraction, we model our understanding and expectations
of what “firms intend” to also be the maximization output. From a classificatory
standpoint, the neoclassical firm is only one among many possibilities of firm design and
function. Thus, if we aim to outline other possibilities of firm design, firm expectations,
and what firm intentions could be, we need a more flexible concept of firm function.69
I continue my analysis by looking at how the institutional framework enabling the
perpetuation of the neoclassical model of firm function influences the values that a firm
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One may wonder how this move is different from what List and Pettit posit by arguing for corporate
agents with particular kinds of organizational design. My aim in this chapter is not to offer a different
account per se, but to offer an explanation of how we can get to an understanding of firm function that will
enable us to develop group agents that will also function as moral agents. As such, I am aiming at a similar
target to List and Pettit, but developing a non-idealized account about how to get there from the history of
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conditions that allow for the logical possibility of corporate agents.
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uses when devising methods to increase stability (i.e., reduce uncertainty and
inefficiencies). I argue that shifting to a model of understanding firm function as a
knowledge creation toward the end of acting efficiently will act as a bridging concept that
models firm behavior as agential at the level of the collective, but within the constrictions
of increasing stability. This bridging concept is essential to distinguishing between firm
that function as strategic reasoners, who act only to maximize output, from firms who
function as moral reasoners, who not only reason about the most efficient means to
satisfy their ends but also reason about the ends themselves.
However, even as this shift will enable us to conceive of different organization
structures as compatible with moral group agency, the present system of external
constraint does not promote or reward group agents who make decisions primarily using
moral reasoning (i.e., acting on the basis of moral reasoning at the expense of strategic
gain). Such reasoning would threaten group efficiency by bringing into question the very
ends promoted by the present system of constraints: the maximization of output. By
looking at the ways in which efficiency demands placed on organizations affect how
information is stored, considered, and produced in the form of group-level judgments, we
will begin to see how particular kinds of market values become part of the reasoning
process in the aggregate function. The practical reasoning that arises allows the group
agent to make prudent, or strategically rational, decisions that increase its own
knowledge as it learns about its environment.70 Even as such reasoning enables us to
understand how the firm is able to successfully minimize risk present in its environment
and enables the economic agent to survive in the face of external pressures, this power
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should not be confused with the ability to make moral judgments. Filling out a taxonomy
of firm capacities and possibilities that includes the capacity to engage in moral
reasoning, and adumbrates what a virtuous economic group agent might be like, will
entail extending the analysis to the theoretically possible.
This ability to make moral judgments about actions, as I argued in the first
chapter, would be a capacity that distinguishes such organizations from those that do not
have the ability to make such judgments. By better accounting for the ways in which the
environmental evaluative standards that firms operate within will also constrain the way
we make sense of the group’s actions, we will be in a better position to describe an
economic organization that collectively engages in moral reasoning. I have claimed that a
variety of organization structures can support practical reasoning, inasmuch as a variety
of organization structures can support a straw vote decision-making process that would
produce group agency. However, when there is an incentive structure that discourages
firm judgments and justifications for actions to be anything other than strategically
rational this will act as an external constraint. This constraint will also limit the basis by
which to identify aggregate decision functions that have abilities surpassing this basic
kind of practical reasoning. If we are aiming to identify group agents that are moral
agents, or more specifically virtuous group agents who want to develop and engage in
moral reasoning, we will need to develop the means by which to challenge our
representations of these kinds of group agents. If, as I claim, certain kinds of
organizations will be unable to engage in moral reasoning, we must begin to rethink the
limits of group agency. Additionally, we might want to reconsider what kind of
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responsibility we attribute to group agents and index moral responsibility to the group’s
reasoning capacities.
3.2 Economic Associations: A Brief History
It is worth considering the ways in which the corporations that exist today differ
importantly from the sorts of conglomerate economic associations of the past. Although it
is true that corporations have existed for hundreds of years, the anatomy of the firm that
we now colloquially refer to as “the corporation”—by this I mean firms such as WalMart, General Motors, or Exxon-Mobil—has only been a possibility since the 1950s. The
wave of merger and acquisition laws passed during the Eisenhower administration paved
the way for businesses to move out of the realm of smaller business enterprises and into
the realm of global acquisitions and developments that translated into conglomerate asset
holdings in excess of 100 million dollars. Although a few business ventures exceeded this
high level of asset holdings, most notably J.P. Morgan Chase, Standard Oil, Sheraton
Hotels, Continental Baking, and Hartford Fire Insurance, to name a few, these companies
totaled less than 0.1% of business enterprises in the United States between 1946 and1965.
During this time, in comparison to the general growth of small and medium-sized
business enterprises, the United States saw a sharp rise in the number of large
conglomerate business ventures (i.e., business ventures holding assets in excess of $100
million) (Jacoby, 1973, pp. 27-33).71
This shift in the institutional framework caused a corresponding shift in the scale
of what corporations could consider as possible. Thus, it was not surprising that along
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with a shift in possibility of firm growth, a larger number of firms aimed for and achieved
more control over the variables in their processes of supply and distribution, which
resulted in economies of scale. This change in scale has not altered the underlying
framework that informs how economic associations achieve success in either the small or
large scale. To understand why this shift has occurred, we need to step back and evaluate
how incentive structures influence corporate growth. In doing so, we will also be better
situated to understand how different kinds of firms respond to environmental variables; in
turn, this will help us make better sense of how to understand a firm’s actions, as well as
the possibilities for different kinds of agential capacities.
3.2.1 Measuring Success in Economic Associations
The contemporary standard of success for firm functions today is historically
linked to the neoclassical economic tradition. The contemporary neoclassical economic
movement was heavily influenced by utilitarianism, particularly Jeremy Bentham’s social
utility calculus. Stanley Jevons, following Bentham, developed a model for evaluating the
utility of commodities as a continuous relation to market supply and demand (General
Mathematical Theory of Political Economy, 1866). Jevons, and other figures from the
marginal revolution,72 helped bring in the neoclassical tradition and with it a new
representation of economics and firm function. Firms were the means by which persons
in societies maximized personal utility through the supply of commodities. Thus, one
consequence of this influence can be seen in how the neoclassical economic tradition
answers the question of what the maximization of the firm’s utility meant: the
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maximization of output. The traditionalist business literature later translated the
maximization of output so that it became synonymous with maximizing profit.73
The neoclassical understanding of a firm’s structure is an extension of Alfred
Marshall’s “representative firm” (Marshall, 1890/2010, p. 185).74 The representative firm
is understood to be a stable, fixed entity upon which or through which individual human
actors are able to aggregately combine their knowledge, skills, and abilities and enter into
the free market to make their fortune by supplying what the public demands. Since
Marshall, economics has sought to establish itself as a scientific discipline, to be included
among the natural sciences, such as physics (Friedman, 1976, pp. 4, 35). In light of this
goal, neoclassical theorists adopted the utilitarian principles in an attempt to increase the
predictive power of economic theories so that economics could “predict and not merely
describe the consequences of action” (Friedman, 1976, p. 12).75 In this way, we can see
the parallel between the aim of neoclassical economic models and one of the
consequences of understanding economic associations as intentional entities: both enable
us to provide explanatory and predictive power over the actions of such entities.
Additionally, the empirical turn in economics was, in part, hastened as the American
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Alfred Marshall’s work is recognized as the foundational work in contemporary economic theory because
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courses through the present day. It should be noted that Marshall was not a utilitarian, and critiqued the
idea of an abstract person being used as the basis for economic theories founded on the social calculus (pp.
26-28).
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The utilitarian assumptions I am referencing here is the simplified economic adaptation of Bentham’s
dictum, “each to count for one and none for more than one” combined with a decision-making process that
maximizes output of all interests.
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economic tradition moved toward a secularized form of economics (Bateman, 2008), thus
prompting the creation of empirical means of objectively evaluating and comparing firm
function (Hands, 1993, 2001).
The standards that dictate what we expect from firms, or how we expect them to
act, are based on how the firm calculates and projects output. Recommendations and
appraisals of firm behavior focus on increasing output while decreasing the effect of
externalities (i.e., things that put a damper on output, such as manager uncertainty,
inefficient market, and epistemic inequalities amongst consumer groups). Ronald Coase
claims, in agreement with the neoclassical tradition, that the origins of the firm are rooted
in the individual’s desire to limit and reduce costs associated with production; if not for
individuals motivated by self-interest, firms would not exist (Coase, 1960). Within this
sort of framework, the firm is simply the individuals who make it up; so the motivation
for maximization of output is closely tied to the motivations of the firm’s members. It
follows from this view that the decision-making capacities of the group would directly
reflect the decision-making capacities of the individuals within the group. However, as I
discussed in the first chapter, how those members are organized matters, and can change
how closely the group-level beliefs and judgments can be mapped onto the beliefs or
judgments of individuals within the group. In majoritarian decision-making processes, the
aggregation of individual opinions can result in inconsistent conclusions that do not map
onto the beliefs of individuals.76 Additionally, as my discussion of the Citizens United
decision pointed out, if the members are organized around a decision-making process that
gives rise to rational and autonomous judgments and actions, we have good reason to
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think that we will not have the ability to predict group behavior and decisions directly
from individual preferences and beliefs.
Different models of evaluating firm function within various branches of
economics consider and weigh variables in a variety of ways. However, just because a
model includes different variables does not mean we should expect the judgment function
to take a different form. Rather, the process of calculating output itself is the means by
which moral reasoning is overlooked. For example, sustainability models take the effect
of increased output on the environment and local community into account. In doing so, it
may appear that moral principles are entering into the group decision-making process.
Even as these models attempt to add more nuanced calculations to the balance sheet, the
fact remains that the mode of evaluation for these kinds of associations is one whose aim
is to discover the most strategic way to maximize output, not to ask whether we should
aim for output maximization when allocating scarce natural resources. The point is that
the primacy of the profit motive constrains the degree to which those engaging in
business decision-making structures can foster or justify fostering ways of engaging with
others through means that do not result in direct firm benefit.
Consider how we might ordinarily infer the impetus behind a business decision to
implement a recycling initiative. Are we to expect that the firm would engage in greening
practices if it would hurt their bottom line? In most cases, we would assume that the
judgment processes in which the group engaged when considering the question “ought
we implement a recycling initiative” centered on the cost of the initiative, how to offset
the cost, and whether such a move would result in an increase in customer loyalty or
brand recognition (i.e., whether this move corresponds with how the consumer thinks we

107

should act). The point is that we would not expect that the firm was weighing whether the
action was morally permissible, but rather that the firm was deciding whether or not the
action would be optimal. Rationality, or consistency in judgments, does tell us which
actions based on these judgments are morally permissible.
The limitations in moral reasoning arise from the fact that firms are designed to
function strategically without questioning whether or to what extent they ought to
maximize output. When strategic rationality weighs the consequences of actions, it does
not present a moral limit or impermissibility in judgments; it advises whether or not a
decision would be optimal. By considering morally weighty variables (e.g., human
suffering, domination of resources, waste production, pollution, constraint of employee
freedom and well-being) against a standard of strategic rationality, the mode of
evaluation and judgments is one that measures efficiency (see models suggested by
Epstein, 2008). Consequently, firm improvement and justification for firm actions take
the form of either greater demand or greater efficiency. In the case of greater demand,
output increases; hence, greater utility in firm production. In the case of greater
efficiency, transaction costs decrease (producing the same amount of goods with less
effort); hence, greater utility in firm production. In either case, the justification for the
actions of the firm takes an instrumentalist form; increase utility in a predictable and
dependable manner. This instrumentalization of reasons is something that, if it is to be the
standard informing firm behavior, becomes part of the internal feedback process. As part
of the feedback process, it also becomes the determining ground of how the firm tracks
and ensures means-end coherence, and the filter through which all judgments pass.
Moreover, this model of firm function does not constrain strategic rationality to coincide
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with satisfying individual preference (i.e., preferences of the consumer, the employees, or
the local community).
Such models assume that firms function as individual units in response to
competitive market forces and are kept in check by the demands of external consumers.
The traditional neoclassical models measure firm success with the static equilibrium
model of firm behavior. The static equilibrium theory, in its most basic form, is a theory
of production with a focus on the firm operating at a particular point in time (t)
(Chandler, 1977, pp. 490-91; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002, p. 995).77 Although there are
plenty of cases in which strategic rationality will overlap with individual preference,
particularly in smaller business enterprises or small-scale joint-stock companies where
rationality will dictate satisfying individual preference, what strategic rationality dictates
will change as firm decision-making becomes standardized and formalized. Therefore,
we should expect that as firm capacities change, strategic rationality would dictate
courses of action, which reflects what Chandler describes as “[the] altered internal and
external situations in which and about which business decisions [are] made” (1988, pp.
70-71). To highlight how models of firm preference as individual preference are not
indicative of strategic rationality, consider how we might describe the success of two
firms that use the same process of strategic rationality, while only one coincides with
individual preference: a small town used car dealer (case A) and Wal-Mart in the same
small town (case B).
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Although behavioral economic theories, such as those proposed by Cyert et al. (Cyert, Feigenbaum, &
March, 1959) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), does shift the focus to the way individuals make decisions
under conditions of uncertainty, the focus is still on the individuals at a particular point in time and not on
the ways in which the strategy of actors within firms affects the structure of the firm itself or the process
through which production and distribution are actualized.
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The idealized model tells us that businesses open in response to market demand,
they are responsive to consumer feedback, and if demand changes in light of new
alternatives (or lousy product quality), businesses will either become more competitive
(i.e., become more efficient) or be driven out of the market. In case A, the used car dealer
stays in business because she supplies a product in response to the demand of the
community. She supplies her product at a price high enough to make a profit (otherwise
she would not be in business), but low enough that her customers are satisfied (otherwise
they would not buy a car at her shop). We can look at her inventory and her output (the
number of cars she sells off her lot) and explain her rate of growth or decline accurately
through reference to market forces. If she sells too many lemons or raises her prices
beyond what the market considers reasonable, the small town community would be able
to keep her in check by taking their business elsewhere (e.g., the new car dealer, the used
car dealer one town over, or buying a car online); hence, market competition explains the
function of her firm.
Things are different in case B. The success of Wal-Mart does not depend on how
well or poorly it meets the demands of individual communities. Rather, a better account
of Wal-Mart’s actions would one that depicts a strategic rational agent maximizing
efficiency to minimize uncertainties in its environment by eliminating competition,
consumer choice, etc. In other words, Wal-Mart’s profitability and growth cannot be
explained through reference to the laissez-faire principles of a firm responding to
community demand and input in the same way that we can explain the profitability and
growth of the used car dealer. In case B we cannot offer the same kind of explanations; if
we do, we miss something important about the function of the firm and its effect on the
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local community or the broader society. That is, we neglect the fact that Wal-Mart is a
different kind of organization with a different range of agential capacities.
In both cases the incentive structures encouraging growth and development are
identical. The difference is the degree to which each is better suited to respond to its
environment to reduce uncertainties, or, to refer back to the variables introduced in the
first chapter, the difference is the degree to which each must function within an implicit
or explicit regulatory environment. We do not want to explain only why or how a firm
functions or might function in instances of idealized conditions, where the constraints
upon rationality dictate maximization of individual interest. Rather, we need to
understand how the firm and its environment dynamically engage with each other, with
the firm responding to environmental changes to maximize output in an ongoing or
sustainable manner.
I have argued here that representing firm function as intentional offers an
explanatory framework for why economic group agents’ practical reasoning enables them
to thrive under competitive market conditions. However, understanding firms as
intentional, when taken against the background of an expectation that firms are
maximally self-interested, and this self-interest is explainable in terms of the interest of
some particular set of members within the firm, will not adequately capture the range of
the firm’s agential capacities. I will now turn to an alternative account of firm design,
function, and intention that will be more compatible with the full range of firm agential
capacities, beginning with the group’s capacity to reason practically, a necessary
condition of group agency, in response to the wider institutional environment.
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3.3 Environmental Pressures and Organizational Design
The history of economic development is littered with examples of how
institutional frameworks aid or hinder the advancement of industry (see Durkheim, 1984;
Weber, 1978; North, 2005). Advancement, in such cases, is measured by the degree of
increase in the specialization of expertise and technological development achieved
through the division of labor (North, 1991, p. 99). Social institutions, which dictate the
shape economic advancement may take within a given society, are structures contingent
upon the social networks of a culture. The American system78 has aimed to develop
efficient solutions to market problems through competition, wherein competition aims to
reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Reducing transaction costs enables
firms to grow, but firm growth, if it is to be sustainable, must consistently review avenues
of maximizing firm efficiency. Consequently, efficiency, specialization of expertise, and
technological development can also be seen as parts of the institutional framework, parts
that contribute to shaping the variables within organization structures, and as such
influence the group’s agential capacities. If we are to understand how group agents arise
within different contemporary organization structures, having an adequate account of
how environmental pressures shape a corporation’s internal decision-making process
becomes paramount.
The degree to which societies are able to build stable institutional frameworks,
where there are widespread accepted standards enforced across populations in the
community, directly influences the way businesses operate within a community (North,
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The American system can be understood to be a capital market. A capital market is one that secures
property rights, has relatively wide latitude in forming and governing the organization’s affairs, and has a
judicial system that permits low contracting costs (North, 1991, p. 101). When transaction costs, such as
contracting costs, are too high growth in capitalistic markets tapers off (Coase, 1960).
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1991, pp. 103-8). North explains that the development of social institutions is one way in
which human beings have sought to minimize uncertainty in their physical environment
(2005, esp. pp. 13-22). As uncertainty can take many forms, so too does reducing
uncertainty; North describes five of the most common methods:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Increasing information given the existing stock of knowledge
Increasing the stock of knowledge within the existing institutional framework
Altering the institutional framework
Restructuring beliefs in the face of novel situations
Entertaining/Developing “non-rational” beliefs to deal with residual
uncertainty (pp. 17-19)

Maximizing efficiencies within economic associations, as a means toward maximizing
output, often takes the form of minimizing uncertainties in the organization’s immediate
environment. Just as different organisms are better or worse at adapting to and stabilizing
their physical environment, so too are different kinds of economic associations able to
interact with their environment more or less successfully. That is to say, different firms
will have different abilities to maximize efficiencies both inside and outside the firm. For
example, smaller-scale organic firms might maximize efficiency by implementing
changes to their internal communication processes, streamlining production, or creating
consumer feedback mechanisms. Such changes could be described in terms of reducing
uncertainties through increasing information given the stock of knowledge (implementing
feedback mechanisms), increasing the stock of knowledge (developing new expertise),
and changing beliefs (responding to feedback). In addition to the methods employed by
organic firms to minimize uncertainties, larger-scale hierarchical or bureaucratic firms
(i.e., corporations with more asset holdings, greater member strength, and greater
purchasing power) might also be able to alter the institutional framework by demanding
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that suppliers provide services at lower costs, lobbying governments for lower taxes, or
acquiring smaller competitors to increase market share.
Each of these strategies tries to reduce uncertainties in order to create a more
stable social environment, enabling the organization to grow and thrive. These strategies,
however, must be formed in accordance with the rules of the game. This means that
social institutions external to the firm constrain firm choices in order to develop a firm
that will function as anticipated. Within a capital market system, corporate strategies are
judged and rated based on how well or poorly they competitively maximize output.79
These judgments are captured in the calculations of risk and return, and are measured
against benchmark rates of risk and return over time.80 The benchmarks express the
public’s perception of market performance.81 If a firm is to thrive, which in this context
means that it is able to remain solvent and expand market shares compared to others in
the industry, then it must be able to create subsystems to manage output efficiently while
monitoring and responding to market conditions. Without these kinds of feedback
mechanisms, firms would not be able to measure how well or poorly they functioned, and
this would directly impact their likelihood of attracting investors, entering into long-term
contracts (i.e., buyers must have evidence the firm will be in business in a year), or taking
out a line of credit. That is to say, for a firm to survive in a capital market, it must
develop specific kinds of information processing systems that aim at measuring
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As dictated by the rules of the free market, meaning firms will be viewed as irregular and open to sanction
if they act monopolistically (with the exception of government-regulated monopolies, as is the case with
utility and media companies).
80
Standard markers of performance are measured in P/E ratio, return on investment (ROI), and beta-scores
to evaluate solvency. Standard stock ratings are evaluated based on firm or portfolio (for mutual funds)
performance over particular intervals, usually marked at years 1, 3, 5, and 10 (although sustainability
models also forecast predictions for 10, 25, and 50 years).
81
A few examples of standard benchmarks are indices made public through the NYSE, S&P 500, and
NASDAQ.
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efficiency, and make decisions in a manner that maximizes output that shows up to the
world as such.
To achieve a competitive advantage, a firm must develop an additional kind of
capacity, one that does more than merely track and respond to environmental conditions
in order to stay in the game. A competitive advantage is achieved when the firm develops
systems to act in accordance with strategic rationality, acting as a way to reduce
uncertainties through the maximization of efficiency in a way that rivals cannot. Such
instances of competitive advantage happen when a firm has an exclusive product that no
other competitor can supply, has access to resources that are scarce, has a the ability to
contract labor and skills that leaves other firms unable to compete, etc. 82
One can imagine that the firm, in such instances, functions much like a vehicle:
information from the world is fed into the system, the data is converted into useable
information that acts as the basis of strategy, and then the driver (managers, CEO, etc.)
steers it along as it trucks through industry. This analogy parallels the way that Nonaka
and Toyama describe the function of firms in their theory of dynamic firm behavior
(2002). Nonaka and Toyama shift away from the neoclassical perception of the firm as a
production entity aimed at the maximization of output. They recommend understanding
the firm as a knowledge-creating entity, and while they argue that this is the end at which
the firm aims, I will use their theory as a bridging concept to better understand how group
agents create knowledge, which is the process whereby the firm is able to convert data
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This approach can be differentiated from bargaining or coalition building. Coalition building is a
behavioral theory of firm function offered by Cyert and March (1963). Under a coalition account, there are
tradeoffs amongst individuals or groups that aim at imperfectly maximizing the utility demands of each.
Again, there is no account of how the strategy of the irreducible collective is affecting the structure of the
firm.
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into meaningful information83 as a means by which to achieve and maintain competitive
advantages. Compared to the traditional neoclassical account of firm function, Nonaka
and Toyama’s model has two foundational differences that make it more compatible with
viewing the firm as a rational agent. First, they explain how information-processing
systems give rise to organizational knowledge as opposed to, or in addition to, localized
individual knowledge. Firm survival is based on acquiring external assets, including
knowledge assets, by synthesizing contradictions external to the firm resulting in an
expansion of the firm’s boundaries.
Second, they present a model of firm function that depicts the firm as an entity
consistently engaged in dynamic feedback with its environment toward its end(s). In their
account, the end is a competitive advantage achieved by creating knowledge out of data
that flows through the firm’s information processing systems. This process can be
distinguished from information processing, although information processing is one part
of it, as the product is the organization’s ability to learn new information that helps it
better engage in the world. Thus, a competitive advantage, the strategic advantage one
firm has over its rivals within its industry, is achieved when firms not only develop a
stock of knowledge but continuously create new knowledge out of existing capabilities
(Nonaka & Toyama, pp. 997-98). That is to say, firms continuously engage in learning
new things and remembering them for future use. Through creating information feedback
processes, the firm can continuously react to changes in its environment based on what it
learned in the past. When considering this model against the background of North’s
analysis of economic change it becomes a way to understand and interpret a firm’s
83

To say that information is “meaningful” means that it satisfies a particular end. In other words, the firm
does not produce just any knowledge whatsoever, but rather knowledge toward the end of maximizing
competitive advantage, which also has the effect of minimizing uncertainties.
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actions as intentionally seeking to minimize uncertainties in its environment in a way that
can be instituted as part of the collective information processing systems for future
reference. Additionally, this model is compatible with an account of group agency in
which individuals (those making up and contributing to the information processing)
process information for group decisions in a way that produces autonomous group
beliefs, strategies, and actions.
Following the flow of information, and how such information is used in the
decision-making processes of the firm, requires understanding how we can make sense of
such processes at two levels. The first level is that of the individual persons used in the
group knowledge creation that the firm then uses in the decision-making process. The
second level is the (meta) level of the firm decision-making processes, which use the
knowledge supplied to the group, to produce decisions distinct from the particular
individuals who supply the information. Turning to the level of individuals within the
organization, we might properly ask how we are to understand their role in this kind of
information processing. In other words, if we are the information processors of the
knowledge-creating systems within a firm, those that give rise to and function in
accordance with strategic rationality, how are we to understand the role of persons in the
process? I will respond to this in two stages. First, I will walk through how to understand
this claim from the standpoint of the firm as an entity employing persons as one
necessary part of its information systems. Then, I will invert this perspective to explore
the question of what it means for us that we occupy such roles.84 In the sections that
follow I will argue that transactive memory systems, one way of structuring
organizational design to promote efficiency, are consistent with the production of
84

This will be examined in the next chapter.
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organizational knowledge that functions as part of the group’s practical reasoning system.
I will then move to explore the constraints upon individuals’ ability to engage in moral
reasoning when acting within these kinds of information-processing systems.
3.3.1 Efficiency and Instituted Knowledge
In List and Pettit’s account, the decision-making processes necessary for
producing group agency are those that consistently produce group-level decisions and
actions that avoid inconsistencies in judgments, produce judgments about the world that
are true, and can respond to changes in the environment. This is to say that groups are
agents to the extent that individual members work together to enable the group to realize
the capacity of practical reasoning. However, although List and Pettit provide details
about organizational structures and the necessary and sufficient conditions for group
agents to arise within those structures, they do not discuss concrete organizational
designs (p. 81).85 As my goal is to develop a non-idealized account that might result in
concrete changes in real organizations, I will be filling out the story of how group
agency, as List and Pettit describe it, might arise from the kinds of organizational and
institutional arrangements we have and promote.
This section will shift between levels of description of the individuals acting as
part of the group86 and the product of these interactions. Specifically, we will follow the
way individuals’ tacit knowledge (skills, abilities, and data) becomes explicit as the
organization engages in transactions with its members, extracting the information
necessary for decisions, and examine how that information moves through the
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Even as the desiderata they discuss in chapters 4, 5, and 6 outline stricter criteria that well-organized
group agents would employ, they do not give examples of how these criteria map onto actual organizations.
86
This section will not seek to make sense of individual identity within economic associations, but this will
be considered in the next chapter.
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organization’s decision-making processes. By looking at the extent to which this
knowledge is able to be instituted within the firm instead of in particular people within it,
and how this process relates to decision-making processes that produce group judgments,
we will begin to see how these kinds of firm decision-making processes treat people as a
kind of resource to use toward the group’s ends. Treating group members as sources of
information does not entail that they are treated poorly, but rather, that group members
are not expected or encouraged to engage in reasoning processes or actions that are not
directly relevant to their role within the system’s processing. In this way, when people are
used as information processing units they are expected to function much like a GPS,
which engages in a kind of strategic rationality when it determines the most efficient
route through a city. This is to say that they are expected to engage in strategically
rational actions, which are actions the group would deem to be in accordance with
practical reasoning.
Knowledge-based efficiencies in organizations can be achieved through the
development of specialized knowledge structures to enable shared cognition87 within the
organization. Sharing is an ambiguous term. In the strong sense of sharing, it could mean
something like common beliefs, consensus of group aims, and overlapping plans. This
kind of shared cognition would be compatible with an account of group agency arising
from jointly intending individuals participating in a shared cooperative activity (Bratman,
esp. 1992b, 1997). As I have previously argued in Chapter 1, economic groups do not
need this stronger sense of “sharing” when stable structures support group actions.
Particularly in the case of economic group agents, whose activities are a product of the
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For an overview of the use of the term “shared cognition” across disciplines see Hopp, Smith and Hayne
(2002).
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group’s decision-making processes, the group remains stable as long as organizational
roles produce consistent results, and not because all members share in their plans. Thus,
while I describe the manner in which the group engages in distributed cognition broadly
construed, I focus on the kind of distributed cognition that would be compatible with the
general aim of organizational designs, specifically focusing on a model of group
cognition that aims at efficiency and output maximization. The minimal sense of sharing
required by this kind of group is the sharing of the workload by dividing it up. Within
collective cognitive research, transactive memory systems are a kind of shared cognitive
system that pools diverse and complementary bodies of information and directs them
toward an organization’s ends.
Transactive memory systems allow organizations to arrange information systems
such that individual members serve as external cognitive aids to each other (see Wegner,
1986, 1995). We might think of transactive memory systems as being comparable to a
network of computers that refer to one another in order to create a shared database of
collectively constructed knowledge. When groups engage in decision making, they
aggregate information though centralized pooling systems into a form that organization
members can share and access during task completion. In the case of group decisions and
judgments, the process of information pooling results in knowledge production used to
drive decision-making. By dividing the cognitive labor throughout task completion, the
organizational payoff from setting up information-processing systems using transactive
memory working groups is that it increases productivity at the level of the group and
increases efficiency. In a manner similar to efficiency gained through factory processing,
transactive memory systems function by means of a division of specialized labor, skills,
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and abilities. Another efficiency gained by the process of the division of labor is that
individuals’ roles become more clearly defined and narrowly focused. For example,
completing a forecasting report for inventory is a complex task. One person could be in
charge of gathering and inputting the data from past quarters, inputting current long-term
contracted purchases, researching and inputting market variables on projected growth in
the region, and then crunching the numbers. When the forecast report is divided among
four or five employees with clearly defined tasks, such teamwork reaps greater
efficiency. This means that the members of the working group can focus on one aspect of
the production process, communicate with others whose roles are clearly defined and
whose expertise associated with that role is trusted, and no one person has to be
responsible for the entire knowledge production or decision-making process. Hence, the
increase in efficiency occurs, in part, by decreasing the degree to which information
processing and knowledge production relies on any one individual in particular. 88
The difference between transactive memory systems and systems that engage in
the stronger sense of shared cognition is, in part, the degree to which information is
standardized and formalized; that is, the degree to which information is open access
(transparent) or kept as a form of tacit knowledge. In transactive memory systems,
individuals identify the subjects of the knowledge in which the information is encoded
(i.e., which persons within the organization know x). In this way, transactive memory
systems are means by which individuals within organizations can coordinate tasks
88

Here I would want to distinguish between specialized knowledge, something that comes with taking up a
certain organizational role, and expert knowledge, something that comes with the acquisition of skills and
can be independent of particular organizational roles. For example, one kind of expertise is accountancy:
one can be a certified public accountant (CPA) without being a CPA for a particular firm. In contrast, the
role of chief executive officer (CEO) is a kind of instituted or organizational role that carries with it
specialized knowledge; one cannot be a CEO without taking up the role of heading a particular
organization.
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without having to learn new things (e.g., skills or procedures that they have to carry out
themselves) per se; they have to know where to go for the information. Such systems use
people as repositories for information, query about specialized information, or input data
that others later retrieve when they transactively engage with the organization’s systems
(e.g., pull a report from the computer system). When people are the components of
information systems, care is needed in design and how this design will affect the
treatment of those people. Unlike other forms of information storage and retrieval, such
as diaries, maps, computers, or books, people care about how they are treated during the
storage and retrieval process, and they share or withhold information accordingly. Unless
I buy my computer from an evil genius who designs malevolent machines, I can
generally assume that my computer will continue to supply me with reliable information
even if I have no other relationship with it. Likewise, I assume I can write in the margins
of a book without it caring about how I am using it. When people make up the
information processing systems whose aim is the maximization of output, decisionmaking systems may begin to treat people as they might treat any other information
processor (e.g., a computer, book, or BlackBerry). The question, then, is how the
treatment of people, when they act as parts of transactive memory systems, affects the
agential capacities of the organization.
When information is stored in a device, as opposed to in a person, the individual
persons accessing the information act upon the device to retrieve the information
requested. Similarly, when group structures organize around information processing
systems, they bring the parts of that system under their control. When I refer to a calendar
on my computer or consult my android app to find out when the next bus will arrive, I am
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the one who looks; the device that I use to retrieve this information does not care about
the manner in which I ask it for information. The “job” of the device is to provide me
access or to store the information until such time as I need to retrieve it. This does not
diminish the role of the storage device in the process of cognition; both my cognitive
hardware and the device’s software are necessary to get the job done. However, it does
generate a different kind of relationship to these types of storage systems than other
systems or entities that might be able to initiate such processes. In the case of transactive
memory systems, in which individuals turn to other persons to complete a task or retrieve
stored information, the way we use another person is different from the way we use other
kinds of data storage devices to access the information for our ends. However, using
people as a means to store, retrieve, and process information renders them vulnerable to
exploitation.
Deborah Tollefsen explains the differences between using other kinds of devices
that function as part of extended cognitive systems and extending one’s cognition using
others as part of a collectively coupled system (2006). Tollefsen argues that a substantial
difference exists between the kind of role a data storage device plays in the comparatively
solipsistic coupled system and the kind of role another person plays in the collective
coupled system, and this is a good thing. She reformulates the example of Otto and his
notebook (Chalmers & Clark 1998, p. 12) to capture a collective coupled system; Olaf
and Inga. The original example used by Chalmers and Clark, introduces Otto as a person
with a mild form of Alzheimer’s disease; he utilizes a notebook to help structure his life.
He catalogs the places that he visits, schedules necessary tasks, records important
experiences and facts, inscribes directions to places he enjoys going, etc. Comparing Otto
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to Inga, who relies on her short- and long-term memory to structure her actions (in the
example, they are both going to the museum), Chalmers and Clark claim that the role of
Inga’s memory processes functionally equates to the role Otto’s notebook plays in
structuring his actions. The point of the example is to challenge the assumption that the
process of cognition takes place only in Otto’s head. When Otto relies on his notebook
(one kind of data storage device) in the process of structuring his beliefs to guide his
actions, his cognition is still his (thus the reason Tollefsen calls this kind of “coupled
system” solipsistic). However, the active process of cognition does not only involve Otto;
it involves the notebook as well (hence, the example as a defense of the extended mind
thesis).
Tollefsen uses the example of Olaf and Inga, a couple who rely on each other to
supply the information that structures their lives in a manner functionally equivalent to
the way that Otto relies on his notebook. The differences Tollefsen identifies concern the
nature of the relationship between Olaf and Inga, as compared to that between Otto and
his notebook. She sees the nature of the relationship as a difference that alters the kind of
cognitive processing going on. By looking more closely at the distinction between the
two, I will explore whether and how this difference alters transactive memory systems
when they are employed by organizations to produce group cognitive processes aimed at
efficiency and output maximization.
Tollefsen argues that the collective coupled system of Olaf and Inga is more
active than the coupled cognitive system of Otto and his (passive) notebook; people can
withhold information, they can deceive, but they can also provide more than mere
information (p. 144). Tollefsen claims that Inga’s active participation may lead Olaf to
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endorse the information she provides in a way he would not if he were retrieving the
information from a notebook. Tollefsen notes that, “because Inga is an active participant
in the coupled system of which she is a member her presence is more reliable than a mere
artifact. A loving and committed, cognitive partner, Inga is always there – through
sickness, health, and memory loss” (p. 143). What Tollefsen hints at, and comes close to
making explicit, is the effect of trust on our interpersonal relationships and the degree to
which such trust can lead to endorsements of information from trusted sources. However,
we do not need a deeply intimate cognitively coupled system to accept Tollefsen’s more
general point that the level of trust in the collective coupled system, because it is made up
of two agents that depend on each other to construct the cognitive process, is more
interdependent than the coupled system comprised of an individual and a notebook. The
recognition of the different ways of relating to each other within organizations prompts
us to look deeper into the procedures of information processes to determine how treating
other persons as mere data storage devices affects the kind of reasoning capacities in
which these groups engage.
In organized transactive memory systems, trust can enhance group functioning.
Organizational behavior studies have demonstrated that transactive memory systems
exhibit high degrees of efficiency within organizational settings when this trust and group
cohesion is present (Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1998; Argote & Ingram, 2000),
particularly when communication is high between group members (Moreland &
Myaskovsky, 2000).89 The kind of structured ways in which people relate to one another
within complex organizations supports this point as well. When two people or a network
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These studies have provided both direct and indirect evidence of the positive effects of transactive
memory on group performance, such as efficient storage and recall of knowledge.
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built around people acting in transactive memory systems operates within the confines of
an organization, particularly one that experiences a high degree of member turnover, we
cannot expect the presence of trust or loyalty, particularly when we compare the level of
trust we might expect in a committed relationship between life partners.
Particularly in organizations that have high turnover, the relationships between
people in organizations are defined by their institutional role, which is based upon
transactive interactions with others. Transactive systems function just as well when
information is communicated to team members about who possesses which skills (i.e. the
individual team members are not trained together) as when team members are trained
together and develop trust (Moreland and Myaskovsky, 2000).90 Trust based on
friendship, fidelity, or loyalty is not necessary for transactive memory systems, and
interpersonal experiences can hinder group output.91 Particularly when interpersonal
experiences lead to conditions of distrust or organizational cynicism, transactive teambased efficiency breaks down (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Dean, Brandes, & Dharwadkar,
1998). When I become a new member in the department, I expect that my chair will
design an equitable teaching schedule because she is the chair. After I get to know her, I
may think she is an equitable person because she has demonstrated this over several
semesters, or I may come to think otherwise. Likewise, when I input data into the
computer to calculate output projections for an organizational decision, and additional
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This experiment tested whether the benefits of transactive memory systems are due to improved
communication among group members. The results indicated that they are not. Groups whose members
were trained apart, with no chance to communicate with one another, performed well after receiving
information about one another’s skills. Their performance was comparable to that of groups whose
members were trained together, and both types of groups performed significantly better than did groups
whose members were trained apart.
91
It is often the case that these kinds of intimate relationships are discouraged for fear of nepotism.
Particularly in the case of office-based romantic relationships, many organizations discourage, if not ban
altogether, the mixing of professional and personal life.
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input from another person in the organization is needed, I assume the person occupying
that role will input the data, not because I particularly trust that person, but because she
occupies a given organizational role. Thus, I trust that anyone in that position will act in
accordance with that role.
Highly structured organizations, such as factory firms or hierarchical firms, have
set roles that are not (typically) personalizable: the person conforms to the role rather
than the other way around, whereas organic firms with low levels of standardized roles
and dispersed authority structures would depend more upon trust to establish a shared
cognitive system. As people take on roles that are transactive in nature, such as in the
case of highly structured organization settings, we would expect them to conform to the
performance expectations of their roles, including the way they employ reasoning skills
as members of the group. Reducing uncertainties in group transactions that produce
knowledge necessary for group judgments would dictate the development of roles that
strictly define the expectations of group members. When people act within defined roles
or answer to efficiency demands, we should expect that their engagement with other
people would constrain the way they engage and consider information throughout the
decision-making processes. When information is taken out of the hands (or minds) of
particular individuals, and knowledge is produced through firm processes, decisionmaking processes become streamlined. As decision-making processes are streamlined,
firms can reduce uncertainty through consistency in judgments; that is, judgments that
display strategic rationality.
I have argued for an understanding of how business firms organize individuals
into working groups that function as transactive memory systems. The purpose of this
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discussion has been to understand how individuals can coordinate to produce group-level
knowledge that enhances organizational efficiency and enables the group to achieve and
maintain a competitive advantage through a dynamic learning process. However, we
ought not assume a similarity between this mode of engagement and other kinds of
collective cognition. The shared cognitive systems these kinds of groups encourage are
based on transactive information extraction and exchange. This transactive process
results in consistency in judgments, but it also constrains the kinds of reasoning that
people share during group transactions. The kind of reasoning that they make explicit
reflects the roles they occupy.
3.3.2 Instituted Knowledge and Moral Reasoning
Determining how groups make decisions is no easy task. Particularly when our
social arrangements explicitly promote maximizing output within firms, determining a
firm’s intentions outside of our representations of them is especially difficult. At the level
of group processing, strategic rationality may dictate that firms ought to act as if they can
understand the morally weighty variables with which their judgments struggle. In other
words, if a corporation engages in a sufficiently rations decision-making process, it will
be able to consider morally weighty statements and proffer a judgment in accordance
with past decisions, and maybe even provide justification for its decision, although this
capacity does not entail that we demand that the corporation demonstrate its robust
ability to engage in moral reasoning. We frequently see this in companies’ response to
disaster. For example, consider BP’s response to the Deepwater Horizon incident (2010):
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BP immediately took (some) responsibility, acknowledged wrongs done to particular
people, and took courses of action to remediate those wrongs.92
On List and Pettit’s account, a group judgment occurs when a choice is presented
for consideration (i.e., statements of possible action are included on the agenda) and the
group undertakes the appropriate decision-making processes, in accordance with its
structure, for endorsing or rejecting those statements or courses of action. List and Pettit
claim that there is no principled reason why we should think that such groups cannot
engage in moral reasoning because corporations involve individuals (in the committees,
as part of the authorized subgroups, or as the official representatives who make the
decision) who can (and presumably do) engage in moral reasoning in their everyday lives
outside of the organization (2011, p. 159). Yet, the justification for understanding certain
organization structures as agency-producing has to do with producing logically consistent
judgments, and the deliberation processes in organizations that result in logically
consistent judgments do not ensure that the reasons for actions are moral in nature. In
other words, the ability to reason practically does not entail moral reasoning.
List and Pettit’s account does not seem to take into consideration how information
processes in shared cognitive and transactive memory systems can change the way that
decisions are made such that the decision-making process itself no longer mirrors how
individuals make decisions in their daily lives. This is to say that List and Pettit do not
seem to take seriously the transformative role that buy-in and group participation play
when people participate within these kinds of organization structures. In other words, List
92

To track the progress and extent to which BP is living up to its avowed commitment, see the BP site
dedicated to the Deepwater Horizon incident. Regardless of whether or not we think BP is sincere, the site
demonstrates that they are at least committed to the appearance of sincerity.
http://www.bp.com/sectionbodycopy.do?categoryId=41&contentId=7067505&nicam=PaidSearch&nisrc=
Google&nigrp=GOM_B-E&nipkw=BP_Spill&niadv=bp_oil_spill
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and Pettit’s account does not capture how the organization structure heavily influences
the kinds of reasoning in which individuals in the decision-making processes engage, and
in turn, how this constraint impacts an organization’s agential capacities. Decisions made
by these kinds of group agents are often arrived upon through processes that ensure that
the group demonstrates strategic rationality, but these processes also function through an
epistemic division of labor. This division of labor often divorces the decisions produced
from the individuals who construct the knowledge that underlies group decisions; this
also means that those most likely to recognize the morally salient features of the decisionmaking process are not necessarily those who make the decisions. Particularly when
automated systems are used to calculate the most logical course of action given a specific
goal, and group members act in accordance with the calculated solution, the group can
still be said to engage in reasoning simpliciter. In such instances, organizational design
does not include a level at which the group morally reflects about whether the end is
worth pursuing.
The ability to reflect on the ends one is pursuing and decide whether to pursue
those ends or select a different set of ends, enables group agents to begin to recognize
themselves as a source of action. This is to say that the ability to engage in moral
reasoning necessitates a different kind of connection between the action and the agent.
The agent must have the ability to think of itself as a cause; it must be able to have a
representation of self. The economic group agent is certainly a cause toward the end of
maximizing output, but that end has been determined by the representations of a
particular kind of firm function. However, if an economic group agent could reflect upon
whether it should pursue that end, then it would bring into the decision-making process
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the ability to choose the means to that end, and even when not to take that end as the one
to pursue. If the function of economic group agents is, in part, to minimize uncertainty
toward the aim of maximizing output, enabling the agents to question the end opens up
the possibility of greater control over their actions.
However, one may argue that to implement systems (such as feedback loops that
alert managers and decision makers of what morally relevant features to consider at any
point in the decision-making process) in highly structured organizations would risk
straining firm efficiency. Imagine if every checker at Wal-Mart could bring an issue to
the CEO or district manager. It would seem that efficiency in decision making would be
threatened if every point of information sharing and knowledge production could be
stopped for moral reflection and deliberation, although firms could piggyback this kind of
feedback-based reflection on their systems checks on efficiency. Systems checks for
efficiency occur at every level of group action. Many companies create reporting
mechanisms by which they can cultivate ideas about reducing waste, increasing safety, or
identifying opportunities for better contracted pricing. We could explain each of these
three suggestions in either strategic or moral terms. Reducing waste decreases disposal
and clean up costs. It also has the benefit of not damaging the local environment.
Increasing safety decreases the amount paid out in lawsuits and worker’s compensation.
It also ensures that the workplace does not harm people in preventable ways. Cutting
spending, regardless of where the reduction occurs, increases profit margins. Cutting
spending could also allow the firm to employ more people, ensure that employees have
access to benefits, or give back to the local community. The problem is that the moral
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language employed does not provide a way to track when and if practical reasoning or
moral reasoning is present in the group decision-making process.
These examples have shown no conflict between moral reasoning and strategic
rationality. That is to say that what was good for business did not conflict with the results
of moral reasoning we would expect from such considerations. However, we should not
expect this to always to be the case; particularly when the end is maximizing profit, moral
reasoning would often result in recommendations that contradict strategic rationality. For
example, take the controversy surrounding Starbucks’ support of the same-sex marriage
bill in the state of Washington. One of the shareholders, Tom Strobhar, asked Starbucks
CEO Howard Schultz how the company could justify an action grounded in moral choice
that conflicted with business strategy. Strobhar stated, “What concerns me is possible
economic boycotts, shareholder resolutions, things that might affect the sales of our
company, the earnings. [I]s it prudent to risk the economic interests of all the
shareholders for something that might affect the private lives of a very small percentage
of our employees?”(Butts, 2012). The expectation that a firm should refrain from taking
actions that threaten its profitability, even as the action may serve the interest of equality
or justice, is clear.
In the case of shared cognition in organizations, especially in cases where the firm
has developed intricate information processing systems, efficiency is promoted through
the division of intellectual labor. Technology aids in the efficiency of information sharing
by linking sources of information (persons) to recipients who use the information for
constructions of different knowledge or to build on the initial data input. Knowledge
construction used in the process of group decision making is produced by a multitude of
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individuals, who add information into a system to generate calculations, predictions,
forecasts of demand, etc. In such cases, individuals at various stages may check the
calculations or decisions produced to ensure that the information was entered correctly
(e.g., that forecasted demand is not unusual compared to past precedent, that the T
accounts balance, that no data is missing). When individuals occupy roles within
organizations, many of their expectations are defined by the experiences of those who
have come before them, by the structures that have been developed to ensure efficiency
as people enact specific organizational roles.
When List and Pettit describe the process of group moral reasoning, they seem to
want more than people recognizing information as they enter it into a system. Ensuring
that group agents engage in moral reasoning would require stricter decision-making
policies, or another design desideratum altogether. This kind of involved decision-making
also seems to differ significantly from processes wherein deliberation over how each
stage of information gathering and consideration leads to the display of group rationality.
The kind of group processing that allows for group judgments would have to be more
demanding (i.e., require more than logical consistency) and would produce recommended
actions that are not always optimal for output (i.e., the maximization of profit). This kind
of demandingness would need to become a quality required from external systems or
otherwise promote the firm’s interests. Otherwise, the strategic cost to companies that
engage in moral reasoning would be too high.93 To use a game theory analogy, in the land
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In “How can organizations be competitive but dare to care?” Andrew Delios (2010) presents significant
empirical data showing that the nature of industry and the institutional environments in which organizations
exist jeopardizes the competitiveness of organizations that implement practices prioritizing care and social
responsibility over profit maximization. He further shows that globalization amplifies the economic risks to
the organizations. The solution he suggests is that organizational leaders should proactively change the
nature of their competitive environment to one more conducive to those ends.
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of defectors, cooperators lose. In other words, organizations cannot escape their
economic imperative. Systems of constraint (e.g., external legal or regulatory systems)
can, however, alter that imperative. Such change would have to arise from altering the
external assessments and evaluations used to encourage or discourage certain kinds of
firm behavior. This is another instance in which the environment comes to bear not just
on how particular firms will come to evaluate possible courses of action, but also on how
those outside the firm will come to understand the firm differently, using a different
representation to understand how and why the firm came to the decisions it did.
3.3.3 External Assessments of Firm Capacities and Judgments
In market environments, firms are assumed to make decisions in accordance with
limiting transaction costs and establishing or maintaining a competitive advantage. With
this economic raison d’être the external modes of assessment from other firms and from
other social institutions assume that the primary basis for decisions will accord with the
demands of firm survival through promoting its self-interest. It is assumed that firms act
and are assessed in accordance with profitability, and valued accordingly. Firm
rationality shows up only when it displays itself in accordance with strategic rationality;
that is, in accordance with maximizing firm value. If firm managers or employees enact
actions to the contrary, such actions will appear irrational. For example, if a firm donates
to charities past the point of tax incentive, and additional benefit from positive public
relations is not reflected in the market value of stock, the charitable actions would be
deemed irrational. The perception of irrationality--acting in a non-optimal manner--of
firm behavior can negatively affect the firm’s ability to attract investors and maintain the
appearance of competitiveness (Spulber, 2009; Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007).
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In the instance that a group agent could make judgments in a way that considered
the moral gravity of the decisions and act in accordance with those decisions, those
outside the firm would not be able to discern this capacity from firms that act strictly in
accordance with strategic rationality. Even when moral language is employed, it is done
in a manner that shows how acting morally is also strategically rational (i.e., good for
business). For example, even as Mike Duke, Wal-Mart’s president and CEO, explains
how great it has been to “see the role that Wal-Mart has played on the big issues that
really matter,” he also admits, “it’s clear to me that sustainability is an area where WalMart leads.” One of the first lines of his sustainability message is that “[s]ustainability
continues to make Wal-Mart a better company by reducing waste, lowering costs, driving
innovation, increasing productivity and helping us fulfill our mission” (“Message from
the CEO,” 2010). Here we can see the slippage from acknowledging “big issues that
really matter” to “reducing waste, lowering costs, driving innovation, increasing
productivity,” all qualities that make a company competitive. We can infer from this
message that the company really does consider the moral reasons for implementing
sustainable practices, but emphasizes that these practices are good for business. External
evaluators of firm behavior take such strategies to be further evidence of the degree to
which such firms will go to ensure they have a competitive advantage over rival firms,
rather than evidence that the firms reasoned morally and acted accordingly.
The more general problem is that the traditional role of firms in our society holds
the actions of firms to standards of instrumental, rather than moral, justification. It is by
virtue of the fact that firms employ the language of instrumental evaluations as their
justification for actions that those outside the organization discount the degree to which
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these kinds of agents can engage in moral reasoning. One might wonder about the
inevitability of this system; how might we alter the environmental variables, thereby
encouraging firms to develop the capacity to engage in moral reasoning, and how might
the external community notice such a capacity?
3.4 Environmental Values to Promote Recognition of Moral Reasoning Capacities
If our purpose is to discuss the possible agential capacities different organization
structures could be capable of, and what this might be like, we will need to better
understand the conditions under which others might recognize this capacity. I have
argued that representations of firm function govern systems of constraint. As such, an
environment that reordered priorities of firm function to reason morally about the ends
the firm pursued would be reflected, in part, in the systems of constraints influencing
organizational development. This kind of shift in how a society solves the problem of
coordination would transform not only how a firm develops its capacities, but also the
way we conceive of the possibilities for firm agency and judgment capacities. It does not
have to result in firms that are not competitive, but it will constrain the way that they
compete.
When a corporation makes a decision, the ability to engage in moral reasoning is
not simply a reflection of whether or not the firm can proffer a response or give a
justification for its actions, but how the process enables the group to understand itself as
an agent acting for reasons in the first place. When a corporate agent considers, for
example, whether or not to establish an employee education fund, to downsize
“redundancies” in personnel, to pay a living wage to international employees, or to clean
up the local environment after decades of ill-managed waste disposal, moral reasoning is
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more than considering what would produce the better outcome for the firm’s set ends. It
is also entails deliberating over the ends aimed at and how to achieve those ends, which
could dictate foregoing profit or minimizing harm at a cost to the company, if it is the
right thing to do. Even as economic group agents become moral agents, this does not
mean they will resemble the kinds of moral agents we take individual human beings to
be. Economic group agents will be limited in the scope of moral life in which they
engage. With the recognition of these limitations, we can also recognize the reasons to
constrain these moral agents in a way that mirrors the scale of moral agency.
In the next and final chapter, I will examine the limits of moral agency in
economic group agents. I will use these limits to inform our thinking about group
responsibility, the kinds of obligations economic group agents might be able to assume,
and the extent to which economic agents who function as moral agents would have to
reflect this moral agency in their interactions with group members. The interactions
between the organization structure and the members, who are the building blocks of
group agency, will need to structure the process of buy-in to produce the kind of moral
reasoning capacities necessary for the group to function as a moral agent. Transactive
memory systems, as I have argued in this chapter, may be sufficient to produce group
agents who function in accordance with standards of organizational efficiency, but this
will not sufficiently encourage the kind of buy-in necessary to bring about and sustain
moral group agency. By understanding member buy-in as a transformational act that
affects how group members come to think of themselves in relation to the group, I argue
that group agents that are virtuous moral agents will need to prioritize a particular kind of
organizational life. Specifically, I argue that if the group wants to promote moral
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reasoning, it will need to treat members with moral respect in order to encourage and
sustain this kind of reasoning. In doing so, group incentive structures that directly shape
members’ practical identities through the transformational process of buy-in will also
need to reflect moral respect for group members.
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Chapter Four
Corporate Agency and Responsibility
The business of business is business. —Alfred Sloan, CEO of G.M. (1923-1946)
The business of business is people. —Herb Kelleher, Co-founder of Southwest Airlines
4.1 Introduction: Economic Associations, Responsibility, and Obligations
I have argued that business firms, as we understand them within particularized
histories and embedded in systems of power relations, are constrained by external and
internal structural variables. The internal and external pressures that encourage strategic
rationality allow those outside of the firm to interact with the group as a locus of agency.
As entities that can engage in practical reasoning, other agents (i.e., individual human
agents or other group agents) expect the economic group agent to understand its potential
to set into motion events that affect others. Combining the ability to reason about
consequences with the freedom of choice over the means toward an end, other agents are
justified in treating this kind of group agent as the proper target of responsibility. As
responsible agents, other agents can form reactive attitudes toward economic group
agents, praising or blaming the decisions that act as the basis of their actions. In this way,
one might say that an economic group agent is more than a minimal agent; it is a kind of
person.
Even if one considers economic group agents as a kind of minimal person, the
norms governing this kind of agent are not the same norms that govern the range of
interactions people experience with other persons. We would not expect an economic
organization to be friends with us, care about us, or consider our ends the way our friends
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would. This is to say, we would not expect group agents to engage in the same range of
interactions that other moral agents employ. Thus, even as the group agent may be
capable of engaging in moral reasoning, and even counted as a kind of moral agent, the
strict limitations in the range of moral life that the moral group agent can experience
distinguishes this kind of moral agent from full persons.
The way we understand firms to act influences the kinds of interactions we expect
economic agents to engage in or take on, as well as the degree to which those interactions
bind economic agents with obligations. One way economic agents take on obligations is
by entering into legal contracts with other persons and corporate agents. We would not be
surprised to learn that economic agents might break such contracts if the payoff were in
their best interest. This kind of strategic action reinforces the perception that economic
group agents understand and respond to economic incentives and fulfill obligations when
the outcome results in the maximization of self-interest. Given the current institutional
incentive structure constraining economic group agents, we would expect this kind of
agent to respond to strategic reasons, even about morally weighty issues (e.g., whether or
not to break a promise). Likewise, when it comes to attributions of responsibility and
fulfilling obligations, we would hold a strategic rationalizer accountable for fulfilling
obligations to others, even if the bindingness of those obligations are prudential reasons,
not moral ones. However, as I argued, changing the way we represent group organization
structures opens up the possibility that group agency can arise from the interplay between
internal and external variables, thus altering the way the group reasons about its actions.
In this way, I have argued that the scale of organization types should expand to include
the possibility of groups who can collectively engage in moral reasoning and act in a
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manner that reflects group agency. We might wonder how this change in group capacity
affects the degree to which we think group agents can take on obligations, that is, to be
responsible agents.
In this chapter, I discuss the limits of group responsibility, how engaging in moral
reasoning might make us think differently about responsibility for economic agents, and
how this reasoning capacity can be demonstrated within the group. From the discussion
of group responsibility, I will move to explore in more detail the kind of organizational
life that a virtuous group agent would endorse. In particular, I examine how this kind of
group agent would engage with members, how we might envision that organization
practices within these kinds of groups would be able to support and enable an economic
group agent who is also a member of the moral community, and what granting moral
status to these kinds of agents would entail in terms of group rights.
This discussion will begin by examining the model of group responsibility
presented by List and Pettit, and suggest a modified version of their account of group
responsibility. List and Pettit suggest group members’ responsibility should be mitigated
by the role that they play in organizational decision-making processes. I suggest that
attributions of responsibility to group agents should mirror this account and be mitigated
by a group agent’s possibilities for developing different kinds of reasoning capacities.
When situated in an environment that does not promote group agents that engage in
moral reasoning, we should not be surprised that moral reasoning is not present, or that
attributions of moral responsibility will ring hollow to the group agent.94 Thus, within
systems that constrain group agential capacities against a standard of strategic rationality,
94

To be clear, under these conditions, it would still be perfectly reasonable to hold the individuals within
the group, to whatever degree appropriate, responsible in a more demanding sense. That is to say that
individual agents may still be the proper target of reactive attitudes, moral praise or blame, and the like.
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group agents should still bear the consequences of their actions, but the grounding for
responsibility will be the agents’ causal role and the degree to which they could have
reasonably done otherwise. That is to say that under market conditions, group agents
should be held accountable for their actions because they have rational self-control.
When group agents operate within a system of constraint that models, promotes,
and aids in the development of group agents that engage in moral reasoning, attributions
of moral responsibility for actions become appropriate. When the group agent has, as part
of its decision-making processes, the ability to consider and understand moral reasons for
actions, such as recognizing an action as harmful to another person (e.g., explicitly unfair,
physically unsafe, degrading, violating their dignity), holding the agent accountable is
justified not only because the agent was causally responsible for its actions, but because
the agent chose its actions. In addition to taking on accountability, the group agent
becomes a proper target of the reactive attitudes95 of others. Moreover, since the group
agent is now a moral agent, we would expect it to be able to respond to the reactive
attitude (e.g., express guilt, be remorseful, change its policy to alleviate wrong-doing).
However, I argue that being in a position to be held morally responsible for one’s actions
is not enough to discern when a particular economic agent functions as a moral agent. I
argue that economic agents who model their decision-making processes and actions
against a standard of moral reasoning will prioritize a particular kind of organizational
life, and identifying this way of life will help us recognize moral group agents.
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I am not attempting to spell out the scope of reactive attitudes; whatever that scope might be, I will
assume that some will not be understood by group agents and others cannot be appropriately applied to
group agents (e.g., amorous love). Likewise, defining exactly what kinds of reactive attitudes might be
appropriately targeted at economic group agents is outside of the scope of this project.
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List and Pettit discuss incentive structures within organizations as a way to ensure
member buy-in. Member buy-in, they argue, is the foundation of the group agent because
it promotes a tight connection between group members and their role in bringing about
and sustaining group agency. I argue that member buy-in should be considered more than
an incentive structure that entices members to comply with group demands. By
understanding member buy-in as a transformational act that affects how group members
come to think of themselves in relation to the group, I argue that group agents aiming to
be moral agents will need to prioritize a particular kind of organizational life.
Specifically, I will argue that if the group wants to promote moral reasoning, it will need
to treat members with moral respect in order to encourage and sustain this kind of
reasoning. In doing so, group incentive structures that directly shape members’ practical
identities through the transformational process of buy-in will also need to reflect moral
respect for group members. I argue that moral economic agents ought to prioritize the
kind of organizational life that adheres to a standard of organizational justice.96 I end by
discussing how these suggestions come to bear on contemporary accounts of human
resources management and organizational design.
4.2 List and Pettit’s Account of Responsibility
List and Pettit (2011) discuss how to hold individuals within the group agent
accountable for their actions, and how to hold the group accountable for actions not
reducible to the actions of particular individuals. They defend their two-tier account of
responsibility against the claim that holding the group responsible for what individual
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A group agent that is also a moral agent must be able to demonstrate that it can understand moral reasons
for actions and take these reasons into account during its decision-making processes, and the actions that it
chooses should not explicitly violate the most basic level of well-being for its members. Such violations
will only undermine the member buy-in necessary to produce and sustain group agency.
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members do in the name of the group is redundant. They develop a more nuanced
account of individual and group responsibility. List and Pettit claim that individual
members should be understood as acting within their organizational role, and they
advocate mediating individual responsibility by contextualizing the individual’s
limitations on personal freedoms, rights, and the degree of authority that comes with their
group role. Individual responsibility, then, comes in three different kinds, depending on
one’s role in the organization: designer, member, or enactor. Each kind of responsibility
can be attributed to a person within the group based on the individual’s causal role in
influencing the organization’s decisions or actions.
Designers of the organization are responsible inasmuch as they have the ability to
directly shape the beliefs and desires of the group agent. List and Pettit liken designer
responsibility to the responsibility of parents to their grown child; they influenced the
child’s formative habits, but the scope and scale of this influence does not replace the
child’s responsibility for its actions (List & Pettit, p. 164). Group members become
responsible only when the group has done something. That is to say, unlike designer
responsibility, which can be attributed to a person based on her ability to shape group
beliefs or decision-making systems that produce beliefs, member responsibility enters the
scene only once the group agent acts. Thus, as group agents do good or bad things in the
world, the members’ responsibility will vary based on their roles in the group. Finally,
enactor responsibility adheres to individuals for what they do in the name of the group.
Enactor responsibility, they claim, is determined based on “the extent that they could
have refused to play that part” (List & Pettit, p. 164). Thus, attribution of responsibility to
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the group makes sense when accountability for individual actions does not fully mitigate
the consequences of group actions.
In their account, List and Pettit describe the interplay between developmental
(external) systems of constraint and systems of constraint that the group agent takes as its
own (internal) (List & Pettit, pp. 156-57).97 The first, external developmental constraint,
limits the form groups can take and the rules by which they have to play when operating
or engaging with others in the public sphere. Such systems of constraint operate through
legislation and enforcement of social norms of reciprocity and fair play. The second kind
of constraint, systems of internal constraint, limits and gives shape to the range of
permissible actions open to the group agent in the same way that primary decisionmaking constrains secondary decisions. In other words, the internal constraints represent
another feedback mechanism that reveals whether or not a group agent’s choice of action
would accord with prior actions. The interplay between the two systems of constraint can
be understood as an exchange between systems that present the guidelines of rational
action and the internalization of expectations. Attributions of accountability and
responsibility derive from the fact that group agents understand the expectations and
consider them when they make choices that violate or accord with these expectations.98
Similarly, when economic group agents act within a system that recognizes their agency,
this recognition opens up the possibility of granting the group the ability to enter into
different kinds of relationships with people. Thus, the recognition of group agency is the
97

Although this interplay is meant to describe how we come to appropriately attribute accountability and
responsibility to group agents, it could easily be read back into their account of how we mitigate individual
responsibility.
98
It should be pointed out that group agents, as with individual agents, are not bound by these expectations
in an absolute sense. Expectations, particularly in the form of legislation, are quite permeable. Economic
group agents can influence regulatory standards, lobby for changes in regulations, change jurisdiction to a
different system, etc.
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first step in the process wherein a group agent becomes a candidate for being considered
a responsibility-bearing entity capable of taking on obligations.
List and Pettit explain that as group agents take on obligations, such as those they
incur as a result of a legal contract, these obligations become part of the internal systems
of constraint. That is, the obligations become part of the internalized set of expectations
that a group agent considers during deliberative decision-making. As a group agent
considers these obligations as part of its decision-making process, it enters this space of
obligations (List & Pettit, pp. 177-78). But this space of obligations, that is to say the
legal space of obligations, is a particular kind of social space. The threshold for entering
this rather confined space of obligations is the ability to engage in practical reasoning.99
There are, however, different social spaces of obligations beyond this.
Moral agency opens up a realm of obligations that overlaps with legal obligations,
but also moves beyond this rather narrow space. For example, if a company “promises”
me a product integral to the operation of my company by a particular date, such as a
software upgrade, and they renege on that contract, then they owe me my original
investment plus other potential damages (e.g., the software upgrades were designed to
prevent some Y2K meltdown and now all my computers are nonoperational; I am able to
claim damages based on the reliance they induced). I am entitled, then, to compensation,
per the agreement that was entered into. I am not, however, entitled to expect the
company to express remorse. However, when another person entices me to rely on her by
promising to give me a ride to work, and she does not follow through with the promise,
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Even among individual human agents, those who cannot exhibit rationality in accordance with the
standard set by social norms are barred from taking on these obligations voluntarily or being held
accountable to uphold them. I’m thinking here of the status of mental defect, insanity, or underdeveloped
rationality (i.e., children).
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unless she has a compelling reason I am justified in my anger at her. I am, generally
speaking, not justified in bringing a lawsuit against her, but I may at least be entitled to
an apology. Thus, when List and Pettit claim that we can censure economic group agents,
and do so through reference to their obligations, expecting them to be moved by the
reminder (List & Pettit, p. 174), a bit of a leap is being made that parallels the leap they
made in detailing the kinds of reasoning capacities we can properly expect from group
agents.
In a move similar to the assumption that practical reasoning entails moral
reasoning, List and Pettit imply that entering the space of legal obligations entails that
group agents can enter a space of moral obligations. When the group agent enters the
space of moral obligations, List and Pettit claim that the group agent becomes a kind of
person, a performative person.100 For List and Pettit, this group person is performative in
that it “is capable of contracting obligations by entering into legal and other conventional
arrangements with others” (p. 173). Here again, we come upon the question of whether
the kinds of capacities an agent, any kind of agent, would have to possess to enter into a
system of legal obligations are sufficiently robust to infer that they can grasp the moral
reasons for acting and curtail their behavior in light of those reasons. Group responsibility
for actions, just as with individuals, should be indexed to their capacities. Moreover, even
if group agents and individual human agents considered moral reasons and acted in light
of those reasons, this does not mean that these agents “access precisely those resources of
mutual influence [and] call on one another as parties to a shared system of expectations
and obligation and expect that call to be heard” (List & Pettit, p. 174). As I will discuss,
100

To be clear, List and Pettit do not advocate that group agents are full persons. Among the differences
between group agents who are performative persons and human individual persons is that group agents do
not have a right not to be sold and they have extensive power that must be checked (pp. 180-185).
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we have good reason to think that individual human agents have systems of expectations
and obligations that do not apply to and cannot be accessed by group agents.
4.2.1 Situating Group Responsibility
As I mentioned earlier, there are two senses in which we can hold agents
responsible for their actions. When the group agent has, as part of its decision-making
processes, the ability to engage in practical reasoning, understand the consequences of its
actions, and deliberately chooses to act in a manner that satisfies or violates its
obligations, we are justified in holding that agent accountable. This kind of agent, be it
individual or group, not only can be held accountable, but is also the proper target of
others’ reactive attitudes. This is to say that as long as the agent in question, individual or
group, is self-reflective, i.e., one who understands itself to be a causal force for the
actions that it undertakes intentionally, recognizes itself as a causal force of change in the
world, and has the capacity to reflect upon its ends, the agent is morally responsible and
accountable for its actions.
When group agents (agents who can reason practically) act in the world, we
should at the very least hold them accountable for their actions. If they choose to break
contracts, they should have to pay. If they cause harm to the environment, we should hold
them liable. But, to what degree do we say that they are responsible? In a way similar to
how we would calibrate our attribution of responsibility and accountability to individuals
within the group based on their degree of control over group decisions (designers), their
involvement in group decisions and actions (members), and their freedom to do otherwise
(enactors), so too should we calibrate group responsibility. The development of a more
nuanced account of group responsibility should be indexed to the group’s possibilities for

148

action based on standards similar to those List and Pettit use to index individual
responsibilities.
Even when we cannot discern the kind of reasoner the organization is, a more
nuanced account of group responsibility will give us a basis from which to hold the group
responsible. By looking at the particularities of the economic group agent within systems
of constraint, we can attribute group responsibility based on the role that particular kinds
of group agents play in the larger society. For example, when a firm leads an industry and
sets up expectations that smaller firms must meet to stay in business, the group
demonstrates the ability to minimize uncertainties in its environment by influencing intergroup community standards. This justifies us to attribute greater designer responsibility to
this firm. When an economic group agent has the power to engage in deliberation with
the systems of regulation (e.g., lobbying efforts, negotiating government incentives,
petitioning to increase group rights within society), we are justified in attributing to them
member responsibility for their actions. Finally, when we attribute responsibility to firms
that control multiple points on a supply chain, and as such influence conditions of
exploitation in other sectors, the relative freedom of choice they enjoy in dealing fairly
with other vendors allows us to justify holding such firms accountable for policies that
enact such conditions. These all represent different kinds of responsibility (as
accountability) that we can attribute to economic group agents without appealing to the
kind of reasoner (moral or practical) that they are.
As List and Pettit have pointed out in their discussion of individual responsibility,
we have to calibrate individual responsibility against the standard of reasonable
expectation for that individual’s agential capacities. When looking at firms within
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laissez-faire market environments, we can begin to identify which corporations have the
different degrees of agency within the larger institutional frameworks. When we
understand the degrees of freedom—the degree to which the agent could have chosen
differently—that firms have to minimize uncertainty and internalize risk, we can better
calibrate group responsibility to group agency. We might want to know, in addition,
when it would be appropriate to attribute moral responsibility to such groups.
One consequence of a more nuanced conception of group responsibility is that we
can start to identify the ways in which the systems of moral expectations and obligations
are enforced by the expectations set forth by external systems of constraint. As I argued
in the last chapter, the capacity to develop moral reasoning within group agents should
not be taken as a given, but should be understood as a product of how economic group
agents are organized and developed. Thus, when external environments prioritize and
constrain group reasoning to engage in moral reasoning about actions, we can say that it
is possible to judge the group agent’s actions morally. Simply organizing systems of
constraint that encourage groups to engage in moral reasoning does not mean that they
will, but it is enough to open up a conceptual space where such group agents could be
morally responsible. This point shifts the question to how we can know whether a group
agent is engaging in moral reasoning. We can answer this question by looking at how the
group works.
The organization depends not only upon the aggregate decision-making process,
but also upon individual members to produce and sustain group agency. The same applies
to the production of moral group agency. List and Pettit discuss incentive structures that
encourage member buy-in as the foundation for group agency. Just as the standard for
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moral reasoning processes is higher than for practical reasoning, so too is the standard for
group member buy-in complicated when groups strive to be moral agents. By looking at
the standard of respect presented by List and Pettit, that is, the standard necessary for
individual members to buy in and promote group agency, we can identify the gaps
between the way they use the term “respect” and a stronger notion of respect necessary
for buy-in and promotion of moral group agency.
According to List and Pettit, the ideal of respect is the foundation of the
relationship between agents, that is, the relationship between natural persons and group
agents. Mutual respect between group persons and individual members “represents a
form of relationship that can be grounded in the will of each, at least to the extent that the
relevant oblations—the terms in which persons relate to one another—are accepted on all
sides, as a matter of common awareness” (List & Pettit, p. 179). Without an expectation
of respect, they argue, people will hesitate to buy into the group; furthermore, once they
do decide to join, identification gaps would open and threaten group agency.
This ideal arises from a concept of respect as non-domination and noninterference, as much as possible. Where there is interference, List and Pettit advocate for
respectful interference. Respectful interference allows group agents to incentivize
particular courses of action or offer rewards, but also requires them to respect (i.e., not
block or close off) exit options, by which individuals can decline a particular course of
action in favor of an alternative. For example, if a company offers an employee education
program that incentivizes the adoption of skills useful to the firm, this could be
understood as a kind of respectful interference. In other words, the decision to opt out of
the employee education program does not threaten one’s job (i.e., there is no harm in

151

refusal), even as it provides incentives for options that further the group agent’s end (e.g.,
creating a supply of mid- to upper-level managers, creating more specialization of skills
for knowledge production used during the decision-making process). Although respectful
interference, and respect as non-interference, may be a proper standard for buy-in more
generally, the promotion of moral group agency requires buy-in through moral respect.101
Moral respect within an organizational context could be expressed by setting up a
system of incentives and policies that govern organizational design (e.g., hiring and
promotion, vacation, sick leave); those that affect group members are designed to
promote inclusion. Inclusive incentive systems and policies that govern organizational
design are those that are enforced by procedures and organizational checks that
demonstrate them to be consistent, fairly distributed (see Greenberg, 1986, 1993),102
transparent, correctable, and responsive to employee feedback (Judge & Colquitt 2004, p.
395). This is to say that the systems of buy-in and managing members attempt to mirror
standards of organizational justice. Moral respect, as it promotes inclusion, is more
demanding than respectful based on the ideal of respect as non-interference. A group’s
incentives can be respectful, in that they do not directly undermine a member’s goals, and
still simultaneously and indirectly undermine the member’s way of life. Buy-in is not
only about what it takes to incentivize member participation in the group, it is also about
how those systems of reward encourage and promote a way of life or standards of
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One of the ways that I am distinguishing List and Pettit’s respect as non-interference from moral respect
(that is, respect which demonstrates moral reasoning about policies), is by arguing that moral respect is not
only necessary for group member buy-in, it is also evidence of the group agent’s ability to engage in moral
reasoning, whereas respect as non-interference would be perfectly consistent with strategic rationality.
102
Greenberg states “unbiased” instead of fairly distributed. However, when dealing with systems of
inequality, sometimes fairness to persons necessitates biased treatment. For example, allowing a woman
additional training and mentoring when she has been absent from the work force for 20 years is not
unbiased, but it may be fair. This is to say that distributive fairness in organizations will have to balance
equal distribution with distribution based on individuals’ needs
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professionalism that marginalize or otherwise undermine the dignity of members. Buy-in
so understood is a transformative act, and for this act to promote the end of moral group
agency, it should include processes that positively promote moral respect.
4.3 Moral Respect in Economic Associations
Economic associations are powerfully influential agents in the lives their
members. According to the labor statistics the U.N. reports for workers over the age of
15, individuals in the United States work approximately eight hours a day for most of the
week, and a majority of them work more than forty hours per week.103 Indeed, when we
go to a cocktail party or meet new people at a concert, one of the first questions we ask is,
“What do you do?” Moreover, as List and Pettit discussed, the extent to which large
corporations have power to control the lives of other persons, we have only to look to
Wal-Mart as a salient example. When a Wal-Mart opens in smaller communities, to a
profound extent it quite literally determines the possibilities of what can be supplied and
where people can work. Particularly with corporations such as Wal-Mart, the short-term
positive economic impact on local communities is often outweighed by a drastic increase
in individuals becoming dependent on welfare programs, a decrease in preventative
medical care received by workers, and the closing of local shops and business.
List and Pettit argue, in their chapter on “Identifying with Group Agents,” that
group members must identify with the collective to participate in the group-level
processes that produce and sustain group agency. If members cannot or do not identify
with the group, the group agent is threatened because the members do not give uptake or
do what is necessary within their context of the aggregate decision process (p. 187).
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According to the census data reported by the UN since 1985, in the U.S., 85.8 percent of males and 66.5
percent of females work more than 40 hours per week. Americans work an average of 33.6 hours per week.
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When we begin exploring questions of organizational buy-in and the degree to which
economic associations might function as a minimal person (an agent who can
demonstrate practical reasoning and engage in self-reflective deliberations about its
ends), we need to look at two related questions.
First, how do systems of reward and reinforcement promote a way of life that may
hinder member buy-in? Second, how does the standard for the rewarded way of life come
into tension with other identities integral to our individuated lives in a manner that
violates moral respect, and thus undermines buy-in necessary for moral group agency?
The second question, in particular, should be considered an extension of my critique
against the concept of freedom underlying List and Pettit’s account more generally (see
pp. 40-42), and particularly as it applies to their description of appropriate incentive
structures. I will argue that even as the standard of respectful influence put forth by List
and Pettit may directly support a pluralistic vision of a good life, it may still indirectly set
back individuals’ self-interests, especially because group identities influence how group
members’ make sense of other practical identities. Exploring these two questions will fill
out the picture of what a virtuous economic group agent, one capable of setting up
internal systems of buy-in necessary to bring about and sustain moral group agency,
would look like in practice.
4.3.1 The Role of Identity in Responsibility and Respect
List and Pettit argue that without personal identification with one’s role in the
organization, the ties of individual responsibility start to loosen. I may not give uptake to
the legitimate claims others make on me when I operate as a member (or designer, or
enactor) of the group (p. 190). To repair rifts in the seam of group agency, the firm, other
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members, or organization leaders must set up systems of support to encourage continued
member investment in the organizational identity. List and Pettit point out that economic
agents rely primarily on financial incentives to build and maintain affiliative bonds
amongst group members. They also discuss how group membership may require selfsacrifice of personal identities when these identities do not correspond with group
attitudes (List & Pettit, p. 199). This seems to be an overly simplistic view of the way
member buy-in functions within the context of different professional structures.
Organizational incentive structures and standards of professionalism within
organizations do not affect us only during our working hours.104 These structures dictate
more than what the group is able to do for me (or do not do for me); these structures are
the fundamental aspects of the member buy-in process. Moreover, member buy-in is not
just about minimizing conflicting identities to ensure that group members can function
within the group, although this is part of their function. Rather, member buy-in and group
membership, more generally, entails reconciling different practical identities. When we
enact an organizational role, the process of buy-in alters the ways in which I evaluate
whether or not to go along with the group identity. Those decisions, the ones we make as
members of a group, also color how we make sense of ourselves and how others make
sense of us outside the organization.105 In other words, it is about how I, as a member of
the group, find meaning and significance in the group. This is the sense in which I mean
that the group plays a transformative role in the lives of its members. Virtuous economic
group agents would encourage buy-in as a means by which to enhance the likelihood that
104

For an interesting study on the effects of organizational life on individuals outside of the organization,
see Putnam (2000).
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For example, if I compromise or otherwise sacrifice some other practical identity I have in the name of
the group, depending on the context, I may wonder if this makes me a bad woman, mother, friend, or
partner. This example should also help clarify the sense in which buy-in is transformational.
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a group member will engage in moral reasoning while they occupy their role in the
group; they would aim to harness the transformative power of buy-in in a manner
reflective of this aim. Without a holistic organization structure flexible enough to adapt to
a plurality of practical identities, the individual member’s personal identities could
conflict with her roles in bringing about the group aims, thusly undermining group
agency. Even when the incentive structures are not explicitly coercive, the roles we adopt
within the group affect our other practical identities (i.e., those in the private sphere of
control). As such, the incentive structures and the kind of practical identities with which
they are compatible should be as pluralistic as possible so that member buy-in will be
more likely, and moral reasoning within the group would be promoted for a variety of
practical identities.
These buy-in structures also influence how we structure our private (home) lives
and the degree to which we are able to pursue a life we find meaningful. Even as
organizations may seek to enable members to pursue a way of life they find meaningful,
when that way of life comes into tension with the standards of professionalism in a given
industry negotiations between identities become difficult. This difficulty does not only
concern the ways in which economic agents demonstrate respect for persons; more to the
point, the difficulty arises when the standards of professionalism against which economic
associations are judged indirectly undermine other practical identities agents endorse.
Group agents, to the extent that they can exercise reflective deliberation beyond mere
strategic rationality, are able to reason about their own organizational structure and how it
is designed to promote group agency. The internal organizational design is directly under
the group agent’s control in a way that market regulations are not. Therefore, looking at
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the most foundational level of the group’s organization, and at how that organization
encourages member buy-in, will allow us to infer what kind of reasoning capacities the
economic group agent is attempting to create or maintain. The standard of moral respect
for group members is relevant, then, because it would allow economic group agents to
demonstrate the capacity to engage in moral reasoning in a manner that would be difficult
to translate into strategic justification. Setting up systems of buy-in that adhere to a
standard of moral respect will be challenging. However, by reordering organizational
priorities in a manner that promotes moral respect, the group agent will not only create
group incentive structures that will encourage member buy-in, but also demonstrate its
capacity to engage in moral reasoning and to act accordingly.
Sarah Buss explains the difference between acting in ways that are directly or
indirectly respectful (1999, esp. 802-7). When an organization engages in communication
that explicitly recognizes members as valuable, the group is being direct.106 For example,
a company may state explicitly that they value feedback from every level within the
organization, companies may have suggestion boxes in the break room, or managers may
promote “open door” policies. These are examples of potential feedback mechanisms that
help the group track member buy-in and the degree to which different group members
identify with the aims of the collective. Acknowledging people directly ensures that they
are aware that their feelings and points of view matter; acknowledging people indirectly
ensures that they are aware that their feelings, projects, and values matter within a
specific context. An organization may indirectly treat a member with respect when the
group constrains or otherwise adjusts its aims out of respect for that member. For
106

It may be worth noting that the communication does not always have to be positive. Telling group
members when they are not performing up to standards is also being directly supportive. Of course, how
the information is relayed matters as well.
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example, a company may have a general promotion incentive program to give everyone
equal opportunity for internal advancement; this is a direct incentive. When the company
also recognizes that women and historically marginalized populations face additional
barriers to advancement, and provides additional mentoring or skills development for
those populations, it indirectly acknowledges how to promote the interests of particular
people within a given institutional framework. These kinds of organizational practices
occupy a domain of decisions that well organized group agents could reflect upon, reason
about, and modify to support and perpetuate group agency.
To look more closely at the ways in which actual economic agents seek to
develop and maintain systems of respect and support, I will turn to ideals presented in
human resource management theory. Using these ideals, I will fill out the story of how a
virtuous group agent would set up systems of interaction between the group and its
members. Furthermore, looking at the concepts of respect and respectful interference in
business theory will serve two supplementary purposes. First, it will allow us to apply the
standards under discussion to concrete cases that inform organizational practices, and to
extrapolate from these cases to sketch what group buy-in systems within a virtuous
economic group agent might look like.107 Second, it will demonstrate more conclusively
how systems of respectful interference within the organization indirectly set back the
interests of group members, thus undermining member buy-in in a way that would
undermine the production of moral group agency.
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It should be noted that at this point in the analysis, while I am using theories that capture actual
organization structures, my appropriation of these ideals within the context of virtuous economic group
agents may not map on to any organizations actually in existence.
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4.3.2 Rethinking Ideals in Human Resource Management
In human resource management (HRM) theory, an inclusive workplace is the
ideal. HRM theorists seek to achieve work-life balance, recognize achievements, and
diminish the feelings of exploitation in employees through the creation of a diverse and
inclusive workplace. Nicola Pless and Thomas Maak (2004) reframed the debate of
organizational culture by appealing to the moral grounding of the concept of
inclusiveness. Post-Pless and Maak, subsequent theorists, downplaying the role of moral
values inherent in HRM, have sought to identify and measure perspectives of diversity
within organizations (Allen et al., 2008), develop methods to “infuse” organization
culture with inclusion (Chavez & Weisinger, 2008), and develop tools to identify skill
gaps and deficiencies for remediation (Turnbull et al., 2009).
Attempts to implement the theoretical ideals of “inclusion” and “diversity” have
proven difficult. Leaving to one side the justifications for adopting inclusive practices
toward the strategic ends of increasing efficiency (e.g., better productivity and
organization performance), we see HRM theorists appealing to the intrinsic goodness of
creating an atmosphere of equality in organizations, fair distributions of rewards, or
encouraging work-life balance. Just as List and Pettit suggest that member selfidentification with the group is necessary to produce group agency, HRM recognizes that
self-identification with the group is necessary for a member to preserve a sense of
dignity, self-respect, and respect for other members. One of the primary goals of HRM is
to develop methods and practices that enhance member buy-in to the organizational
identity.
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The organizational identity ideally reflects a vision and goals that are open-ended;
that way, members can buy-into the organization’s identity within their particular
organizational roles without having to give up their individual differences or personal
identities. The history of diversity initiatives has seen a shift away from simply including
the historically marginalized in business organizations, an empty gesture that functioned
as a kind of tokenism.108 This picture of member buy-in was one that de facto required
some people to yield core aspects of their identity and become like others, if they wanted
to succeed in the organization.109 Instead of encouraging member buy-in, such initiatives
plunged many different kinds of people into organizations without providing procedures
to create respectful engagement. In short, there was a diversity of bodies without a
pluralism of perspectives.110 More recently, the HRM literature has moved away from the
primary goal of recruiting diversity of members and toward creating a culture of
inclusion.
As pointed out by Carolyn Chavez and Judith Weisinger (2008), the difference
between managing for diversity and creating inclusive environments is the distinction
between emphasizing the differences between groups of individuals and creating
solidarity in an organization by highlighting peoples’ similarities. Creating supportive
systems within organizations goes beyond respectful interference, but is one way to
enable employee buy-in and identification with the group in a manner consistent with
organizational justice. A turn to organizational practices will further illustrate how
108

For a thorough history of the relationship between Title VII legislation, affirmative action, diversity
management, and the shift toward the culture of inclusion, see Edelman, Riggs-Fuller, and Mara-Drita
(2001), Nkomo and Stewart (2006), Burns and Schapper (2008), and Chavez and Weisinger (2008).
109
This identity conflict is discussed in detail in much of the literature of the past decade. See, for example,
Caver and Livers (2002), Calás and Smircich (2006), Dawson (2006), and Nkomo and Stewart (2006).
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Pluralism in this context recognizes that individuals can have particular identities without having a
singular, unified group identity (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, p. 12).
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inclusive environments encourage buy-in through moral respect for group members.
From these actual practices, we will build a foundation from which to explicate what kind
of buy-in a virtuous group agent would promote and foster.
4.3.3 A Second Look at Chavez and Weisinger
Chavez and Weisinger suggest that fostering understanding between organization
members through a process of education and narrative-based shared experiences may
have the best chance of enhancing organizational diversity (pp. 337-38). They describe a
classroom-based learning approach coupled with sharing practices, such as making food
dishes and explaining the significance of the dish, as a means to open up a social space
within the organization that enables connections between members and mutual
understanding through the sharing of histories.111 The stated objective of these exercises
is to empower individuals with deep-seated differences to open up to others and to “break
barriers” between seemingly incommensurable groups.
The objectives of this approach are increased open communication, improved
listening skills, and heightened comfort levels between different groups of people within
the organization. These exercises build common ground by directly acknowledging
people as worthy of respect. Sharing exercises, such as the example given by Chavez and
Weisinger, give people a space to talk about their histories and share their stories, and in
this way, the organization directly acknowledges that they matter. As List and Pettit point
out, group agency often arises spontaneously, not because people are painstakingly
thinking in group terms or subjugating themselves to the will of the group (p. 192).
111

It is important to note that these exercises are only successful when top management within the
organization presents a story first, and gives freedom of choice to employees about what to share;
management must be open-minded and be “ready for anything” (i.e., act as a facilitator to prompt reflection
from the rest of the group without shutting anyone down, and encourage organic conversation) (pp. 34243).
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Creating an atmosphere in which members are more likely to develop different levels of
attachment and affiliation with the collective will only encourage buy-in. Making time
for these kinds of interactions and encouraging employees to be embraced by others
demonstrates that the group respects them as persons.
Being respectful, to any degree, to members of the group is not just about taking
on a group identity, it is also about developing an organizational culture that holistically
supports persons within the group. Through the encouragement of group values and
collective respect, the group’s incentive structures act as the foundation for members to
identify with the group, buy in to the group goals, and incorporate the reasoning
capacities they employ as part of their personal practical identities. In other words, how a
group chooses to incentivize buy-in says just as much about how it reasons as the
aggregate decision-making process; theoretically, the systems of incentive were also the
result of the group deliberative process. The virtuous group agent would demonstrate at
the most foundational levels of interaction that the group is collectively promoting the
values of its members; members within their organization roles are encouraged to reflect
on these group values and challenge them by appealing to the group. In short, the group
and its members are recognizing and engaging with each other as moral agents.
These kinds of HRM practices also count as evidence about what kinds of
reasoning capacities the group uses as the foundation for its actions. If a group agent
cannot demonstrate moral respect to those who make its agency possible, how sincerely
could it demonstrate this ability otherwise? Spontaneous acts of corporate philanthropy
are often explained as examples of an economic agent’s good will. However, in such
instances, we come back to the difference between beneficence in accordance with
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strategic rationality and beneficence as an extension of character or speaking to one’s
motivation. When Bank of America sponsors neighborhood building projects, we may
think of this as a social good; but we also recognize that it is not without benefit to the
corporation. Thus, we typically do not infer from these acts that the economic agent takes
itself to be acting as a moral agent, particularly when we possess evidence that the
organization engages in exploitive practices. The systems of support and respectful
interference may give us reason to think that economic agents are candidates for moral
agency. The real test, however, is whether the economic agent is willing to demonstrate
respect for members indirectly. Indirect moral respect for group members becomes most
immediately apparent when respect necessitates actions on the part of the economic agent
that do not directly align with the organization’s interests.112 Evidence of indirect moral
respect for members may also be a useful way to differentiate between virtuous group
agents and economic group agents more generally. Turning again to HRM practices that
stress inclusion, this test is where many fail to live up to the standard of virtuous group
agency; that is, group agency that promotes collective, not only the group agent’s, wellbeing.113
Even as the aim of inclusion stresses attention and appreciation of difference, the
measure of inclusion demonstrates that the primary motivation for inclusive programs is
group self-interest. That is to say that the programs are justified as a means to translate
the direct respect for personal differences into economic value. If a group member’s
value is not immediately measurable by the organization (i.e., it does not add to the
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To be clear, simply because an incentive program or organizational policy is not in immediate alignment
with the organization’s interests does not mean it would harm the organization.
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Again, I am not claiming that any organization in reality meets the standards of a virtuous group agent.
Rather, the point is that there is the possibility that this kind of group agent might exist.
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bottom line) then the value of inclusion is discounted. This tension between
organizational and personal identities arises because economic agents do not really
promote an appreciation of pluralism or collective well-being, but rather an appreciation
for difference when it can be translated into a justified value-added quality that mirrors
their standard of meritorious desert. This standard of merit, and the overall ability to
translate one’s value, is grounded by an understanding of productive, efficient
functioning as a measure of one’s worth. The merits of productivity within organizations
are reflective of a person’s ability to exercise her individual capacities and better both
herself and the organization through the development and use of specialized knowledge,
skills, and abilities that will further the group’s ends.
For example, many economic organizations have employee education
enhancement programs. Such programs constitute a social good in that they further
benefit employees by helping them pursue the educational ends they value. However,
organizations often set limits on such benefits that restrict the allowable disbursement to
courses or degree programs that closely align with the interests of the organization. A
bank, for instance, might install a program that will reimburse employees for courses that
they take (and pass) in business, finance, or management. They might not, however,
reimburse employees for courses in the humanities, social sciences, or other professional
tracks (e.g., engineering, law, medicine). Thus, even as the bank directly acknowledges
that education is a social good it wants to promote in order to benefit its employees, the
policy is implemented in a way that indirectly reinforces the standard of professionalism
and a way of life that promotes the organization’s interests, not the interests of the
collection of members. If I work for an organization like this, such policies do not
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directly work against my interests; the organization abides by the ideal of respectful
influence discussed by List and Pettit. It is clear that this kind of respectful influence is
not supportive of my way of life. It demonstrates to me that if I want the organization to
accommodate my interests, I have to constrain my interests and goals.
When economic organizations act in this way, two effects obtain. First, the
likelihood increases that the disenfranchised individuals will not buy in to the
organization’s goals; this could threaten group agency. Second, such action can
undermine claims of moral reasoning at the level of the group. If, as List and Pettit claim,
the way to encourage moral reasoning at the level of the group depends upon group
members using the same reasoning capacities they employ in their general lives outside
of the organization, then the organization should be aware of how the member
disenfranchisement that results from certain kinds of incentive structures will threaten
this group reasoning capacity by virtue of the fact that it may conflict with the group
member’s personal practical identities. When the group disenfranchises the group
members, and it justifies its actions via strategic rationality (i.e., claiming that it is a good
business policy), it supplies inductive evidence to those group members and others
outside the organization that the group agent is not a moral reasoner. If economic agents
and other organizations want to develop inclusive practices that encourage respect and
foster buy-in that promotes moral group agency, then the priorities of the organization
reflected in systems of reward and organizational decision should reflect a moral respect
for members. One way for organizations to do so is to promote the interests of the
members by constraining the incentives of the group to fit with the aims of group
members.
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This means, however, that organizations must first evaluate how their aims
constrain the interests of their members. Thus, if we recognize a problem with the ways
in which economic agents fail to recognize and morally respect members, then HRM
needs to evaluate this problem. Focusing and getting clear on our goal of pluralistic
support would help us narrowly tailor our models, practices, and initiatives in measuring
successful outcomes as compared to this ideal. Only after carefully setting up goals in
light of particular gaps in member buy-in can we get a handle on what the problems
might be, and only then can we start to reflect on how individual managers, employees,
or organization policies are adding to or unable to solve the problem. However, this
means that the tools we currently use as the models for respectful organizational
arrangements could be re-envisioned to fit within the context of a framework promoting
group agents who are also moral agents. In other words, the process of reshaping ideals
that structure group training, education, and practices must begin with developing
methods of incentivizing member buy-in that are morally respectful in both direct and
indirect ways. Economic agents should, at least occasionally, constrain or modify their
interests out of respect for their members.
4.4 Group Agents and Group Rights: Revisiting Citizens United
One consequence of my arguments thus far is that group agents are always
responsible for their actions. Furthermore, even when we do not have a way to determine
the kind of reasoner a group is, we can look to its actions within the wider institutional
framework and attribute responsibility to the group for actions not reducible to individual
group members. This is to say that if group responsibility is to be mitigated by the
relative degree of power and choice the group had within the broader system of
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constraint, then those groups with more power and influence would be more culpable for
certain actions than others. This means that their scope of accountability should be
indexed to their capacities and scope of influence. Additionally, I have argued that
economic group agents with the capacity to reason morally are candidates for moral
agency. That is to say that our systems of constraint can consider these group agents to be
the appropriate targets of moral responsibility. However, even as group agents may be
able to engage in moral reasoning and be morally responsible, the difficulty still exists of
discerning when economic group agents are functioning as moral agents.
I have argued that we should expect virtuous economic moral agents to promote a
certain kind of organizational life, one that prioritizes its organizational policies,
incentives for buy-in, and systems of reward in a manner that reflects moral respect for
group members. However, I have been careful to point out that there is no reason to think
that even though virtuous economic group agents are possible, there is little reason to
think that one exists in reality. Moreover, if the history of collective actions has taught us
anything, it is that groups, particularly those that are able to function as agents, are
extremely powerful and should always be subject to strict transparency regulations and
oversight by other social institutions.
One may wonder: if such an entity existed and exhibited moral agency, does this
entail that the group agent, by virtue of its moral status, is entitled to rights? We can cast
this concern in a slightly different light: in a close possible world, if there were a metric
for moral group agency that could be used to determine when groups had the necessary
agential capacities for moral agency, would they be a candidate for bearing rights, and if
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so what kind of rights would they accrue? We might also ask what this means for group
political speech. I will respond to these questions in reverse order.
To be clear, I am not opposed to groups, regardless of their status as moral agents,
having political speech rights. In the case of Citizens, one arm of my general critique was
that the Court did not present a clear picture of corporate function. In fact, the
representation of firm function that grounded their decision—a model of corporate
democracy—is clearly in tension with the representation of firm function presented in
corporate law. I could imagine that if the Court ruled that economic associations had a
right to political speech as a group, something akin to the expert speech, then I would not
necessarily have a problem with granting group agents speech rights. However,
transparency would need to be upheld, even in instances of political expenditures to
501(c)(4) organizations. Consequently, I would not think that the status of moral agent, or
any kind of agent, would change my position on what kind of groups or individuals
should be granted political speech. Rather, the justification for granting groups expert
status and giving them speech rights has to do with determining the most efficient manner
by which to encourage free exchange in the marketplace of ideas.
The more general question about the status of moral group agents as rights bearers
is the more interesting one. I have presented a taxonomy of organization structures that
allows for the possibility that groups can function as agents, as well as an account of what
kind of moral agent a group agent may be. However, I have also recognized clear
limitations on the range of moral agency we might expect from group agents. Group
agents can come to see themselves as instruments of change in the world and reason
about the ends they take up without focusing solely on the most efficient means toward
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those ends. Yet, the scale and scope of change and influence these groups can undertake
far surpasses that of individual human beings. Moreover, the change that group agents
may want to make will not always align with our interests. More to the point, it is
specifically in light of my arguments that economic group agents are limited in the ways
they can respond to other moral agents—individual human beings in particular—
combined with my prior point about the power these kinds of collectives are able to wield
that gives us good reason to constrain their rights. Taking into account these limitations
and the arguments that I have made about the causal power such collectives have to
transform people, we see that if moral economic group agents were given rights, even if
such organizations existed in reality they would not be equal to the rights enjoyed by
individual natural persons.114
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To answer this question fully would require an analysis of the scale of moral agency and the grounding
of rights as indexed to different moral capacities.
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Conclusion: Moral Economic Group Agents?
The preceding project has attempted to draw together two otherwise disparate
areas of inquiry regarding representations of collective action, economic associations, and
group agency. By bringing into conversation group agency theory and mainstream
representations of firm function in business theory (i.e., corporate law, neoclassical
economics, and HRM), I hope to have convinced you of at least the following:
-The explanations of collective action in these two seemingly unrelated fields
have similar ways of inadequately accounting for the phenomena of group agency
in economic associations. Moreover, the two fields have more in common than
either might have assumed, and both have something to offer the other.
-By focusing on how the representations of business firms in the mainstream
economic and business theory literature dynamically inform and perpetuate a
standard of firm behavior that promotes strategic rationality, both fields can come
to understand how each needs to improve to account for group agency within
economic associations. Overcoming disciplinary boundaries can open up the
possibility of creating strategies to subvert this seemingly inevitable mode of
decision making.
-By focusing on how group agency arises within situated contexts, and within
particular kinds of organization structures, we can begin to engage in practical
conversation about how to understand group agency as it arises from certain kinds
of decision-making processes. Furthermore, we can describe the scale of potential
capacities for economic group agents, from the minimal agent capable of strategic
rationality to the virtuous group agent that exhibits moral reasoning within group
decisions.
In order to move from the second point to the last point, I have provided an account of
how the mainstream perceptions of firm agency shape our expectations of firm behavior.
As I argued in Chapter 1, the representations of firm function directly inform how the
Supreme Court made sense of individuals’ right to political speech in association with
other people. Once we step back from these abstract representations and analyze how
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information flows through the economic association, we can begin to see how group
agency arises and what the limits of an economic group’s reasoning capacities will be by
virtue of how the firm internalizes our expectations. While these processes are causally
constitutive of group agency, it is better not to think of the internal decision-making
processes as the primary variable of group agency, but rather as always working in
tandem with external structural variables and systems of constraint in the creation and
sustenance of group agency. Moreover, any account of the possibilities and limits of
economic group agents must, I argue, take into account the socio-historical frameworks
that are an essential part of how agents as such are identified by others. How we come to
understand groups as agents, then, will inform not only how we think of their capacities
and possibilities for action, but also how what will be necessary to enhance member buyin to produce different kinds of group agents.
Overall, I think my project furthers the aim of List and Pettit to lay the
foundations for a revised picture of the loci of agency in our complex social world. By
incorporating different structural constraints upon economic group agents, and how those
constraints play out in HRM theory and organizational practices, my account of representing the possibilities and limitations of firm function comes closer to understanding
one kind of corporate agent. Certainly, broader questions can be asked about the
difficulties of altering dynamic systems and the limitations of a group agent’s claim to
rights. Taking seriously the possibility of group agents, understanding the dynamic
mechanisms that produce group agency, and understanding our possibilities as parts of
these agents, I suggest, is the key to building strategies to navigate some of the most
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complex problems in defining and delimiting the actions of the individual and the
collective.
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Epilogue: Corporate Social Responsibility
[T]he increasing interdependence of national economies in a globalizing world and the
emergence of rule-based regimes for international economic relations have meant that
the space for national economic policy, that is, the scope for domestic policies, especially
in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development, is now often framed by
international disciplines, commitments and global market considerations. –U.N. World
Summit Outcomes, 2005
Introduction
Group agents, one kind of organized collective, are unique in that they have the
potential to develop the capacity of practical reasoning. This capacity demonstrates that
group agents can be stable and respond to reason in a manner that we would not expect
from other kinds of collectives. Their organizational structure enables them to function
rationally and act toward ends they choose to promote. With the capacity to act as
intentional agents comes greater responsibility for the consequences of their actions.
However, group agents, like individual persons, do not develop in a vacuum. Their
reasoning capacities are influenced and constrained by external environmental variables
and values.
Presently, economic agents act in a system that rewards and judges according to
the standards of strategic rationality. Promoting the development of economic agents that
are also moral agents necessitates changing the scale of organizational life to valorize
moral reasoning as the standard against which group agency is judged. Developing
economic agents that can engage in moral reasoning would entail firms change their buyin structure to produce and sustain moral group agency. As organizations come to see
themselves as instruments of change—as agents in more than a strategic sense—they will
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want recognition of this capacity. As such, economic group agents will need to
demonstrate this capacity by prioritizing an organizational life that is indicative of
organizational justice. As economic agents situate themselves as one part of a model of
organizational justice, the next step would be an account of how these group agents can
responsibly use the transformative power within the broader nexus of social institutions.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a field of study seeks to find a place for
calculating the effects of business decisions on a variety of stakeholders (e.g., employees,
local communities, vendors, governments, politicians) and taking these effects into
consideration throughout the decision-making process. By taking into account how
business decisions and actions effect change at different points throughout society,
businesses are also coming to understand how they can effect change in other social
institutions. As North points out, altering the institutional framework is one way in which
social institutions minimize uncertainties (2005, pp. 17-19). Although some business
strategies explicitly aim at altering institutional frameworks, most do not track what that
means for the affected persons and social institutions, except inasmuch as such changes
will affect business. What the CSR discussion has left out is how businesses, as social
institutions, have the freedom to change the systems of constraint. Recognizing the
corporation’s interdependence with other social institutions, corporate social
responsibility entails political actions. As such, practices in the name of corporate social
responsibility are political practices.
In this brief epilogue, I will discuss one consequence of the arguments I have
made throughout this project and how I think the direction of CSR should continue to
push the boundaries of businesses’ conceptions of themselves. The first two waves of
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CSR sought, through different means, to endorse a positive account of how business
actions affect the broader environment, how businesses can account for such impacts, and
the responsibilities that such recognition implies. Until now, the CSR literature has
focused its arguments and tools of persuasion on making the “business case” for
sustainability. I would like to argue that sustainability is not only a corporate strategy, but
also a political ideal. As organizations grow in size and adaptive capacities, they develop
abilities to effect change in practices inside and outside the organization. Just as we are
unlikely to hit a target we cannot see, paying attention to the values of fairness, equality,
and justice as only business strategies will limit our success at tracking changes in the
world toward the broader aim of sustainability practices.
Waves of Corporate Social Responsibility
The study of corporate social responsibility is now in its second wave. The initial
wave of CSR theories began in the early 1970s. During this time, large corporate
conglomerates were just beginning to flex their political muscles, and at the same time
the United States was undergoing cascades of political change. In the wake of the
Vietnam War, the OPEC oil crisis, and the separation of the Federal Reserve from the
Executive branch, there was an increased call to pay attention to our interrelation with
natural and social environments. One of the first proponents of this reevaluation of the
role of the corporation in our lives and the responsibilities the corporation has toward
constituents outside of its stockholders, and of the traditionalist models built from market
values, was Neil Jacoby.
In Corporate Power and Social Responsibility, Jacoby begins his analysis of the
corporation by counting it as one of the contemporary social institutions to be included in
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the ranks of governments, unions, and the education system (1973, pp. 3-4). When taking
up the question of how we ought to measure the success of corporations, Jacoby contends
that social institutions ought to seek to serve the consensus of the democratic majority.
He states, “the performance of corporate business [should] be judged by the degree to
which it has fostered progress toward the consensual goals of the American people. The
proper measure of success as a social institution is its actual contribution to the Good
Society, as most Americans envision it, compared with its potential contribution”
(Jacoby, pp. 15-16). What is novel about Jacoby’s claim is that it evaluates the
corporation not only against the standards set by society in general, but also against
evaluating corporate business in its relations with other social institutions. In doing so,
Jacoby calls for a reform of the prior standards of measure, which evaluated corporate
success in isolation not only from other institutions, but also from other sets of values,
such as the values of the external society. Jacoby goes further than merely criticizing the
traditionalist’s models; he suggests a new model to be used for evaluating and measuring
the success of the corporation.
Jacoby proposes to replace the managerial model of measurement with what he
calls the social environmental model (SEM). One of the primary forces behind Jacoby’s
development of the SEM is that the managerial model does not take into account the full
societal environment and context in which corporate behavior is performed. He finds that
one of the major limitations of the managerial model is that “a company’s social
involvement is limited only by the humanitarian propensities of its management”
(Jacoby, p. 194). In constructing his version of SEM, Jacoby does not seek to radically
overthrow the managerial model but rather to “reconcile the principle of self-interest with
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corporate concern for social responsibility” (p. 196). The result of this hybrid principle,
then, still involves the cost/benefit analysis to justify the implementation or support of
socially responsible business practices. At the time of its inception, it was a quite radical
reconceptualization of the corporation. In calling for the measure of success of corporate
businesses to include the way in which the corporation is situated in regard to its external
environment, political contexts, and external societal values—which in turn shape the
decisions of the corporation—the SEM was the catalyst that began the CSR movement.
In this way, SEM was the precursor to the stakeholder theory movement.
The move to stakeholder theory, popularized in the last decade, represents the
second wave of the CSR literature. Stakeholder theories, as discussed in Chapter 2,
advocate for the creation of a more complex cost/benefit analysis with which to consider
the impact of corporate decisions on people, the planet, and profit. This “triple-bottom
line” approach to decisions is quite similar to Jacoby’s SEM account, but considers the
justification for sustainable business solutions to be self-evident. For example, in Marc
Epstein’s Making Sustainability Work, he states, “the issue of whether companies should
consider their social responsibility or the impact of their activities on their stakeholders is
no longer up for discussion . . . these issues have become a central part of the creation of
shareholder value and the management of both global and local enterprises” (Epstein,
2008, p. 19).
Epstein’s argument and presentation of strategies for creating sustainable
enterprises is focused on reducing uncertainty and hedging the firm from different kinds
of risk (e.g., social, political, economic). Epstein states, “Corporations have become
sensitive to social issues and stakeholder concerns . . . the result is that managers must
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make significant changes to more effectively manage their social, economic, and
environmental impacts” (p. 23). However, these impacts that corporations make are not
limited to shareholder value and business efficiency. If we are to robustly recognize the
effects that corporations have outside of business enterprises, then CSR theory and
practice should also seek to develop the means by which we can recognize, measure, and
direct practices of sustainability as a political ideal.
CSR as a Political Ideal: The Third Wave?
As business managers and organization members place more emphasis on
measuring the effects of corporate practices on stakeholders external to the corporation, it
will become increasingly difficult to refuse acknowledgment of the corporation as a
social institution. Although Jacoby advocated conceiving of the corporation as a social
institution, I do not think his methodology recognized that sustainability functions as both
a business ideal as well as a political ideal. Charting the ways in which corporations
engage with other social institutions demands more than Jacoby was aiming for. As such,
a turn to political philosophy may help smooth the transition from corporate social
responsibility to broader sustainability practices.
I suggest an expansion of Jacoby’s definition of social institution to come into
direct conversation with political theory, by revising how we conceive of the function of
social institutions in the pursuit of just social arrangements (i.e., changing our ideals), and
then situating the ideal in the kinds of institutions we have (i.e., instantiating policies and
institutional actions that bring us closer to the ideal). In the first instance, I would like to
stress that social institutions are part of the processes of socialization that structure how
we make sense of our rights and duties and how we set up our life goals. In other words,

178

it is not enough to recognize that business firms have a heavy hand in determining how
well or poorly the lives of those inside and outside of the organization go. Rather, we
should also acknowledge how such social institutions have operated toward this end so
that we might open up the possibilities of different institutional arrangements that more
closely mirror the ideals of reciprocal power relations between moral agents.
To fill out the account of how to develop just sustainable practices, we have to
begin by acknowledging that the conditions of constraint that govern our business
practices are historically contingent. Business strategies have traditionally been seen as
occupying a space between the public and private spheres. By identifying the points of
power asymmetries in corporate structures, and undoing their histories, we will also open
possibilities for the kinds of social arrangements that enable ethical relations between
persons. That is to say, by showing how the history of corporate power has consistently
been apt to description in political terms, we can start to uncover the normative enterprise
of this institution. Furthermore, we can begin to bring into question the practices that
function as power in the broader social context.
By acknowledging the power of corporations as one part of the broader nexus of
power relations, sustainability practices can be re-envisioned as guiding principles for
business practices and policies to direct other social institutions toward positive social
goals, such as human well-being, flourishing, and a pluralistic democratic society. The
first step in the reinvisioning of sustainability practices as political ideals is to specify
sustainable practices. From there, we can more clearly see how sustainability practices
are political in nature and how such practices might best be employed toward the goals of
social justice. Finally, in drawing the connections between corporate sustainability
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practices and social justice, we would have to connect these political ideals to suggested
practices focused on building sustainable communities. In what follows, I will outline
how Joan Tronto’s conversation on “Care and Political Theory” (1993, pp. 157-80) might
serve as an example for building models of political practice from newly reconceived
political ideals.
Corporate Sustainable Practices as Political Ideals
CSR aims to minimize corporate risk by reducing the conflict between business
interests and the interests of other stakeholders. Although the goals of corporate
sustainability initiatives vary with industry and firm size, the basic principles focus on
minimizing harm to people (both within and external to the firm), benefiting local and
global environments, and acting in the best interest of long-term profit (e.g., forming
action plans with forecasts of 25-50-100 year projections). Several basic assumptions
underlie these practices and aims. First, corporate sustainability practices rely on
assumptions about the interconnections between business firms, different populations of
people, other social institutions, and the natural environment. Second, sustainability
practices challenge the traditional assumption that profitability is the measure of
maximizing output. Rather, CSR advocates for the consideration of the needs and
interests of others on par with concerns about profitability. Finally, CSR’s focus on the
effects of business decisions and their impact on others foregrounds a method to identify
how businesses can act in a morally engaged manner. This is to say, firms are forced into
a critical reevaluation of the position of detachment that is often the result of modeling
courses of action toward the outcome of profitability as the primary objective.
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Corporate sustainability models and the practices they promote are particularly
well situated to illuminate the boundaries drawn between business practices and their
social effects. Moreover, corporate sustainability practices are designed to promote social
equality, fairness, and justice in a way that is particularized to a given history of power
relations. By illuminating these boundaries, CSR is poised to engage these boundaries
critically, showing how they obscure the interdependency of human beings, and how
sustainability practices could stimulate pluralistic politics in democratic states by
extending a platform to historically marginalized populations. The political ideals
underlying these basic assumptions are quite similar to those that Tronto identifies as the
political ideals of care. As such, looking to the ways in which Tronto connects the
political ideals of care to political strategy might be a fruitful starting point for
developing sustainability practices as political ideals.
Political Ideals and Practice
In her book, Moral Boundaries (1993), Tronto outlines the moral boundaries that
have constrained the ethics of care to the private sphere. This privatization of care is
maintained through the reinforcement of political dynamics of care relations that describe
the tendency of women and other minorities to perform care work in ways that benefit the
social elite. In her chapter on “Care and Political Theory” Tronto explains how
understanding care as a political ideal will result in changing the status of care (i.e., will
result in a shift in values) and the status of those who do the work of caring in our culture
(i.e., will result in a shift of moral boundaries). By using care as a political tool, we will
be able to reveal unequal power relations and the inequalities that result from the ways in
which social institutions perpetuate these power relations. From this care analysis, we
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will be able to begin to bring care into the political discourse by giving a voice to
historically disenfranchised groups. Tronto argues that through encouraging a pluralism
of perspectives and voices in political debates and policy decisions, care can act as the
basis for political change (pp. 175-79).
In a similar manner, I suggest that my work in this project, specifically in
Chapters 3 and 4, would act as the foundation for claiming that we ought to push business
firms to engage in sustainable practices in a way that stresses the importance of care as
the basis of sustainability as a political ideal. By tracing the historical forces that have
shaped the way businesses have been trained to not notice the political influences they
have, and identifying who benefits from the political models businesses promote, we will
be in a position to determine which models of business function treat corporate social
responsibility in this traditionally privileged manner. Business practices that valorize
models of corporate action as only the maximization of output, I would argue, promote
irresponsible behavior. This irresponsibility could be elucidated by comparing it to the
phenomena described by Tronto as “privileged irresponsibility” (pp. 120-22).
My hope in pushing this line of argument is twofold. First, I hope to further the
practice in which firms perceive themselves as sources of positive social change (i.e.,
resulting in a shift in the values of sustainability practices) and develop models of
advocating sustainable practices responsibly. Second, I hope to show that this positive
social change is one more way by which corporations should directly acknowledge the
moral worth of persons, and work toward more equitable institutional arrangements (i.e.,
resulting in a shift of the moral boundaries of CSR). Responsible sustainability would be
modeled and measured against how well or poorly business firms promote justice and
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care broadly understood. Sustainability so conceived would aim to demonstrate the
central role of the corporation in our lives and how this social institution can be more
adequately built into a model of collective, pluralistic flourishing.
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